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China’s engagement in mainly coastal, resource-rich African countries features tremendous 
trade volumes, increasing FDI flows and massive infrastructure projects. As the PRC’s 
Ministry of Commerce and China EXIM coordinate capital flows, money supply and the 
respective projects that are bargained with the beneficiary African government, they, to 
some extent, created a fiscal-monetary political subsystem on African ground. Pro-active 
fiscal and monetary policy is needed to actively respond to the economy’s needs in favor of 
domestic consumption that spurs diversification and sustainable economic growth. Based 
on the theoretical findings of Neoliberalism, Monetarism and New Classical Economics, 
IMF and World Bank instructed developing economies to implement structural adjustment 
programs that led to fiscal and monetary policy constraints. China’s tremendous state-led 
economic growth empirically refutes the Western Neoliberal paradigm of passive fiscal and 
monetary policy. Rent seeking phenomena reappear, which indicate the reincarnation of the 
Elsenhansian state class. Fiscal and monetary policy should use these rents to spur domestic 
consumption that initiates diversification and sustainable economic growth, based on the 
Keynesian multipliers. Own national fiscal and monetary strategies are needed. 
 
VR Chinas Afrika-Engagement, von dem hauptsächlich ressourcenreiche Küstenländer 
betroffen sind, wartet mit stark anwachsenden Handelsvolumina, erhöhten Investitionen 
und beeindruckenden Infrastrukturprojekten auf. Das Chinesische Handelsministerium und 
China EXIM koordinieren Kapital und bestimmen über Abläufe derbeschlossenen Projekte. 
Auf diese Weise entwickelt China sein eigenes fiskal- und geldpolitisches Subsystem 
innerhalb afrikanischer Staaten. Gerade ein solches ist auf nationaler Ebene vonnöten, um 
in den Afrikanischen Partnerländern der Volksrepublik nachhaltiges Wirtschaftswachstum 
voranzutreiben. Geleitet von Paradigmen, die sich der Ideenwelten des Neoliberalismus, 
Monetarismus und der NCE bedienten, implementierten Weltbank und Internationaler 
Währungsfond über die letzten Dekaden hinweg in Entwicklungsländern 
Strukturanpassungsprogramme, die genau diese nationale wirtschaftspolitische 
Rahmensetzung verminderten. Chinas überaus beeindruckendes, durch den Staat 
koordiniertes Wirtschaftswachstum untergräbt nun die Westliche Vorstellung einer 
zurückhaltenden Fiskal- und Geldpolitik. Das, als überwunden erachtete Phänomen des 
Rent-Seeking nimmt mit Chinas Präsenz in Afrika wieder zu, was als Reinkarnation der 
Elsenhansschen Staatsklassen gedeutet werden muss. Eben diese sollten sich jene Renten 
zunutze machen, um per Binnenkonsum einen Diversifizierungsprozess einzuleiten, welcher 
auf Grundlage diverser, durch Keynes identifizierter, Multiplikatoren zu nachhaltigem 
Wirtschaftswachstum führt. Eine pro-aktive Fiskal- und Geldpolitik, basierend auf einer 
nationalen Wirtschaftsstrategie eigenen sich dazu am besten. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 seemed to have required massive state interventionism 
in an inevitable manner. The world’s governments carried out bailout programs that 
involved government spending with values of some three-digit billion US dollars. Just a few 
of these countries citizens ask for theoretical and empirical justification. In Africa, there is 
also a crisis. This crisis is called poverty. Bankers, corporations and statesmen often forget 
this crisis, as it seems to have little impact on their profits and aspirations to be reelected. 
Besides its human tragedy, the state of poverty is the worst economic crisis in economic 
history. 
This master thesis addresses the issue of poverty reduction in its simplest and, at the same 
time, most extensive way. Moreover, it provides approaches how African ministries of 
finance and central banks can reduce poverty and, simultaneously, assure sustainable 
economic growth at the case study of PR China’s post-reform development and how it 
shapes foreign governments in fiscal and monetary facets. Their tools are allocated by fiscal 
and monetary policy. Therefore, section 2 raises the very important question of why these 
relatively fameless subjects matter for developing economies and how the current global 
financial regime constraints fiscal and monetary policies’ operational range. Even this 
regime’s evolvement in historical perspective is also described, as it shaped the developing 
world via World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs. Simultaneously, it is argued 
that these programs affected Africa most in comparison to other regions. 
Chapter 3 frames fiscal policy as this paper’s key instrument to tackle poverty. Theories on 
fiscal policy are complex but necessary to grasp in order to understand its power and 
significance. Its impact on outcomes like the trade balance, GDP growth and employment 
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are adduced in the same section.Monetary policy as this study’s second important prosperity 
initiating factor is analyzed in chapter 4 which describes its theoretical development, 
provides efficient measures, and opposes the Bretton Woods institutions assumptions and 
policies. Chapter 5 postulates that a pro-poor development policy always requires country-
specific strategies and an active fiscal and monetary engagement. 
In the sixth section PR China serves as a role model for fiscal and monetary policy that 
exactly applied the latter’s economy-regulating features. Such state-led national growth 
strategies contributing to China’s matchless poverty alleviation success and sustainable 
economic growth were initiated by deep real economy reforms and accompanied by 
financial system reforms. Momentous state regulation increases rent seeking potentials and, 
indeed, in China as well as African economies such activities play an important role. 
Therefore, the seventh section deals with the rent-derived phenomenon of the Elsenhansian 
state class. The same chapter depicts this paper’s favorite developing strategy, based on 
mass demand and diversification. 
How China shapes African trade, investment patterns and pro-poor aspects like 
infrastructure is discussed in this thesis’ 8th section on “Pro-Development Sino-African 
Cooperation”. As China’s undertakings in Africa are derived from domestic developments 
and rely heavily on the PRC’s strong financial institutions, namely China Export-Import 
Bank, China Development Bank and China-Africa Development Fund, the 9th section 
discovers their importance for the ongoing Sino-African cooperation and presents 
prospects of this trinity’s future development. 
The last chapter highlights the fiscal and monetary political indicators of this partnership’s 
outcomes, while the conclusion summarizes this thesis’ main findings. If those findings will 
be recognized by African leaders, this master thesis was no waste of time and paper. 
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2. FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY - A MATTER FOR DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES 
2.1 Why raising the Issue of Fiscal and Monetary Policy? 
In times of crises, as experienced by the Global Financial Crisis 2008 initiated by real estate 
mismanagement in the USA and leading to a financial breakdown that swarmed the global 
economy, market actors turned towards their respective governments and asked for support 
or at least adequate management. Most of the governments, especially the US 
administration – the perceived spearhead of Neoliberalism - decided about a bail-out 
program of about $700 billion to help banks and apparently Detroit’s Big Three.  
If, in these circumstances, one imagines a scenario that global institutions ban this world’s 
Obamas, Browns, Merkels and Sarkozys to take action through fiscal and monetary policy 
measures, everyone would concordantly agree, that an idle fiscal and monetary policy will 
worsen the crisis. Taken this in mind, one can imagine what happens, if this decreed 
standstill is experienced over decades, while the crisis permanently accompanies this 
economy. In facing the reality observing the imposing relationship between the sister-
institutions IMF and the World Bank with the developing world, one has to conclude that 
fiscal and monetary policy has been and is still restricted in the above described manner, 
except for the fact that starving people instead of prime rates are the crisis’ implications. 
The following chapter analyzes fiscal policy’s possible impact on poverty, development, 
growth and macroeconomic stability. The serialization of these objectives is a highly 
political issue. In order to conceive the complex of fiscal policy, the very objectives and 
measures as well as the behavior of governments in historical perspective needs to be kept 
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in mind. Within global competition, observers upheave the criterion of the trade balance as 
macroeconomic stability’s indicator. How fiscal policy can influence an economy towards 
the latter’s alteration is fathomed here. 
Evolving ideologies distinguished by Smith’s, Keynes’ and Friedman’s trains of thoughts 
determined the role of fiscal and monetary policy. As the economic ideology of 
Neoliberalism became predominant in the International Financial Institutions, its outcomes 
shaped the developing world with their agenda of putting macroeconomic stability first. The 
latter’s (ir-)relevance for poverty reduction and sustainable economic development is 
disputed among scholars, whereby the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference 
in 1944 institutionalized the overall objective of macroeconomic stability into the so called 
Bretton Woods institutions. Originally founded as financially stabilizing and balancing set 
screws in the global economy, four decades later, the IMF and World Bank implemented 
strategies of structural adjustment as Neoliberal requirement for flourishing trade in the 
1980s. In a global perspective, the Bretton Woods institution’s conditional lending practices, 
based on fiscal and monetary policy restricting structural adjustment and financial 
programming orthodoxies, reveal their concept of implicit limitedness of policy actions and 
prospective developments. 
Fiscal and monetary policy is a matter for the achievement of economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Limiting fiscal and monetary policy space means restricting development. The 
following section explains why this can be proclaimed free of polemics. 
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policy can be below followed in figure I which 
illustrates that both policies, embodied by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, 
should work hand-in-hand to achieve economic stability and sustainable economic growth. 
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Figure I: Fiscal and Monetary Policy's Interplay, Actors and Measures 
 
Nevertheless, in order to achieve the overall goal of poverty reduction, fiscal policy provides 
direct contributive measures to tackle the problem of poverty indicating too low incomes 
while monetary policy is foreseen to succeed in its supportive role. 
2.2 Evolvement of the Global Neoliberal Trinity Regime 
2.2.1 Bretton Woods and the Initial Need for Peace and Stabilization 
According to Peet (2003), the classical liberal John Stuart Mills postulated that trade 
prevents war. Based on his idea and amidst WW II, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed in 1941 
on the Atlantic Charter that suggested “close cooperation and equitable arrangements in 
international economic affairs” (Low 1995: 38) as vision for the post-war world.  
In the summer of 1944 the conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire ultimately 
manifested the great leap towards international trade and international financial stability 
based on “commonly shared” regulations. In fact, the Bretton Woods agreements have 
been bargained between the rising economy, as well as military superpower, USA and the 
Fiscal Policy 
 
Actor:       Ministry of Finance 
Measures: 
 Taxation 
 Expenditures 
 
Monetary Policy 
 
Actor:           Central Bank 
Measures: 
 Money supply regulation 
 Control of interest rates 
 
 Fairer Distribution 
of Wealth 
 Macroeconomic Stability 
 Sustainable Economic Growth 
DAVID ENGELHARDT   -   MASTER THESIS AT UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA, NOVEMBER 2009 
6 
 
declining hegemonic power Great Britain, embodied by the chief negotiators Harry Dexter 
White and John Maynard Keynes. The former, representing the US Treasury Department, 
chaired Commission I that was concerned with the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund, while the latter, as UK’s finance minister, headed Commission II on the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  
Most of the 27 delegates from developing countries as well as the residual 15 delegates from 
developed countries lacked sufficient expertise to understand what has been negotiated. 
Moreover, the majority of war-suffering economies has been highly dependent on the 
United States as prospective creditor, providing loans for post-war reconstruction. Hence, 
Peet (2003) polemically interprets the whole bargaining process as formalizing dominance.  
As Girling (1985) points out, the major outcome of this summit was the establishment of 
the IMF, assuring short-term assistance in order to balance respective countries’ payment 
deficits, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which became known 
as the World Bank, and the attempt to found an International Trade Organization. 
2.2.2 Rise of a Global Development “Constraining” Agency  
Initially, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was founded to assist 
the rebuilding of post-war Europe and to “guarantee loans made by private banks for 
projects in poorer, developing countries” (Danaher 1994: 6). The statutes of the IBRD 
came into force on 27th December 1945 after they had been ratified by the prospective 
member states during this year. George and Sabelli (1995) note the bank’s first official 
meeting was summoned for 8th March 1946 in Savannah, Georgia. 
Although the Bank has been established in order to provide money for reconstruction, the 
Marschall Plan, officially European Recovery Plan (ERP), accomplished the lion’s share of 
loans of about $41.3 billion by 1953. Danaher (1994) compares this huge amount with the 
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clearly less contribution of US$497 million by the IBRD to support war damaged Europe. 
In practice, the Bank’s ultimate field of work, namely reconstruction, has not been an issue, 
as it has merely applied in three cases. The Bank concentrated on loans for development 
projects, but according to the World Bank Annual Report, 1947-48 cited in Danaher (1994: 
6) “the number of sound productive investment opportunities thus far presented to the 
Bank is substantially smaller than was originally expected”. In the IBRD’s view, there was 
enough money for loans, but the Bank itself blamed the borrowers for insufficient expertise 
in project planning. As a result, the World Bank started to assist the recipients in 
“appropriate” project preparation in the 1970s. In the first four World Bank presidents’ 
administrations until 1968 (Eugene Mayer, John McCloy, Eugene Black and George Woods 
– all of them bankers or businessmen), the Bank provided a relatively small loan-volume of 
US$10.7 billion. Investments in infrastructure dominated the loans-policy by the Bank, 
legitimized by the economist’s perspective that these measures would initiate economic 
growth. Poverty was not on top of the IBRD’s agenda for the first two decades. Girling 
(1985: 66) argues that in the early 1960s the Bank’s loans-policy was distributed by 76.8 
percent to electric power and transportation, 6 percent to agricultural development and 1 
percent to social programs. 
But as the Bank’s fifth president Robert Strange McNamara started his work in April 1968, 
a turning point was recognizable. George and Sabelli (1995) state that he declared the 
IBRC’s overall task of reducing poverty in 1973. Hence, referring to Danaher (1994), 
McNamara introduced “huge agricultural colonization and land-clearing schemes on poor 
soils in tropical forests in Latin America and Asia” (Danaher 1994: 10) during the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, these strategies dramatically failed, while he simultaneously bureaucratized the 
Bank.  
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2.2.3 SAPs and Castigation of Developing Countries 
Within the Bank, participation weighting is related to the proportion of the countries’ 
economic power manifested in a capillary elaborated contribution quota setting. Therefore, 
the United States, Great Britain, Japan, West Germany and France pre-dominated the 
World Bank as major donors over decades. They altogether got 40 percent of the votes and 
the opportunity to veto acclamations on membership. All of those countries, especially the 
World Bank dominator USA, are export oriented and demand a huge share of the world’s 
resources. To feed their economic growth, they had to expand their markets and secure the 
inflow of raw materials. Obstacles like import barriers constrained such free trade and asset 
expansion ambitions. The strong belief in Neoliberal ideology is best exemplified by 
Reagan’s speech in front of the annual meeting of the World Bank Board of governors in 
1983, quoted by Gwin (1997: 231): “Millions of making their own decisions in the 
marketplace will always allocate resources better than any centralized government planning 
process”. As Peet points out, “[s]tructural adjustment became the main means of carrying 
these political beliefs into economic practice” (Peet 2003: 123). Those measures, consistent 
with the IMF, have limited governments’ fiscal and monetary policy space tremendously, 
disguised by stabilization efforts. Indeed, the increased developing countries’ indebtedness 
exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis and the unilateral U.S. decision to abolish the Gold 
Exchange Standard seems to have legitimized drastic measures in order to back the crashed 
world economy. 
When the former Bank of America president A. W. Clauson changed the Bank’s course 
from project lending which characterized the McNamara-era towards policy interventionism 
since his assumption of office in 1981, he implemented the full range of Neoliberal policies 
of deregulation. This fomented criticism, arguing that “poverty took a back seat to the new 
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driving forces of macro-economic policy, stabilization and balance of payments 
adjustments, all understood within a more right-wing doctrine of the strict limits of 
governmental intervention and the virtues of flexible, self-adjusting free markets” (Peet 
2003: 122). 
Actually, the Reagon-Thatcher-Kohl administrations in the 1980s used the Bank not solely 
as a promoter of economic interests but also for political purposes, namely confining the 
“communist threat”. Scilicet, the plan-economical aspect of socialism was an appealing 
development model to newly independent countries in the 1960s and 70s seeking national 
development paths after years of foreign oppression. Intellectually backed by the centre-
periphery conception of the Dependency Theory which blamed the structural injustice in 
the global economy for the underperformance of developing countries, the danger of asset-
expansion-aspiration limiting protectionism had become reality to Western political leaders. 
In the late 1970s, African countries faced huge amounts of debt due to the oil crisis. Hence, 
“attempts to redress SSA's [Sub-Saharan Africa’s] privative economic setbacks have 
centered on adjustment instruments implemented by the major international lending 
agencies under the aegis of broad programs like the World Bank's Special Facility for Africa 
and the IMF's Special Adjustment Facility” (Logan and Mengisteab 1993: 4).  
As Cornia (1987) and Okogu (1989) put it, structural adjustment aims at the reduction of 
imbalances in external accounts. Furthermore, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are 
divided into three categories: expenditure reducing, expenditure switching and stabilization 
programs. Expenditure reducing policies serve the enhancement of a country’s trade 
balance by strengthening domestic demand for local goods in order to decrease import 
volumes. Expenditure switching policies tackle factor inputs in order to favor the tradable 
goods sector. Stabilization programs, on the contrary, are more short-term measures during 
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at most two years targeting the country’s output, rate of inflation and balance of payments 
(compare to Logan and Mengisteab 1993). Figure II underlines the monotonically increasing 
interference of World Bank and IMF in developing countries’ fiscal and monetary policy 
issues by revealing the rising numbers of World Bank structural adjustment programs 
during more than two decades. 
Figure II: Number of World Bank Adjustment Operations 
 
Source: Koeberle et al. (2005: 46)   
As a critical note towards SAPs, World Bank researcher Branko Milanowic adjudicates upon 
SAPs results: “How to explain that, after sustained involvement and many structural 
adjustment loans […], African GDP per capita has not budged from its level 20 years ago? 
Moreover, in 24 countries, GDP per capita is less than in 1975, and in 12 countries even 
below its 1960s level […]. How to explain that the best ‘pupils’ among the transition 
countries, after setting out in 1991 with no debt at all, and following all the prescriptions of 
the IFIs, would find themselves 10 years later with their GDP halved and in need of debt-
forgiveness? Something is clearly wrong” (Milanovic 2003: 1).  
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Many scholars like Weeks and Patel (2007) criticize the World Bank’s and IMF’s 
predominant focus on macroeconomic stability which also is one of the goals of fiscal and 
monetary policy in keeping inflation rates low and balance of payments stable. Since SAPs 
shrink fiscal and monetary policy space, development is doomed to be “stabilized” which, 
empirically proven, means standstill. National development paths seem to be forbidden by 
the IFIs’ loan conditionality based on SAP guidelines. Peet also judges that the “Bank’s 
closer association with the IMF since the mid 1980s, especially in the area of structural 
adjustment conditionality, has tarnished its reputation, while half hearted efforts at public 
participation have done little to improve its ethical position” (Peet 2003: 223).  
2.3 Conditionality – A Political Issue 
The World Bank published a report entitled "Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, 
and Why," (The World Bank 1998). Therein, it postulates the allocation of aid should be 
determined in accordance with the policy of the recipient country. According to the World 
Bank’s definition of conditionality on development policy lending, depicted by the 
Development Committee of the Bank itself and the IMF, conditionality means “that the 
Bank makes its resources available if the borrower (a) maintains an adequate 
macroeconomic framework, (b) implements its overall program in a manner satisfactory to 
the Bank, and (c) complies with the policy and institutional actions that are deemed critical 
for the implementation and expected results of the supported program” (Development 
Committee 2005: i). 
Since Williamson introduced the term in 1990, “Washington Consensus” subsumes opening 
trade, fiscal restraint, prudent macroeconomic management, deregulation and privatization 
and became also a metaphor to polemically paraphrase IMF and World Bank conditionality. 
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Meanwhile, the Development Committee of the World Bank (2005: 15) argues “that 
consolidating democracy beyond elections and sustaining economic reform beyond 
structural adjustment both require strengthening the institutions of governance, enhancing 
the rule of law and enhancing accountability and transparency”. Such an involvement, 
termed by Burki and Perry (1998) as “Post-Washington Consensus”, includes the 
strengthening of governing institutions to “shape the behavior of individuals and 
organizations in society” (Burki and Perry 1998: 11). 
The G7 Finance Ministers met in Fukuoka in July 2000 and postulated the improvement of 
governing institutions in borrowing countries. Therefore, the summit encouraged the World 
Bank and the IMF to play an active role in public sector reforms and the fight against 
corruption. Furthermore, the July 2001 Genoa Summit concluded in its G8 Communiqué 
that “Open, democratic and accountable systems of governance, based on respect for 
human rights and the rule of law, are preconditions for sustainable development and robust 
growth” (G8 Communiqué 2001: 6). Especially, the New African Initiative participating on 
the summit to discuss the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) came up 
with the linkage of democratic governance and poverty reduction. 
Considering the World Bank (2007), conditionality can be summarized in five key good 
practice principles: “Ownership [as] realistic assessment of which relies on the government's 
policy intentions and track record of reform. It also acknowledges that some reforms may 
be owned by some constituencies and opposed by others. Harmonization [in form of] 
agreement[s] up front with government and other partners on an internally coherent 
framework for measuring progress. Customization [, as] accountability framework and 
modalities should support country circumstances and should never be used to add policy 
actions to the government's agenda. Criticality [in order to] choose from the accountability 
2. FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY - A MATTER FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
13 
 
framework a set of policy and institutional actions that are critical for achieving the results 
of the program. [As well as t]ransparency and predictability conduct transparent progress 
reviews conducive to predictable and performance based financial support”. It is still 
unclear whether the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, promoting its headliner of 
donor harmonization, will worsen the conditionality problem as the giver community 
speaks with a much stronger voice, or weaken conditionality. Until 2003, Africa had 
experienced the highest number of SAP programs, as the comparison by region 
demonstrates in figure III. 
Figure III: Regional Share of Adjustment Lending by Number of Operations, 
           1980-2003 
 
Source: Koeberle et al. (2005: 48) 
2.4 Competing Concepts of Fiscal Policy Space 
The IMF approach emphasizes, that “fiscal space can be defined as the availability of 
budgetary room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose 
without any prejudice to the sustainability of a government’s financial position“ (Heller 
2005: 3). This is critically opposed by UNCTAD that proclaims “that financial stability is 
not sustainable without social improvement, and that poverty reduction and enhanced 
equity are not sustainable without financial stability” (Bradford 2005: 1). Nevertheless, 
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recent World Bank and IMF reports underline decreasing conditionality in their findings, 
which can be interpreted as self-defensive steps. Conditionality is far from being a moral 
issue. In contrary, the Bretton Woods conditionality prevents other states from being 
perceived as credible and legitimate to hold participation rights in the respective IFIs. 
Therefore, conditionality, as the Western hegemony maintaining force, prevents the IO-
trinity from becoming reformed and democratized. But the three Forums on China Africa 
Cooperation in 2000, 2003 and 2006 adumbrated China as a new player in, but actually 
outside, the giver community, to stir up the long-established aid system. 
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3. MANAGING DEVELOPMENT I: FISCAL POLICY 
3.1 Framing Fiscal Policy 
According to Weeks and Patel, “[f]iscal policy includes taxation and expenditure policies of 
the central government, which are normally implemented by the ministry of finance” 
(Weeks and Patel 2007: 2). Therefore, decisions about governmental spending and tax 
structure adjustment are highly political not solely because “politicians, not economists, 
determine fiscal policy” (Crain and Muris 1995: 313). Furthermore, decisions are embedded 
in domestic institutional frameworks as well as international commitments, which constrain 
fiscal policy actions. If these restraints outweigh, one speaks of limited fiscal space. Above 
that, budgetary room, debt and trade balances restrict the opportunities in the decision-
making process. The government’s dilemma, mentioned by Weeks and Patel (2007), 
consists of limited resources such as loans, official development assistance (ODA), taxes 
and its objectives, namely macroeconomic stabilization, growth enhancement and 
distribution of wealth, including poverty reduction. Todaro and Smith (2006) argue that in 
the long run, “it is the efficient and equitable collection of taxes on which governments 
must base their development aspirations” (Todaro and Smith 2006: 759). 
3.2 Evolving Ideologies 
Managing fiscal policy is highly political. But also among economists it ignites an ideological 
debate guided by three streams of thought, namely the classical view, the Keynesian 
economics and the modern mainstream of Neoliberalism which transforms the classic 
morals into mathematically sophisticated models within contemporary settings.       
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3.2.1 The Classical View 
In Burger’s (2003) understanding, the most important classical protagonists, namely Adam 
Smith (1723 – 1790), David Ricardo (1772 – 1823) and John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873) 
“perceived [public debt] as something negative” (Burger 2003: 22). 
Celebrated as the founder of free market economics, Adam Smith postulates that higher 
public debt hampers capital accumulation and can be interpreted as an incentive to emigrate 
(compare Smith 1994 [1776]). Ricardo (1973 [1817]) agrees with Smith in this point, since 
public debt raises taxes, which influences the decision of prospective tax-payers to leave or 
stay. To overcome debt, the government has to assure “the excess of the public revenue 
over the public expenditure” (Ricardo 1973 [1817]: 162-164), which in turn increases the 
pressure on the population. Therefore, the government’s debt is the present and future 
burden of the citizens. 
The negative effect of debt concerning capital accumulation is explained by John Stuart Mill 
in arguing, that debt reduces national saving. This saving is not disposable anymore and 
cannot be spent in a productive manner. The other way around, an increase in debt 
influences the interest rate to rise, which, in turn, leads to less capital accumulation.  
3.2.2 The Keynesian Revolution 
John Maynard Keynes (1883 – 1946) constituted an own subfield in economics, called 
Keynesianism. His ideas became highly influential to economic policy after the Great 
Depression, since he brought, the before neglected, pro-active fiscal policy into play. 
Keynes argued, that increased saving will not lead to lower interest rates. Hence, saving has 
no positive effect on investment as long as the economy suffers under unemployment. In 
contrast to the classical economists, he proclaimed the ability of budget deficits to “absorb 
the idle saving” (Burger 2003: 25). Furthermore, the famous British economist alleged, that 
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low aggregate demand causes low income and unemployment. This stands in contrast to the 
propositions made by classical economists, who postulated, that, solely, aggregate supply is 
responsible for national income (see Mankiw 1997). 
The Keynesian Model 
The supply side-oriented classicists defined national output (), which is today measured as 
Gross Domestic Produkt (GDP), as the sum of consumer spending (C) and all saving (S)  
 =  + . 
To keep it simple, all quantities supplied for a set price and everything that is saved, 
produced but not sold, contribute to GDP. From a demand-oriented perspective, John 
Maynard Keynes argued that aggregate demand (), as the expenditures for the above 
produced GDP, is determined by consumer spending (C) and investor spending (I): 
 =  + . 
Especially in an open economy, it has to be questioned, that the national output is 
demanded in such a way: If national income as aggregate demand () equals (), saving (S) 
would equal investment (I) 
 =  =  
 = . 
Keynes achievement was to demonstrate “that there might be a disequilibrium that could 
lead to a later equilibrium with unemployment and price instability” (Sherman and Evans 
1984: 60). In order to analyze fiscal policy’s impact on poverty, namely the income level, it 
would be more fruitful to approach such effects from a demand-oriented stance. Therefore, 
Keynes analyses seem to be the most relevant theoretical starting point for this paper’s 
intellectual journey. 
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Keynes’ Marginal Propensity to Consume 
Keynes indicates the positive relationship between consumption (C) and income (Y) as a 
function 
 = 	()   . 
This is explained in the psychology of the consumer’s behavior: Poor people, defined by a 
specific income ceiling, will spend all of their little incomes or savings on consumption as 
the only possibility to survive. They might go into debt, if the satisfaction of their needs 
exceed their incomes and savings. Hence, consumption (C) is higher than their little 
incomes (Y). At certain equilibrium, income equals consumption. When income further 
increases, people consume to fulfill their minimum subsistence and maybe afford a little 
luxury, but the rest of the income will be saved. At this stage, the income exceeds the 
consumption. Theoretically captured, “the change in consumption to a change in income is 
called the marginal propensity to consume” (Sherman and Evans 1984: 61) 
 =
∆
∆
   . 
This describes the direct effect of poverty reduction on consumption and, therefore, on 
economic development, since initiating an income increase will create a spill-over effect that 
raises the income of consumer goods producers who might employ more people who 
receive wages that increase their incomes. The increase of income attracts investment that 
seeks assets. More people will be employed until a certain level is reached that makes the 
income remittee save his or her money, if investment opportunities provide insufficient 
profit-expectation.  
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Keynesian Cross 
The gross domestic product (GDP) measures the output Y of an economy. Such an output 
is determined by the consumption of domestic and foreign goods (C=Cd+Cf), domestic and 
foreign investment (I=Id+If), government purchase of domestic and foreign goods and 
services (G=Gd+Gf) and its net exports (NX=EX-IM) 
NXGICY +++= . 
According to Keynes, in a closed economy (NX=0) planned expenditure (E) is “the amount 
of households, firms, and the government plan to spend on goods and services” (Mankiw 
1997: 250) 
GICE ++= . 
However, planned investment, government purchases and taxes are considered to be fixed 
TTGGII === ,, . 
Since consumption (C) is determined by disposable income as the difference of income (Y) 
and taxes (T), planned expenditure is a function of income 
GITYCE ++−= )( . 
The connection between income and 
planned expenditure is obvious, since 
households, firms and governments will 
spend more, when the income rises. 
Figure IV visualizes the upward slope of 
planned expenditure, called the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC).  
Figure IV: Planned Expenditure as a 
Function of Income 
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Figure VI: Government Purchases in 
the Keynesian Cross 
If total income (Y), which is also 
considered as the actual expenditure, 
equals planned expenditure (E), the 
economy is in equilibrium, expressed by 
the equation  EY = . 
On the added 45° line in Figure V, actual 
expenditure always equals planned 
expenditure. Therefore, point A represents 
the economy’s equilibrium, which will be automatically reached. If GDP is above the 
equilibrium level A, e.g. at level Y1, expenditure E1 is less than the output Y1. As a reaction, 
the more produced goods are added to the inventory as items to be sold later. So the 
economy will produce less in the next period, since the overproduction hampers the need to 
produce at the same level. Unemployment follows, which causes the GDP’s fall. In terms of 
GDP less than the equilibrium level, the opposite reaction will follow until equilibrium is 
achieved. 
Keynes’ Multipliers: Government 
Purchases 
As explained in Mankiw (1997), upward 
government purchases result in increasing 
planned expenditure, because 
GICE ↑++=↑ . 
Figure VI demonstrates that an increase in 
government spending lifts the planned 
expenditure function.  
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Consequently, the intersection is in point B, which means that the change in income (Y2-Y1) 
is larger than the increase of government purchases (∆G), while the latter is represented by 
the upward lift of the curve. 
The government-purchases multiplier GY ∆∆ provides the information, how a $1-increase 
of government purchase affects the income increase. “This increase in income in turn raises 
consumption by MPC × ∆G, where MPC is the marginal propensity to consume. This 
increase in consumption raises expenditure and income once again.” (Mankiw 1997: 254). 
The multiply effect concerning government spending on the income can now be estimated 
∆
∆
=


   . 
As revealed in the section on the marginal propensity to consume, the latter is higher when 
income increases from a low level, let us assume a state of poverty, to some level where 
some income enables the people to consume goods that ensure surviving without 
starvation. At this stage, a positive change in government spending would have greater 
effect on the income, since the MPC is very high: 
∆ =
∆

   . 
In a relatively high income level, the MPC is quite small, which reduces the impact of 
government spending on the change of income. 
The Investment Multiplier 
The British economist discovered another important feature of aggregate demand, as “it is 
vital that government policy makers know how any change in spending whether in direct 
government spending or in private investment encouraged by government spending, will 
affect national income”. Similar to the government multiplier above, Keynes analyzed the 
relation between the change in income (∆Y) and the change in investment (∆I) and “alleged 
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to be a causal relationship running from change in investment spending to change in 
income. Change in investment usually causes a larger change in income and output because 
some of the money spent in investment will be respent by its recipients for additional 
consumption” (Sherman and Evans 1984: 176) 
  ! =  
∆
∆"
   . 
In the poverty scenario, one imagines a villager who inherits a relatively big amount of 
money takes a look at his starving fellows and recognizes that some kind of a pot would 
enhance the situation to cook the ingredients that have been collected during the day. This 
guy buys some metal, assembles some friends and asks them to help him. After forming the 
light alloy to pots, the small manufactory provides its goods on the local market. In this 
example the investment multiplier is many-sided. The investor buys the aluminum for a 
certain price that contributes to the metal seller’s income; it depends on her intention to 
spend her money or to save it. If she spends the money on consumption goods, other 
producers and sellers of these goods might benefit from this little income increase. The pot-
selling inheritor pays his friends for helping him in the form of wages. Hence, he 
contributes to his fellow’s incomes, as well as his own.  
  ! =

#
=


  
The simplistic example demonstrates that the investment multiplier is greater, if the 
marginal propensity to consume is high, or reversely the marginal propensity to save (MPS) 
is low. In low-income societies the possibility to save money (MPS) is low, since any change 
of income is spend to ensure the core family’s survival which also explains the high 
propensity to consume. In such settings, changes of investment and government spending 
have tremendous effects on incomes, whereas the investment multiplier is expected to 
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exceed the government purchases multiplier. Nonetheless, “[w]hen the government spent 
money, demand was directly stimulated” (Sherman and Evans 1984: 288). 
3.2.3 Monetarism 
Monetarists like Milton Friedman advocate for market efficiency and reject most kinds of 
government intervention. Furthermore, Friedman’s fellows strongly oppose the Keynesian 
view that government spending stimulates the national output. They, instead, assume a 
crowding-out effect of government spending on private investment, especially if the latter is 
deficit-financed (see Sherman and Evans 1984: 303). The whole Monetarist argumentation 
will be carefully explained in this paper’s section on Monetary Policy, although its stance 
towards fiscal policy is needed to have been mentioned at this point.    
3.2.4 Neoliberalism 
According to Peet, as a countermovement of Keynesianism, “Neoliberalism renews the 
beliefs of early modern, and especially ninetheenth-century, British classical liberalism [and 
transforms it into] likewise favored self-interested, competitive behavior in economy, polity 
and just about everything else” (Peet 2003: 8). Famous protagonists of the respective 
economic philosophy are Walter Euchan, Franz Bohm and Frank H. Knight in its first 
generation. Knight proclaims in his New Deal critique the ideal of Neoliberalism based on 
creativity, activity and individual freedom. More famous successors like Milton Friedman, 
George Stigler, James Buchanon, Gary Becker and Robert Lucas followed the ideas of 
London School of Economics professor and undisputable guru of Neoliberalism Friedrich 
von Hayek who believed that individual freedom induces civilization’s growth. In his 
argumentation, the markets work best driven by voluntariness and spontaneity. Moreover, 
von Hayek suggests that “government should therefore be democratic, with fixed limits on 
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the sphere of their command [, since] planned economic orders can handle only limited 
complexity” (Peet 2003: 10). 
Nevertheless, Blyth (2002) dwindles Neoliberalism to four intersecting features: This 
contains Milton Friedmans Monetarist appraisal on inflation that predicts self-equilibrating 
markets in the long-run. This is supplemented by the theory of rational expectations, which 
identifies the cause of recession and depressions in interventionism via government 
strategies. Furthermore, Blyth (2002) spotlights Arthur Laffer’s understanding of the impact 
of tax cuts which are seen as self-financing based on Say’s Law’s proclamation that supply 
creates its own demand. The fourth cornerstone of Neoliberalism, as Peet (2003) argues, is 
represented by the inflation generating element of democratic government which, according 
to rational choice theory, presents its electorate with goods in order to maximize votes. 
Neoliberals stick to the paradigm that “inflation, due to intervention by the state in an 
otherwise naturally self-equilibriating economy, was in all-encompassing social crisis 
treatable not by Keynesian policies but by Neoliberal, market-oriented means” (Peet 2003: 
11). 
3.3 Macroeconomic Stability 
As government taxation and expenditure are the major public sector activities, stabilization 
programs suggested cuts of expenditure aiming at budgetary balance (Todaro and Smith, 
2006). Nevertheless, the latter must not be mixed up with macroeconomic stability, as it is 
often misinterpreted and defined in a wrong way. It assumes the overall objective of 
keeping inflation rates low. Therefore, when one speaks of macroeconomic stability, 
monetary policy, instead of fiscal policy, seems to be a better tool to achieve it. But, 
according to John Weeks and Shruti Patel, the sole objective of inflation-tackling is too 
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simple, since it eliminates fiscal policy or at least minimizes its role. Besides, Bruno (1995) as 
well as Bruno and Easterly (1996) revealed in their cross-country studies that below an 
inflation trigger rate of 40 percent “there is no effect and above which growth is negatively 
affected” (Weeks and Patel 2007: 3). The quoted SOAS scholars, therefore, suggest a more 
appropriate definition of macroeconomic stability as: 
“one of the goals of fiscal and monetary policy. […] An economy is macroeconomically unstable if 
key aggregates fluctuate excessively over time. [… T]his definition requires identification of the 
aggregates that signal the need for a policy response, and a definition of ‘excessive’ fluctuation […]. 
Fluctuations can be judged as excessive on the basis of two general rules: 1) when they undermine the 
achievement of outcomes sought by society and/or goals pursued by the government through its 
policies; or 2) when inherent in them is a tendency to increase in amplitude, which will undermine 
those outcomes at some future point in time.” 
  Weeks and Patel (2007: 2) 
Hence, the society’s goals need to be defined. Concerning the UN Millennium 
Development Goals, the “international consensus on poverty reduction implies that the 
basic outcome sought by policy should be sustained poverty reduction in the long run, 
manifested in the medium term by the MDGs targets by 2015”, as put by Weeks and Patel 
(2007: 3). That means that the overall objective is halving poverty until 2015, and not just 
keeping inflation rates low.  
This goal cannot be met by debt relief and NGO activities alone, since, according to Todaro 
and Smith, “the burden of resource mobilization to finance essential public developmental 
efforts must come from the revenue side. Public domestic and foreign borrowing can fill 
some savings gaps” (Todaro and Smith 2006: 759). Enhancing economic growth and fairer 
distribution in the long run are at the core of government responsibility. 
3.4 Historic Development of Government Spending 
According to Wagner’s Law, “a rise in public spending was a natural development that 
would accompany the growth of per capita income” (Mehrotra and Delamonica (2007: 
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310). Additionally, historical factors have to be taken into consideration, too: During WW I 
public expenditures swelled up from 12 percent in 1913 to 19 percent of GDP. Caused by 
the Great Depression constraints on fiscal deficits have been enforced, later 
institutionalized by the International Monetary Fund after the Bretton Woods conference in 
1944. Notwithstanding, government spending grew seemingly unrestrained from 28 percent 
in 1960 to 43 per cent of GDP in 1980 as a heyday of Keynesianism. In the following era of 
structural adjustment programs, expenditures have been kept low. In the period between 
1980 and 2002, government spending in Africa, Asia and Latin America, shows an explicit 
reduction: From 38 percent of GDP in 1980, public expenditures in average decreased to 26 
percent in the year 2000. These numbers express government spending in relation to the 
size of the respective economy. But in fact, the absolute government spending increased 
from 19 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 2002. 
Fan and Coady (2008: 23) point out the fact that “developing countries spend much less 
than developed countries”. In 1960, OECD-countries’ ministries of finance spent 27 
percent as share of GDP, whereas it almost doubled to 48 percent in 1996 (see Qwartney, 
Holcombe and Lawson 1998). The PRC China’s rise, portrayed as the prime example for 
state planned growth via specific public investment, and the contemporary financial crisis 
reveal the tendency towards state’s willingness to increase expenditures, since even the US 
government as the upholder of Neoliberal thoughts announced to provide $700 billion to 
stabilize its financial market and to support Detroit’s Big Three automakers within the 
Paulson rescue program. 
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3.5 Fiscal Policy and the Trade Balance 
3.5.1 Keep the Balance! But why? 
As discussed above, the trade balance correction is not fiscal policy’s overall task. 
Nevertheless, the most popular textbook on macroeconomics written by N. Gregory 
Mankiw (1997) postulates that “the impact of economic policies on the trade balance can 
always be found by examining their impact on saving and investment. Policies that increase 
investment or decrease saving tend to cause a trade deficit, and policies that decrease 
investment or increase saving tend to cause a surplus” (Mankiw 1997: 194). By denying a 
normative interpretation, it has to be taken into account that such influences on 
international flows of capital and goods make no statement about their desirability.  
Therefore, trade balances, negative or positive, do not serve as judgments, whether fiscal 
policy embodied by the ministry of finance does a good or bad job. Although, 
contemporary textbooks on macroeconomics, here represented by Mankiw (1997), allege 
that trade deficits reduce domestic investment and raise the world interest rate. 
3.5.2 GDP and the Trade Balance 
According to Mankiw (1997), the gross domestic product (GDP) measures the output Y of 
an economy. Such an output is determined by the consumption of domestic and foreign 
goods (C=Cd+Cf), domestic and foreign investment (I=Id+If), government purchase of 
domestic and foreign goods including services (G=Gd+Gf) as well as the respective 
country’s net exports (NX=EX-IM) 
NXGICY +++= . 
In order to analyze the impacts of fiscal policy on the trade balance, it is useful to solve the 
output-equation for the trade balance, namely the net exports 
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)( GICYNX ++−= . 
It is argued, that net exports equals the economy’s output minus domestic spending, which 
consists of consumption, investment and government purchases (parenthesized above). As 
a side note, the purchase of imports lowers consumption of domestic goods. In order to 
enable the efficiency of government spending and the investment multipliers, fiscal and 
monetary policy are the only authorities that provide measures to support the multipliers.   
3.5.3 Government Expenditure 
Public Spending and National Saving 
Mankiw (1997) observes the coherence between public spending and national saving, as the 
latter (S) equals the economy’s output (Y) minus its consumption (C) minus government 
spending (G) 
GCYS −−= . 
That means, government spending reduces national saving which, in turn, is determined by 
private saving and public saving 
pupr SSS += . 
Fiscal policy decides about government purchase (G), public saving (Spu) as well as taxation 
(T), which influences consumption as a reduction of output (Y). Public saving, as one 
element of national saving, can be increased via higher taxation and is reduced by 
government spending. If public expenditure increases, while taxation remains the same, 
public saving decreases 
GTS pu −= . 
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Therefore, government spending seems to reduce national saving. In turn, it affects the 
trade balance, since the latter is determined by saving minus investment. 
ISNX −= . 
Mankiw (1997) also argues that “[w]hen domestic savings fall short of domestic investment, 
investors borrow from abroad; when saving exceeds investment, the excess is lent to other 
countries” (Mankiw 1997: 189). 
Subsidies and other Incentives for Investment 
Mankiw (1997) postulates, if there are newly incentives to invest, the “danger” of a trade 
deficit is also given. Such incentives include changes in the interest rate or governmental 
subsidies to encourage investment. This higher demand to invest cannot be satisfied 
without external borrowing, if saving is below this investment demand increase. Therefore, 
saving exceeding investment demand causes a trade deficit, but has great investment 
multiplier effects. The decision about risking a trade deficit in favor of income increases is a 
political question. 
There is another very important investment related issue; investment is not always related to 
a huge investment multiplier as the section on the latter might have implied. In its example, 
a pot-seller has been used to explain the wide-ranging investment multiplier that affects 
various incomes of various people. Such a key example conceals multiplier stoppers like 
profit savers: One imagines a huge multinational corporation (MNC) that is willing to invest 
in an oil field. The MNC buys the machinery in its home country and only employs workers 
of its own nationality while investing in the destination country’s oil field. In the worst case, 
these workers bring their own food and shelter. So, no investment multiplier can be 
expected out of this investment. This underlines the important role of fiscal policy. 
Normally, governments decide about the exploitation of oil fields and sell those rights to oil 
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companies for a certain rent. In negotiating a high rent which the company has to pay to the 
government, the latter is able to invest, spend, arrange tax-cuts or directly give the money to 
the poor. This redistributive function of fiscal policy is one of the major weapons in the 
fight against poverty. The more efficient, in terms of multipliers, the ministry of finance 
acts, the more incomes are affected, and the bigger is the national output measured as GDP.    
Impacts on the Real Exchange Rate 
As explained above, rising government spending or tax cuts affect domestic saving and 
consumption. Decreased saving affects the supply of the domestic currency, which in turn 
raises the real exchange rate. Since a higher real exchange rate makes foreign goods cheaper 
and domestic goods more expensive, exports are hampered and the consumers prefer 
imported goods. This affects the trade balance and leads to a trade deficit. Additionally it 
reduces domestic consumption and the government purchase and investment multipliers. 
3.5.4 Taxation Effects 
… On Consumption and Incomes 
In reducing taxes, the ministry of finance is able to increase incomes, which in turn 
stimulate consumption. Additionally, depending on the MPC and MPS level, lower taxes 
lead to more private saving, since the latter is determined as income reduced by taxes and 
consumption. Keynes argues that peoples’ inducement to save is derived from future 
returns they expect. As an interplay of the monetary and fiscal policy measures, such returns 
depend on the rate of interest but more important on Ministry of Finance’s measures like 
income taxes, taxes on capital-profits and death-duties.  
Such measures are also able to contribute to consumption, as Keynes suggest: “If fiscal 
policy is used as a deliberate instrument for the more equal distribution of incomes, its 
effect in increasing the propensity to consume is, of course, all the greater” (Keynes [1936]). 
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… On Public Saving 
As mentioned above, reduced taxes lower public saving which consequently could cause a 
trade deficit. Therefore, fiscal policy has to be aware, that private consumption, initiated by 
lower taxes or not, and government expenditures reduce national saving, which disembogue 
in a negative effect on the trade balance. 
3.5.5 Foreign Fiscal Policy Changes 
According to Mankiw (1997), foreign governments can affect the trade balance of domestic 
economies as well, because increased foreign government purchases or tax reductions 
decrease world saving. Lower world savings lead to an increasing world interest rate. Hence, 
borrowing money costs more and reduces domestic investment. Consequently, the 
investment exceeding domestic saving will be invested abroad. In this way, foreign 
government spending contributes to surplus in the domestic economy. Concerning the real 
exchange rate, high supply of domestic currency causes the real exchange rate to fall. The 
domestic currency loses value, which makes domestic goods cheaper at export destinations 
in comparison to imported goods from the same. 
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4. MANAGING DEVELOPMENT II: MONETARY POLICY 
The objective of pro-poor growth cannot be achieved by fiscal policy alone. Instead, 
sustainable economic growth via mass demand creation also requires control of money 
supply and the adjustment of the interest rate level. Such a pro-poor monetary policy can 
only be analyzed by theoretical frameworks that allow any monetary influence on the 
economy. Therefore, Keynesian approaches are the most appropriate framework to 
describe the impact of changes in money supply and interest rates as monetary policy 
measures. This stands in sharp contrast to the current IMF approaches that focus “primarily 
on price stability and static market-based allocative efficiency” (Filho 2007: 1) based on 
theoretical conclusions of New Classical Economics and Monetarism, especially those 
approaches elaborated by Milton Friedman. 
Pro-active monetary policy instead can work supportive as fiscal policy’s second hand, e.g. 
in regulating the rates of interest for debt-servicing. Interest rate manipulation induces, and 
to some extent steers, the flow of international capital which determines the country’s 
balance of payments. Besides its supervisory and regulatory function, the central bank as 
monetary policy’s key body manages foreign-asset reserves to secure the domestic 
currency’s value. It also interferes in foreign-exchange markets in order to manage the 
exchange rate of the national currency. As a money printer, central banks determine the 
supply of money which could cause inflation, since more money increases the ability to 
invest; the ongoing battle for investment destinations boosts their value in form of prices. A 
strong central bank is suited with resources that enable the support of fiscal policy actions. 
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Since the ministry of finance deposits government money at the central bank and vice versa 
the latter finances government expenditures, a financially strong state in the long term 
affords a strong central bank.  
Via the rates of interest, the price of money lending, at first instance between the central 
bank and domestic commercial banks, is set. During a financial spill-over, those banks will 
provide credits based on that central bank interest rate plus their requested profit rate. 
Hence, from a final debtor’s perspective, it is likely that he or she is better off when the 
central bank’s interest rate is low. Supervision of local and regional banks is another major 
task. The central bank monitors private and public domestic financial institutions in order 
to ensure that they carry out their businesses in accordance to nationally set regulations and 
financial law (see Todaro and Smith 2006: 747). 
Summarizing the central banks power, it “affects the outcome of short-run stabilisation, and 
influences the policy remit of the state and the economic growth rate in the long run. 
Therefore, it can make an important contribution to a pro-poor development strategy” 
(Filho 2007: 1). 
4.1 Theoretical Approaches to Monetary Policy 
4.1.1 The Classical Golden Rules 
Adam Smith at a stage, when the invention of money changed to some extent the division 
of labor, “disliked paper money; he feared that there would be overexpansion, inflation, and 
perhaps as a final result the abandoning of money”. In these days, it was proven to be 
empirically justified that “banking encouraged the use of money and the division of labor; 
but it did not produce excess monetary expansion and inflation” (Wood 1986: 1225). 
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As a student of the other classic famous British economists besides Smith, namely Alfred 
Marshall (1842-1924) and Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959), Keynes shared the ideas of both. 
Therefore, a short look at the main-thoughts of these economists is useful. 
Marshall’s Scissor 
Alfred Marshall combined the views of the predominant groups, namely the classical 
economic theorists and the neoclassical thinkers also known as the Marginalist theorists. 
Between 1776 and 1823, the school of classical theory, represented by Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, developed the assumption that prices of goods are set by the costs of 
production. In Marshall’s time-concept, he distinguished the (1) very short period, in which the 
price is entirely demand-dependent, lasting from several days to months (2) short period, 
when the production is pushed to the maximum profit leading to an emerged sector, and in 
the (3) long period, the producers adopt to the increased demand affected by the weariness of 
produced goods. 
Such measures are the reduction of production costs to fight the new competitors by 
efficiency. The most efficient producer earns the profit, the so-called economic rent. 
Concerning values, Keynes was convinced by Marshall’s micro-economic scissor-model, but 
in macroeconomic questions, he referred to Pigou’s Monetary Theory. 
Monetary Policy and the Real Balance Effect 
Before Marshall died, his book “Money, Credit and Commerce” had been published, which 
should later inspire Arthur Cecil Pigou to improve Marshall’s ideas. In their academic 
collaboration Keynes’s teachers elaborated, why actors in the economy save money. 
According to them, the economic subjects hang on to their money, because they foresee or 
just wait for future exchanges.  
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Hence, one can argue that, “the nominal value of the demand for money is […] exactly 
proportional to the sum of transactions” (Ventelou (2005: 56). Pigou purposed an 
explanation of the relation between the amount of circulated money and price building.  
In order to achieve this goal, two phases are to be observed. In a short period, new money 
created by the central bank induces the actor’s desire to either spend it on goods or invest in 
financial markets. Due to excess supply, the prices of goods increase. Contrary to that, in a 
long-term period, the additional served money is absorbed by the market, but prices get 
remarkably high. The result is inflation.  
In his earlier work “Treatise on Money” (1930), John Maynard Keynes supported Pigou’s 
“Real Balance Effect”, but in the “General Theory”, he contested the ideas of his 
Cambridge professor, although they served as an appropriate starting point towards his 
“General Theory”. 
4.1.2 Keynesianism 
John Maynard Keynes’ “General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”, published 
in 1936, leaves room for misinterpretations that are still circulating in contemporary 
macroeconomic discussions. Nonetheless, the General Theory accommodates essential 
features to understand the potential power of monetary policy measures. Keynes’ findings 
theoretically contribute to reveal the relationship between monetary policy and poverty 
reduction via mass demand creation. 
The Central Bank’s Role 
In the first place, Keynes suggests that there should exist a central bank. Otherwise the state 
itself would have to fulfill the task of being a lender of last resort by making reserves 
available to the money market. Besides this main central bank’s task, the latter determines 
the direction of national banking. The control over banking and money supply enables the 
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central bank to increase the financial system’s elasticity and to stabilize interest rate 
fluctuations. 
Without any central bank, there would be “no central reserve, no elasticity of credit 
currency, hardly a rediscount market, and hardly a bank rate policy, with the growth of small 
and daring banks, great increase of deposits and a community unhabituated to banking and 
ready at the least alarm to revert to hoarding” (Keynes [1913] 1971: 197). 
Central banks underwrite the stability of the money and banking system and are the only 
conductors of monetary policy. While controlling the “’deliberate’ management of the 
currency and credit”, according to this British scholar “there is no wisdom in rigid statutory 
rules that would unduly constrain the central bank’s operational discretion and weaken its 
position and powers in relation to the financial system” (Bibow 2002: 781). This raises the 
question of how the central bank is related to the ministry of finance, which expresses the 
power of fiscal policy exerted on monetary policy. Of course there is a close relationship to 
the government; since “[i]f the bank is to be useful, it must have the management of the 
Government balances and of the note issue”. Nonetheless, too much governmental 
influence “on the terms of the bank’s charter must tend to make these terms too rigid and 
narrow for practice” (Keynes [1913] 1971: 151).  
The central bank shareholders are the government which controls and appoints the bank’s 
central board, as well as private ownership that enables the bank to be half driven by 
commercial instinct and half responsible to the national wealth. The latter keeps the bank 
partly profit oriented and enables the state to increase its financial opportunities. 
Additionally, “private ownership of the Bank’s capital, even although the shareholders have 
no more than advisory powers, is an important safeguard of the Bank’s independence” 
(Bibow 2002: 755), while contributing to the government’s overall guidelines.  
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Moreover, in order to run the central bank smoothly, [a]dequate profits, adequate reserves, 
adequate knowledge, and adequate freedom from interference by ‘interests’, political or 
financial, are necessary conditions for successful management” (Keynes [1928] 1981: 752). 
Managed Currency 
Before he wrote the General Theory, Lord Keynes was commissioned to improve the 
Indian financial system in the 1920s. The Indian rupee was determined by the gold-
exchange standard. Therefore the central bank, proposed by Keynes, had to face this fixed 
exchange rate constraint.  
Anyhow, he proclaimed, in wise foresight, that “[w]e have reached a stage in the evolution 
of money when a ‘managed’ currency is inevitable” ([1923] 1971: 159); and that “[t]he future 
of the currency of the world is going to be determined not by what has happened in the last 
two or three years, but by what is going to happen in the next 10 years” (Keynes [1926] 
1981: 429). Therefore, a central bank is needed to manage the currency to some degree but 
its central board always has to keep in mind that “the proper aim of monetary policy should 
be to stabilize internal prices in general, rather than exchange rates […], and both inflation 
and deflation must be avoided” (Bibow 2002: 759). 
Employment and the Phillips Curve 
Opposing the classical argument, Keynes interprets unemployment as not always voluntary. 
Additionally, he argues that wages and the price-level correlate. But simultaneously, Keynes 
notes, that prices and wages cannot simply be adjusted. Prices are not determined by a 
single labor market, since a worker does not necessarily consumes the goods, he or she 
produced. Therefore, Keynes introduced the principle of “effective demand” which allows 
posing statements about the price and employment-affecting sum of interdependent 
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markets. In his “equivalence postulate”, Keynes explains these correlations functionally: If 
the nominal wages are fixed and the prices increase, the real wages decrease (see Ventelou 
2005: 106). 
Keynesian thoughts on monetary policy’s impact on the level of employment are attempted 
to be represented in the simplistic modeling of thePhillips Curve which describes a negative 
correlation between inflation and unemployment. Besides the fiscal policy measures that 
enabled the government to affect aggregate demand and employment, “such a stimulative 
effect, [alternatively,] could be achieved by monetary policy. In either case, policymaking 
would be a conceptually simple matter of cost-beneﬁt analysis, although its implementation 
was by no means simple. And since the costs of a small amount of inflation to society were 
thought to be low, it seemed worthwhile to achieve a lower unemployment rate at the cost 
of tolerating only a little more inflation” (Lacker and Weinberg 2007: 208). Such an 
approach towards fiscal-monetary fine-tuning of inflation in order to raise the level of 
employment inherits the justification of deficit-financed spending and an increased money 
supply that abates the unemployment rate. This is somehow naive and “distorts the richness 
of the original Keynesian model, which gives such lavish attention to the financial sector” 
(Sherman and Evans 1984: 289), but it contributes to better perception of monetary policy’s 
power, especially its ability to support the unemployment rates’ decline. 
Chain of Consequences and Causal Nexus  
This assumption leads to his “Chain of Consequences”, which combines monetary policy 
measures with the reduction of unemployment: The level of demand affects the level of 
interest rates which affects the level of consumption which affects the level of aggregate 
equilibrium which, in turn, affects the unemployment rate. Logically, one can argue, if the 
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state is able to adjust the demand for money, employment and development embodied by 
economic growth can be achieved. 
The Causal Nexus contains three postulates: (1) if the circulated amount of money 
increases, the rate of interest decreases. (2) If the interest rate declines, marginal efficiency 
of capital increases, so that there is a stimulus towards investment. (3) This leads to a rise in 
supply and in demand for labor (see Ventelou 2005). But Keynes points out uncertainty as 
the main reason for underinvestment. 
Furthermore, ambiguity destroys economic relationships. Therefore, economic actor’s 
negative impressions should be minimized by economic policy, for which Keynes’ General 
Theory could serve as an analytical framework to be put it in fiscal and monetary political 
practice (see Ventelou 2005). In order to avoid such uncertainties, the central bank is able to 
give the economy some kind of confidence by avoiding excessive actions. Monetary policy 
that is perceived as waveringly will make the people hold their money in form of cash, since 
such a policy increases speculation behavior which requires fast reactions on changing 
situation, only possible when the money is not invested in fixed assets. That means, the 
people’s impression of a fluctuating monetary policy increases the amount of money 
hoarded by cash which “may tend to increase almost without limit without a response to a 
reduction of r”, namely the interest rate (Keynes [1936] 1973: 203).  
The Savings-Investment Adjustment Process 
Besides the theoretical approaches discussed above, a more relevant recognition produced 
by Keynes General Theory in regard to actual policy making is the multiplier effect 
presented in the IS-LM-model. Keynes discovers the linkage between investment (I) and 
savings (S) as well as the linkage between the demand of money (L) and the supply of 
money (M). The balance of investment and savings is a mental process to keep it in 
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equilibrium. But the multiplier effect itself is a more complicated process. It implies, that 
money supply automatically adjusts to the needs of business – so called money-creating 
processes, more precisely, the supply of loans, which leads vice versa to a lack of money 
deposits somewhere else. 
But the model also argues that a central bank is responsible for controlling the money 
circulated in a given economy by limiting its own lending. Contrary to that, central banks 
have an interest to supply money to their national private banks in order to create 
confidence in the financial sector. Respecting this, entrepreneurs’ “hopes and fears 
determine their own demand for credit, the banking system’s accommodation of that 
demand, and the economic activity that results. Everything depends on the entrepreneurial 
state of mind” (Ventelou 2005: 148). 
In order to free the economic actor’s from uncertainty and to initiate the chain reaction 
towards employment, the state can adjust the monetary system. Due to the outcomes of 
these statements, the “hydraulic interpretations of Keynes offer the most direct fiscal and 
monetary policy options. […] Keynes General Theory was, then, a tool for coordinating 
beliefs in the interest of making beneficial policies” (Ventelou 2005: 178). 
Such beneficiary policies should aim at growing employment which spurs domestic 
consumption towards mass demand and, therefore, creates investment assets which, in turn, 
might lead to industrial diversification. John Maynard Keynes connected Kahn’s ideas in the 
latter’s “Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment” with his marginal propensity to 
consume approach in stating that “if the propensity to consume in various hypothetical 
circumstances […] taken as given and we conceive the monetary or other public authority 
to take steps to stimulate or retard investment, the change in the amount of employment 
will be a function of the net change in the amount of investment” (Keynes [1936]). 
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Interest Rate and Investment 
Keynes connects investment decisions to demand, represented by national income. The 
latter decides about the ability to consume, which determines assets as investment 
destinations. Calculating other factors like future prices and sales, the costs of borrowing 
money, represented by the interest rate, also decides about investment, or its forbearance. 
This implies that “the relation between investment and the interest rate is negative”, 
whereas the “[t]he functional relationship between investment and income is positive” 
(Sherman and Evans 1984: 62). Even so, Keynes’ function explains that investment 
constraining high interest rates can be balanced by investment encouraging future 
expectations or demand.  
Monetary policy’s task is to appropriately manage the rate of interest. Lower interest rates 
stimulate investment aspirations and increase consumer spending, since money lending is 
cheaper. Keeping this in mind, monetary policy can directly influence the economy’s 
activity, but has to be clear that its measures can be followed and are expected as non-
experimental. Otherwise, fluctuating monetary policy leads to speculation which causes 
money hoarding that hampers consumption and investment. 
4.1.3 Monetarism 
During the post-world-war period until the late 1960s and early 1970s, “neoclassical 
synthesis” influenced by Keynes’ thoughts dominated the world economy. A discretionary 
fiscal and monetary policy was used to adjust inflation, output and employment levels via 
aggregate demand. When the mid 1970s crisis worsened, Keynesianism was not able to 
explain the experienced “sharp slowdown in growth and a sharp increase in both 
unemployment and inflation” (Filho 2007: 3). Therefore, Keynesianism and state 
interventionism was put into question by a new theoretical stream called Monetarism. 
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Keynesians believe that investment and government purchases increase employment by 
affecting demand. Some hardcore Keynesians, further, proclaim that debt-financed 
investment might lead to a trade-off.  
In the contrary, Monetarists use opposite approaches that suggest restricted bank lending 
and restrained growth of the money supply to tackle inflation. Although the term 
Monetarism might imply an active monetary policy, Monetarists like Milton Friedman, Karl 
Brunner and Alan Meltzer envisage the contrary. Arguing against the Keynesian deficit-
financed government spending that leads to increased national saving, Monetarists criticize 
that “such models ignore the fact that government finance needs are immediate and that 
savings resulting from spending streams generated by the initial government stimulus are 
not immediate” (Sherman and Evans 1984: 289). 
The Crowding-out Paradigm 
They also believe that government spending crowds-out private investment, which became 
known as the crowding-out hypothesis. In the competition for funds, the government has 
the advantage that interest rates do not restrict its undertaking, while private investors are 
disadvantaged by higher interest rates. The deficit caused by the governmental lending 
induces escalating interest rates. From a private investor’s perspective, the former situation 
deteriorated. Monetarists, from their angle, revealed a negative correlation between public 
spending and private investment, packed in the paradigm of the crowding-out paradigm. 
Another theoretical key element of Monetarism can be found in Milton Friedman’s book 
“Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960”, coauthored by Anna Schwartz, which 
connected inflation with money supplied by the central bank. Friedman argues that “[a] 
robust, growing economy will require gradual increases in the money stock year after year to 
accommodate expanding trade, but attempts to use discretionary monetary policy to 
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influence either secular changes in real output or offset business cycles will be ineffective at 
best and counterproductive at worst” (Sherman and Evans 1984: 298). Therefore, Friedman 
postulates that a computer who manages the money supply to grow at a fixed rate would do 
a better job than any central bank. 
Money Supply and the Interest Rates 
Discretionary monetary policy in his understanding implies stimulation-intended changes in 
the money supply in order to lift up the real output. Such measures do not change the real 
interest rates (i), derived from the difference of the nominal interest rates (r) and the rate of 
inflation, in the long run. This Monetarist feature concerning money and real interest rates, 
demonstrated in figure VII’s four-phase model below, describes how money supply distorts 
the rate of interests towards inflation. 
Figure VII: Behavior of Real and Nominal Interest Rates Over Time after an 
Increase in the Money Supply 
 
Source: Sherman and Evans 1984: 299 
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Putting this in a simplistic example, a government that detects insufficient GDP growth 
might ask its central bank for a one-time monetary stimulus via an increase in the supply of 
money to boost the national output. If the central board agrees, the bank circulates this 
additional money. From a Monetarist stance, such an excess money supply makes the real 
interest rates (i) and the nominal interest rates (r) simultaneously drop (phase II). In the pre-
stimulus phase I, real interest rates (i) and the nominal interest rates (r) have been on the 
same level with the natural interest rates (r*) which is defined “as that equilibrium rate that 
would be determined by the interaction of the supply of and demand for loanable funds in 
the absence of any government intervention in the credit market” (Sherman and Evans 
1984: 299).  
During phase III, the possibility of cheap lending enables the creditors to invest and to 
consume, but the investment opportunities and supply of goods remain the same as before. 
That means, prices increase due to stronger demand enabled by cheaper lending caused by 
low interest rates. Such a demand for credits put pressure on the banks as they have a 
limited amount of funds. The supply-exceeding demand for loanable funds supplemented 
by inflation expectations makes the interest rates rise. While the real interest rates (i) 
stabilize at the natural interest rates (r*) level, the nominal interest rates (r) exceed the 
former ones by the rate of inflation (phase IV). Therefore, in the long-run, output remains 
the same, real interest rates remain the same, and the monetary stimulus just caused 
inflation without any beneficial effects (see Sherman and Evans 1984). 
Monetarism also argues that the real output of an economy cannot be increased by financial 
stimuli, since the producer faces rising production costs, although prices for the same 
produced goods may increase. Hence, production, and therefore real output, remains on the 
former level; this Monetarist interpretation is illustrated in figure VIII on the next page. 
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Figure VIII: Upward Shift in the Industry Supply Curve Caused by the 
Secondary Effects of a Monetary Stimulation 
 
Source: Sherman and Evans 1984: 301 
Money supply causes a short-term real output increase, since higher demand (from $% to 
$) meets the supply of goods (%) at a higher price in point b. During the money supply 
induced inflation, production costs also ascend, presented by the upward shift of the supply 
from % to . Consequently, demand meets supply in point c, which prompts Monetarists 
to claim that there is no real output increase in the long term (&%=&). 
Nevertheless, a medium-term output increase is recognizable (see point b). Critics on 
Monetarism could argue that short-term stimulation could help, for instance during a crisis, 
to uplift GDP until the supply side has adapted its production to inflation. 
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The Monetarist Phillips Curve 
Concerning employment, Friedman and his followers assume a “natural rate of 
unemployment which is defined as “rate that would prevail in unfettered and competitive 
labor markets” (Sherman and Evans 1984: 299). The simplistic Phillips Curve, which could 
be understood as a pro-Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy argument, assumes a negative 
correlation between inflation and unemployment. Such a correlation would support 
discretionary monetary policy, since inflation (% to ) by increases in the money supply 
might be able to reduce unemployment (from '% to '), as can be followed in the Phillips 
Curve on left side of figure IX. 
Figure IX: Phillips Curve and Monetarist Phillips Curve 
 
Source: Sherman and Evans 1984: 289, 302 
Monetarism, instead, denies long-term effects of inflation on the unemployment rate. In the 
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national output (U(&%) to U (&) by increasing production that adapts to higher demand 
(see Monetarist Phillips Curve on the right side of figure IX). When inflation reaches the 
(-level, output and employment bounces back to the pre-stimulus level, without any long 
term changes except for inflation. 
Concluding all the recommendations Monetarism provides for central bank officials, it 
advocates for sound monetary policy that cares for taming the money as source of 
disturbance due to itself, especially in a flexible price setting, towards macroeconomic 
stability. The Friedman fellows prefer a “monetary rule” which might be set by a fixed 
percentage that determines the annually money supply in accordance to the respective 
economic growth rate, in order to “keep the economic machine ‘well oiled’” (Sherman and 
Evans 1984: 304). Such an attitude rejects discretionary Keynesian monetary policy and 
promotes sound measures of low money supply in favor of stabilized economic growth. 
4.1.4 The New Classic Economy 
A similar procedure that heralded the fall of Keynesianism in the mid-1970s was observable 
in the early 1980s, since Friedman’s ideas that money supply targeting as a cheap monetary 
policy measure forces inflation rates to drop failed. Former Friedman students founded the 
more radical New Classical Economy (NCE) by filling the gap of collapsing Monetarism. 
NCE protagonists like Thomas Sargent, Robert Lucas and Robert Barro argue that “policy 
makers face no cruel choice between inflation and unemployment over any relevant time 
frame” (Sargent cited in: Stein 1981: 139). In their proposition, there is no chance to 
manipulate the employment by any measure of monetary policy. 
Furthermore, NCE underlines “the inefficiency and wastefulness of the public sector, the 
supposed tendency of state intervention to crowd out private sector activity and the costs of 
accommodating monetary policy” (Filho 2007: 7), while employment concerns have been 
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displaced. NCE promotes monetary policy rules instead of policy discretion in order to suit 
the markets with the most efficient structure to raise economic actors’ confidence. 
Especially the latter is a more psychological aspect that is rooted in the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis (REH) that assumes producers’ forecast of inflation. If a producer 
recognizes, that an excess supply of money creates windfall gains in income of the producer 
as well as its customer and employees, he immediately adopts its produced and supplied 
goods (from % to ) to the increased demand ($% to $) which is met at a higher price (% 
to ) in point c. The REH implies a direct shift from a to b due to the producer’s forecast 
of inflation. 
Figure X: Rational Expectations Hypothesis Explained on the Upward Shift in the 
Industry Supply Curve Caused by the Secondary Effects of a Monetary Stimulation 
 
Source: Sherman and Evans 1984: 301 
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Summarizing this, economic actors directly anticipate their situation and act in accordance 
to its forecasts. Therefore, the Monetarist proclaimed triangular time frame of the supplier’s 
adjustment from point a to b to c is rejected (see Figure X).  
According to the NCE guys, the direct shift of supply due to the forecast of inflation serves 
as justification that government intervention disturbs such anticipations and leads to 
incalculable clutter. In their opinion, price level changes precipitated by monetary policy 
have “no systematic effects upon either the level of output or velocity” (Stein 1981: 139). 
Consequently, NCE argumentation forces central banks to quickly reduce inflation by 
reducing its money supply, while, of much greater importance, such measure needs to be 
accompanied by public announcements which every economic actor is able to apprehend. 
Inflation, adapted supply and demand are revealed as psychologically determined. 
Therefore, information plays a key role, as REH “assumes that information gathering by the 
private sector is efficient, that is, the public is aware of and uses all relevant information in 
forming expectations” (Brimmer and Sinai 1981: 259). The rational expectations hypothesis 
denies learning effects derived from the past and mistrusts macro-economic analytical 
models. In order to ensure that there are no surprises to the public, monetary policy has to 
undergo a structural improvement to effectively manage the interaction between the central 
bank and market agents.  
Translating that paradigm into NCE-favored measures, the state has to restructure its 
institutions to make them more efficient, while it simultaneously has to spur foreign trade 
and investment in order to accumulate the growth-determining resources. 
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4.2 The IMF Financial Programming Model 
4.2.1 How IMF Financial Programming Dominated the Developing World 
The above analyzed big theories of monetary policy provide a great chance to get an 
overview of monetary policy’ as tool to affect inflation, demand, supply, employment, 
output and economic growth. Anyhow, putting it bluntly, important features of monetary 
policy have been forgotten by those ingenious thinkers. What about its impact on output 
composition, on employment diversity, on economic and financial transfers, and, on the 
most relevant aspect, when it comes to poverty reduction, the distribution of wealth and 
income? No answers to such questions, neither by theories nor by the developing world 
dominating model of IMF financial programming, are available. Nonetheless, in order to 
gather some information on monetary policy in practice, the analytical framework of that 
proclaimed global economy stabilizing institution is essential. 
In the late 1950s, the IMF constructed the model of financial programming (FP) that was 
intended to guide developing countries’ fiscal and monetary policy towards macroeconomic 
stabilization. This modeling of macroeconomics is highly political and extremely powerful, 
especially from the 1980s onward, when more and more developing economies have 
exercised IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs as precondition for World 
Bank loans.  
Therefore, understanding this model’s assumptions and recommendations is vital to grasp 
present developing countries’ fiscal and monetary policy options in accordance with such a 
framework, and to, furthermore, develop alternative measures. According to Filho (2007), 
as a framework guideline towards “appropriate” monetary and fiscal policy, FP is based on 
the following assumptions: 
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a) The country’s domestic money supply () is composed by domestic credit (DC) 
and the domestic equivalent of international reserves (IR) 
 = $ + ). 
Domestic credit (DC) is monetized public deficit distributed by the banking system, 
while domestic equivalent of international reserves are net foreign currency reserves 
accumulated by exports abroad but measured in the domestic currency. 
b) It assumes the money demand’s () dependence on the price level (P) and real 
output (Y) 
 =  	(*). 
c) The real income (y) is constant (y=y*). If there are changes in nominal income, it is 
due to the price level (Y=Py). 
d) Exchange rates (FX) are fixed (FX=FX*). 
e) International capital is not freely transferrable. 
f) Exports are fixed (+ = +,) 
At least half of those assumptions are ridiculous in a globalized world economy. 
Nevertheless, in the late fifties some might be applicable. Another weakness is the FP 
model’s starting point which contains various other preconditions like “internal and external 
equilibrium (full employment, balance of payments equilibrium, money supply equal to 
money demand – i.e., no inflation)”.  
If all those assumptions were given, an increase of money supply () would outstrip 
money demand (), spending increases, since money holders can afford more 
consumption. Here, FP modeling differentiates between spending in tradable goods and 
non-tradables. While the former creates inflation at this stage, the latter spurs the demand 
for imports. That creates a negative trade balance and a balance of payments deficit.  
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Those imports are paid with foreign currency reserves (IR) which decline. As component of 
money supply ( = $ + )), this reduction in IR bounces money supply back to its 
previous level. The final results are inflation and a balance of payments deficit through 
exhausted foreign currency reserves. 
Similar to the new classical economics, the IMF FP model blames the government to be a 
source of that outcome as the only macroeconomic actor that is able to manipulate 
domestic credit (DC). The IMF holds the view: “whenever a country faces persistent 
inflation and balance of payments deficits, this must be due to the excess domestic 
absorption created by a fiscal deficit and an accommodating monetary policy” (Filho 2007: 
10). 
Derived from the FP model, the IMF advises its lending customers, for the most part 
developing countries, to carry out contractionary fiscal and monetary policy measures, in 
order to annihilate inflation and balance of payments deficits. Such calls imply domestic 
credit limitations. Furthermore, the IMF financial programming promotes import 
liberalization, currency devaluation and macroeconomic policy reforms. 
While monetary and fiscal policy measures have no impact on real output, as suggested by 
the FP model, import liberalization is detected as tool that “increase[s] competition in the 
domestic market, raise[s] the productivity of capital and labour and foster[s] trade 
specialization according to the country’s comparative advantage” (Filho 2007: 10). 
Additionally currency devaluation is expected to reduce production costs and the profits of 
the export sector, while it is simultaneously favoring the domestic production of tradable 
goods as it increases the prices of imported goods. On the contrary, government investment 
is also hampered, if that requires imported technologies. On this account, “a general 
positive relationship between devaluation and output is questionable [, since] the decrease in 
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the relative prices of the traded goods producing sectors is far from being automatically 
linked to an increase in the level of activity of these sectors [, as] the pace and the extent to 
which the traded sectors can absorb resources liberated by other sectors is limited by a 
variety of technological, economic and social factors” (Buira 1983: 125).   
Macroeconomic changes are the FP core postulations; in detail they include: 
a) “Fiscal and monetary policy discipline, making it possible to cut down government deficit, 
control inflation and reduce the scope for government intervention in the economy. This 
includes tax increases, public spending cuts, higher interest rates and privatizations. 
b) Shift of government spending away from capital investment and direct economic 
intervention, and towards the provision of public goods, especially health and education. 
c) Economic deregulation, to allow the price system to signal correctly relative scarcities and 
consumer preferences. 
d) Domestic financial liberalization, so as to raise real interest rates, stimulate savings and raise 
the returns on investment. 
e) Labour market reforms to increase flexibility and raise productivity. Such reforms include 
changes in hiring and firing rules, decentralizing labour relations, curtailing trade union 
rights, eliminating collective agreements and protective regulation, and reducing social 
security benefits. 
f) Liberalisation of the capital account of the balance of payments, so as to attract foreign 
savings, improve the balance of payments, absorb foreign technology and facilitate access to 
foreign markets. 
g) Legal reforms, primarily intended to increase property rights protection”. 
Source: Filho 2007: 11 
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Such macroeconomic structural reforms, prospected from an FP angle, are expected to 
cause recession in the short-run (1-2 years) but promise to bear long-term efficiency 
increases and GDP growth. 
Those deductive guidelines are latently contradicting. Opposite measures like reduction of 
government intervention and tax increases, foreign technology absorption and import 
hampering devaluation, as well as detection of consumer preferences while favoring 
tradable goods. Filho criticizes that this model is far away from the realities developing 
countries have to face, since they do not feature smoothly working markets and 
employment rates close to full employment, just to mention some of further assumptions 
that entail the FP model’s working (see Filho 2007: 10). 
More drastically, Agenor and Montiel pack their findings into a verbal deathblow while 
arguing: “Although all of the (Bank and Fund) models to be examined have been applied 
frequently in policy formulation in developing nations, we shall argue that all of them are 
subject to limitations that constrain their usefulness for both policy guidance and analytical 
work as medium-term models” (Agenor and Montiel 1999 cited in: Easterly 2006: 978). 
Another curious aspect of the FP model is perceived by Easterly who is wondering “how 
unchanged it has remained over the years despite the large changes in macroeconomic 
theory and empirics” (Easterly 2006: 966). Therefore, it provides an easy target for its 
critics, while the tragedy lies in its pigheadedness accompanied by the political and financial 
power to decide about people’s lives and deaths.  
Besides that deadly tragedy, IMF and World Bank enforce these targets with the “aim to 
make these policy reforms irreversible through the transfer of ‘policy ownership’ to the local 
governments (i.e., ensuring permanent compliance with the imperatives of creditors and 
international financial organizations)” (Filho 2007: 11). Once governments are part of it due 
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to their pressure of financial needs, they become IFI’s slaves condemned to follow their 
policies, while losing their fiscal and monetary policy sovereignty. These losses hamper their 
fulfillment of their actual tasks. Governments act with the overall objective of 
macroeconomic stability rather than to ensure their peoples’ wealth. Central banks are 
obliged to the IFIs instead of carrying out its policy in accordance with its government. 
Under these circumstances the whole development process is undermined and the era of 
financial colonization heralded in the 1980s seems to be conserved for the next decades. 
4.2.2 The Sad Story of HIPC-I and HIPC-II 
Section 3 already dealt with the failure of structural adjustment programs to achieve 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth as promoted by the Washington Consensus, 
while it worsened the poverty pressure. Therefore, calls for conditionality changes, amongst 
others by Joseph Stiglitz, came up during the mid and late 1990s. Pro-poor sector debt-relief 
was promoted by the IMF and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative 
(HIPC-1) in 1996, provided for countries that implemented sound fiscal and monetary 
policies. The judgment, whether these policies are sound enough to be qualified for debt relief, was 
delivered by the Fund and the Bank.  
During the following three years it became obvious that those conditionalities exceeded 
applying countries’ feasibilities and the implementation of such reforms would take too 
much time, which led to HIPC-2. The second version of the failed initiative was adjusted to 
facilitate debt relief much faster and to stronger accentuate pro-poor policy measures on 
“basic health, education, agriculture and water”, but was rooted in the same old thinking 
and analytical tool, namely the five-decade old FP model.  
Weeks and McKinley, who carried out a country case study on Zambia which qualified for 
HIPC-2 in 2000, came to the conclusion “that when all calculations are carried out and 
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attendant conditionalities on policymaking are taken into account, HIPC debt relief 
provides marginally less fiscal space, rather than more” (Weeks and McKinley 2006: 19). 
Burnside and Fanizza go one step further in their critics, as they proclaim that the HIPC 
“initiative might simply be an indirect way to ensure that increased aid flows are used to 
increase government spending on programs favored by donors, as opposed to programs 
that might be preferred by local policymakers” (Burnside and Fanizza 2005: 3).  
Figure XI: The Recipient Governments Optimal Decisions Prior to Debt Relief (left 
side) and After Debt Relief with HIPC Conditionality (right side) 
 
Source: Burnside and Fanizza 2005: 27 
The developed an interesting model that is worthy to mention at this point. This preference 
model describes the negotiation between donor and recipient government concerning their 
preferences. The donor would increase official development assistance (ODA) or debt 
relief, when government purchase on -, for instance donor favoring machine imports, will 
be realized, while there is no taste for poverty reducing government purchases on -. from 
his side. U(-, -.) describes the level satisfaction concerning the composition of both 
government purchases. Prior the debt relief, the donor and recipient government negotiated 
Prior Debt Relief After Debt Relief 
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to meet in -
∗,-.
∗ (left side), since the donor tolerates that some of its ODA is spent on 
poverty reduction (-.), while half of it comes back via machinery purchases (-). Before 
debt relief, the donor asks the recipient government for raising the machinery purchases 
(-) by at least the intended reduction of debt by the same amount (∆). The thick donor-set 
budget line reveals that the government will purchase more machinery as before, while 
poverty reducing government purchases remain the same. Just the composition of 
government purchases have changed and the fiscal constraints have been tightened. 
Such conditionality was not intended by the fund’s fathers. This is evidenced by Keynes’ 
attitude as chairman of the World Bank establishing Commission II, as he “favoured the 
retention of maximum freedom by member countries and […] was contrary to allowing the 
IMF any authority to interfere in matters of domestic policy” (Buira 1982: 111). Exactly the 
opposite has been experienced for decades under SAPs; and recently the HIPC initiative 
additionally encourages donors to tighten the already squeezed developing countries’ fiscal 
space. 
4.2.3 Imprudent Prioritization and Inflation Stabilization 
The above described orthodoxies of Monetarism, New Classical Economics, as well as the 
paradigms that have been put into practice like financial programming, structural 
adjustment programs and HIPC initiatives expect monetary policy to balance savings and 
investment, to keep the inflation rate low and to equilibrate the balance of payments at the 
same time. Filho argues, “if interest rates have to fulfill these three roles simultaneously, 
they will tend to be permanently high, because they cannot fall below the highest of these 
three levels” (Filho 2007: 13). If interest rates are kept permanently high, monetary policy is 
damned to be passive and its potential power is wasted on objectives like macroeconomic 
stability and inflation targeting.  
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IMF and World Bank practices strongly focused on inflation targeting in order to secure fair 
resource allocation and to strengthen market efficiency. They suggest “contractionary” fiscal 
and monetary policies. Concerning fiscal policy, the attribute “contractionary” means either 
increased taxes or reduced government spending, while in terms of monetary policy, it 
contains measures of money supply reduction or to raise interest rates. 
As empirical analyses revealed, there is no reason to promote inflation targeting as high 
priority objective in low-income countries, since low inflation does not necessarily lead to 
higher growth rates and rising unemployment rates. Filho (2007) ascertained such a missing 
trade-off between inflation and growth by studying the economic performance of four 
randomly chosen developed economies (France Ireland, UK and the USA) as well as seven 
developing economies (Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, 
Republic of Korea and Thailand). Futhermore, Filho postulates that inflation control is 
counterproductive, especially in Sub-Saharan African countries, where other factors besides 
inflation like market malfunctions and many other processes hamper economic growth and 
expose their syndromes of high inflation rates. Therefore, inflation control should not be 
the first step to eliminate inefficient markets and inflation. Without any question, monetary 
and fiscal policies conducted in the IMF’s and World Bank’s contractionary understanding 
is able to reduce inflation rates. But the question is which price their followers have to pay. 
Filho put that answer bluntly in arguing that such prioritization “is rarely compatible with 
sustained growth, macroeconomic stability, or the achievement of pro-poor outcomes. 
Contractionary policies frequently stifle growth, transfer income to the financial sector and 
the rich, and tend to conflict with the goals of pro-poor fiscal policy, increasing its costs 
and, possibly, even rendering it ineffective” (Filho 2007: 18).  
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The Bank’s and Fund’s proclaimed universality of such inflation-growth trade-off is clearly 
wrong. Rather it depends on the individual country’s economic, financial and institutional 
structure.     
In the 1980s, when balance of payments problems drastically worsened, the IMF introduced 
inflation stabilization programs to low- and middle-income countries and, complemented by 
structural adjustment programs, left coordinated development policies no chance to survive. 
Sub-Saharan African suffered under severe balance of payments deficits which the IMF was 
willing to finance under its financial programming conditions. IMF organized inflows to 
some extent stabilized the balances of payments but simultaneously caused decreases in 
demand and employment. Real wages adapted to lower levels, since the IMF’s program 
accompanying import liberalization forced the domestic firms to produce cheaper in order 
to compete with increasing imports. While IMF payments helped inflation to decrease and 
the balances of payments to stabilize, “in most cases the economies failed to react. 
Unemployment and underemployment mounted, inequality rose and social tensions 
climbed” (Filho 2007: 34). 
In countries that are featured by lower inflation rates, the IMF applies inflation targeting 
(IT). As IT became en vogue as the monetary policy paradigm, also developing countries 
adopted its policies during the 1990s. Monetary policy rules in the New Classical 
Economics’ understanding dictated the central bank’s transparency. In accordance with the 
NCE paradigm, economic actors can better foresee central bank activities and adapt their 
own actions. Consequently, the developmental state as contributor to employment 
generation, sustainable economic growth and distribution of income diminished in favor of 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policies. IT hits the nominal interest rate and somehow 
plays with the economic actors’ expectations of inflation. For instance, the central bank 
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estimates high inflation rates in the next three years, because of high aggregate demand, it 
will raise the nominal rates of interest, less money is lend; aggregate demand deceases and 
the inflation rate decreases towards its targeted pendant. This psychological game based on 
NCE could work if financial markets work efficiently which might be doubted in most 
African economies. At first the communication of the central bank to every economic actor 
is questioned; secondly IT requires low unemployment rates to effectively impact aggregate 
demand; thirdly the absolute focus on pure inflation control ignores disturbances caused by 
international capital flows and the financial sector as potential disturber evoking much 
worse prospective damage than inflation rate fluctuations. 
Of course, hyperinflation might have negative consequences for the poor as prices increase 
and affordable goods become unpayable, which also hampers growth, “but empirical 
assessment of moderate inflation (around 10-40 per cent) show that it is not correlated with 
low or falling GDP growth rates, low or falling investment (including both domestic and 
foreign investment), high or rising unemployment, or a deteriorating distribution of income 
or rising poverty. And it does not tend to accelerate” (Filho 2007: 24). In contrary, 
monetary contraction leading to too low inflation might lead to low wages which negatively 
affects demand emptying into slow growth. Additionally, the optimal rate of inflation varies; 
hence strictly set targets might be counterproductive. Concerning developing economies, 
much more than inflation tackling is needed, especially when it is bound to structural 
adjustment programs that deny any role of fiscal and monetary policy that potentially could 
directly tackle poverty by simple measures. 
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5. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PRO-POOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
5.1 Individual vs. Universal Analytical Frameworks 
It is simply insufficient and naïve to force individual countries to adopt a set of policy 
measures, dictated as universally valid, in different national settings. It should be up to the 
respective countries’ policy makers to decide about objectives-priorities. Conditionality 
hampers development, growth prospects and, more tragically, poverty reduction. Each 
government as representative of its people should be allowed in concert with its central 
bank to elaborate the most efficient development strategy that sets the rules to achieve the 
country-specific prioritized objectives. The sections on fiscal and monetary policy 
demonstrated possible measures that might help to decide about opportune policy paths. 
5.2 Fiscal Policy Matters 
Relaxed fiscal policy space which allows higher government expenditures affects the trade 
balance, but reduces national saving, which in turn increases the risk of indebtedness. 
Rationally, developing countries’ overall objectives are poverty reduction, growth and 
avoidance of further debts, whereby balanced trade, in order to stabilize the exchange rate 
and prices, is a medium priority goal. 
Concerning the measures of fiscal policy one has to keep in mind, that on the one hand 
taxation is an effective tool for the equal distribution of wealth and to fight poverty. On the 
other hand Classical, Monetarist, Neoliberal, and New Classical Economist theories argue 
that it discourages investment. If any developing country’s government puts inflation 
tackling in order to spur growth on the agenda as objective with the highest priority, it will 
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soon realize that poverty and starvation also scare away investment. Every (long-term) 
investor seeks stability and is not interested in low taxation and cheap labor, while crime 
rates are high and diseases cause burglaries and loss of production, especially in labor-
intensive sectors. Therefore, fighting poverty is a rational overall goal to attract investment 
that spurs growth.  
Limited fiscal policy space cannot fight poverty, and by no means, spur growth and 
development. This paper advocates flexible fiscal policy that reacts on particular developing 
economy’s needs during particular phases and particular settings. For example, one imagines 
a resource-rich but poor developing economy without going into detail, the following mind 
game will expose the necessity of flexibility to deal with fiscal issues: 
In the imagined economy, the extraordinary demand for raw-materials allows high taxes on 
extractive industries in order to secure public revenue, whereby taxation is used to fight 
poverty and distribute wealth equally. If inflation is below the magic trigger rate of 40%, the 
government should not take measure to fight it as an overall objective. Although trade 
balance equilibrium is important to stabilize exchange rates and prices, in the short-run 
import-liberalization might be wrong, since domestic small and medium scale enterprises 
face too much competition from abroad. If poverty rates are achieved to be moderate, 
taxation and import tariffs can be slightly relaxed in order to attract investment. Although 
import-substitution and devaluation are measures that are able to support the creation of 
small-scale and medium-scale businesses, the latter slightly have to increase productivity to 
enable these enterprises to compete with other firms in the global market after being 
strengthened by the former protective shield of tariffs. Hereby, it is necessary that state 
support, financed by extractive industry taxation and invested in the agriculture sector in the 
former stage, raised the prices for agricultural goods and created mass-demand on more 
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advanced products, which puts small- and medium-scale industries into play. On this stage 
of development, macroeconomic stability is decisive to attract investment. 
Disregarding the populist and simplistic suggestions how development “should” happen, 
this example highlights fiscal policy space as an active backup of development, or, in the 
worst case, passive development hampering element. Governments know its country’s 
features and problems best and are, in terms of democracy, controlled by their population. 
The Millennium Development Goals are another good motivating initiative, although 
support from the giver community’s money is predominantly supervised and channeled by 
the two hegemonic fiscal policy space restricting IFIs, namely the World Bank and the IMF. 
Anyhow, there are very good chances for developing countries’ governments to disengage 
from this perceived “fiscal colonization”, since the combination of rising global demand in 
natural resources and (relatively) new donors in Africa like China and India advances 
African countries in the position to choose. Besides the Chinese principle of non-interference, 
which puts the Washington consensus clique under pressure, African governments face 
other opportunities of rent-seeking. Hence, if China does not change its pragmatic 
“economy first, standards second” doctrine based on half-century long principles, while the 
Western “Paris-harmonizers” turn in macerating the conditionality paradigm in order to 
make China part of the donor system, African governments become more responsible in 
fiscal policy questions. Then, the African ministries of finance hopefully evidence this 
chapter’s title. 
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5.3 Pro-Poor Monetary Policy 
In stark contrast to the above outlined orthodox economic, as well as IMF and World Bank, 
paradigms, pro-poor oriented alternative economists suggest that “[m]onetary policy can 
contribute to the success of a pro-poor development strategy” (Filho 2007: 13). 
Chapter 3 on fiscal policy and the section above revealed some possible fiscal policy 
measures like taxation (cuts), tariff (cuts), public investment and government spending. 
These possible pro-poor and growth supportive policies need to be carried out in 
accordance with the central bank. If governments, for instance, decide to give money to the 
poor in-hand, money supply and interest rates calibration decides about the real value of 
that money, prices and spending behavior. Hence, the power of active monetary policy is 
also a demand and supply steering one. If the government aims at lower individual saving 
rates, it asks the central bank to somehow stabilize the inflation via its nominal interest 
rates, whereby it should never be the overall goal, putting poverty reduction and sustainable 
economic growth in the backseat. If the magic trigger of 40 per cent is far from being 
outstripped, there is no need to mainly focus on inflation tackling. Instead, the central bank 
as foreign currency buyer and lender needs to cope with the balance of payments and the 
real exchange rate. Especially the latter is very important when it comes to import 
substitution. Devaluation hampers imports; it therefore forfends competition with imports 
on the domestic market, which gains time to develop competitive small and medium scale 
industries via increased productivity. 
The financial sector in developing economies, especially in Sub-Saharan countries except for 
the case of South Africa, lacks of efficiency, volatility and capital. Even here monetary 
policy plays a major role as it is able to allocate targeted credits to priority sectors, while it 
simultaneously fulfils its banking sector supervising role. Such credits are of major 
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importance. Where insecurity resides, private banks will hesitate to invest. Poor, small- and 
medium-scale enterprises do not have good chances to receive credits from private banks 
because of their inability to securities and back-ups. Either the central bank could help the 
government to found special development banks, or it provides special incentives for 
private banks to invest in pro-poor projects; loans of interest rates below the nominal level 
might be an appropriate measurement.  
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6. PR CHINA - ROLE MODEL FOR PRO-POOR FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY 
? 
6.1 Several Features of China’s Astonishing Development 
6.1.1 The Chinese Trial and Error Mode 
As the world’s largest and tremendously rapid growing economy with GDP increases of 
steady 10 percent over the last decade, while it still keeps the status as developing country, 
China is stigmatized as fascinating, probably unique, growth model. Although Neoliberal 
academia might not doubt its proved success, concerns are raised that question whether 
China could have performed better under the historically given circumstances. Indeed, 
bursting the bubble of Chinese self-praising, after some disastrous decades before 1979, any 
kind of fiscal and monetary policy change would have been fruitful, “since China’s 
economic resources were grossly underutilized and misallocated, with 70 to 80 percent of 
the labor force in the rural sector largely unemployed or underemployed” (Riedel, Gin and 
Gao 2007: 2). Moreover, Naughton (1995) and Rawski (1994) characterize the following 
reforms as “gradual” and “experimental” as appropriate but suboptimal. Opposing these 
authors, other approaches like those of Riedel (1993), Sachs and Woo (1994) argue that 
more the set of conditions in 1979, instead of the undertaken measures, led to progress 
concerning economic development. 
6.1.2 Agricultural Miracle 
When Deng Xiaoping, officially head of state but practically the country’s leader, initiated 
economic reforms in 1979, incentives and institutions have been created that enabled 
structural change and growth. During the agricultural reform 1979-1985, family farming has 
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gradually been restored, which replaced agricultural collectives by 1984. This “household 
responsibility system, under which collectively owned land was assigned to individual 
households that were free to sell their output at market determined prices after fulfilling 
their contractual obligation to deliver a portion of output to the state at the government-
fixed procurement price” induced the actual output growth of 7.6 percent from 1979 to 
1984 (Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007: 5). In the same period, the per capita income rose by 15 
percent.  
As demand highlighting development and growth analysts like Keynes suggests, agriculture 
as demand-into-supply-transforming factors in a given economy functions as decisive 
multiplier. The latter is evidenced by the fact that the Chinese rural population either put 
their surpluses on bank accounts, in credit cooperatives or invested those in new rural 
enterprises (World Bank 2003). In either way, such activities alleviated local enterprises to 
get credits for their project financing. Hence, the share of Chinese enterprises in rural areas 
doubled within seven years from 7 to 14 percent (World Bank 2003). 
6.1.3 State-Ownership 
Since the Chinese government ranked the heavy industry first in their list of priorities, 
agricultural reform was just one measure on the path of government-steered 
industrialization as initial feature that was expected to generate direct investment into the 
state-owned heavy industry. Besides political reasons, state ownership remained necessary, 
since “lack of comparative advantage […] caused central planning, state ownership of 
industry, high levels of protection, and industrial subsidies” (Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007: 7). 
Nonetheless, the CPC recognized the underperformance of state-owned corporations 
(SOCs) and, therefore, it accorded SOCs expanded freedom in production and investment 
decisions as well as more leeway in funding and management issues. Until the mid-1990s, 
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Chinese SOCs performed less than moderate, since “one-third of the country’s SOEs incur 
explicit losses, one-third incur implicit losses, and only the remaining one-third are making 
profit” (Lin, Cai and Li 2003: 156). Furthermore, they negatively affected Chinese state-
owned banks that accounted more and more nonperforming loans in their balance sheets 
(Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007). 
6.1.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
Known as the greater Chinese economy, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong attracted huge 
amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) which caused the ongoing economic tie despite 
fundamental political differences since 1979. Within this regional growth, “China has 
become the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries” (Zhang 2002: 165). 
Between 1992 and 1998, Hong Kong and Taiwan have been the main investors in mainland 
China, whereby Hong Kong carried the lion’s share with FDI inflows of about $125.3 
billion, followed by Taiwan with $19.5 billion. 
These large FDI inflows, in concert with its immediate neighbors, enabled the PRC “to 
upgrade its industrial structure through the absorption of the advanced technology 
embodied in such investment” (Zhang 2002: 167). Especially the non-state sector profited 
from FDI increases, because it enabled the labor-intensive sectors to play out its trump card 
of its comparative advantage of relatively low labor costs, facilitated by shrunk restrictions 
and the “liberalization of the foreign trade and investment regimes, proceeded 
incrementally, gradually replacing administrative controls on imports and exports with 
tariffs and quotas and then subsequently reducing tariff rates and abolishing quotas” 
(Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007: 13). Except for a few sensitive product groupings, the monopoly 
of the state’s trading corporations was abolished, too (Lardy 2003). After China’s WTO-
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accession in 2001, according to Wu (2004), Beijing dropped its average tariff rates from 43 
percent in 1991 to 15 percent in 2001 and below 10 percent in 2004. 
While FDI in state-owned enterprises remained relatively stable of around RMB 35 billion 
over the last two decades, collectively owned companies experienced a gradually growing 
FDI contribution to their businesses starting in 1991 over constantly RMB 20 billion until 
2001. Most apparent beneficiaries are private enterprises that received exponentially 
growing numbers of FDI inflow since 1992 to RMB 240 billion in 2003 (compare Riedel, 
Jin and Gao 2007). 
6.1.5 Village Enterprises and SEZs as Driving Forces 
Riedel, Jin and Gao (2007) also make clear that the tremendous growth, China experienced 
since the 1980s, was mainly caused by non-state enterprises, largely collectively owned 
township and village enterprises which have been able to operate between the state’s 
restrictive pressure on wholly-private and unprofitable SOCs beyond market competition. 
The economic performance of such village enterprises is related to the respective regional 
governments, since the contemporary Special Economic Zone (SEZ) growth model was 
originated by the introduction of the profit contract system that allowed sub-national 
governments “to retain revenues they collected above and beyond those they have 
contracted to transfer to higher-level governments, and in turn were required to finance 
their own expenditures through self-generated and shared revenues” (Riedel, Jin and Gao 
2007: 11). Therefore, regional governments were put in a position to actively manage 
economic development.  
6.1.6 Regional State Classes for Development Management  
This process can be considered as efficient rent-seeking by the regional state class in the 
Elsenhansian understanding as the central leading group in developing countries. The term 
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is derived from the Marxian understanding of classes. Coalescing the structures of 
developing countries and the Marxian cognitions, Elsenhans defines the state class and its 
members as entities, who “are participated in the process of surplus accumulation as income 
of this apparatus via bureau. They decide over its distribution and investment. They steer 
labor and pursue tasks in state-owned firms and state integrated political and social 
organizations” (translated from Elsenhans 1981: 122). Combining this with Hartle’s 
approach arguing that “’Rent seeking’ can be defined comprehensively as investment of real 
resources undertaken by individuals or groups (coalition) of individuals with similar 
interests in the expectation of obtaining an increase (avoiding a decrease) in their income 
wealth as a result of securing (blocking) legal rights; or maximizing the benefit (minimizing 
the cost) of earlier policy changes that created non-exclusive rights.” (Hartle 1983: 543). In 
such an activity, transaction costs are incurred on competition for changes in rights or to 
maximize benefits from existing rights. 
This was exactly the case when these structural changes created “strong incentives for 
subnational governments to engage directly in economic activity, leading to the 
development of rural township and village enterprises, which flourished in the 1980s” 
(Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007: 11). This gives Elsenhans’ idea of “Overcoming rent by using 
rent” a new meaning on the meso-level, as the “efficient regional state class” uses its right to 
allocate resources in an efficient way, while it simultaneously raises profits of the respective 
village enterprises. Since they were collectively owned, they could compete with private 
enterprises which have been restrained by the Chinese government and utilize their 
comparative advantage based on low labor costs in the rural area. Therefore, in the long-run 
a new bourgeois class was formed which will be able to eliminate its creator, namely the 
“efficient regional state class”.   
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6.1.7 Socialist Market Economy Development 
The government’s decision to give its regional governments more autonomy backfired in 
the 1990s, when these “vassals” started own protectionist measures. In the meantime, more 
and more SOCs have not been able to repay the loans provided by state-owned banks. As 
the government seemed to lose its measures to react on the ongoing inflation, it endorsed 
the “socialist market economy” at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, accepting the 
private sector as “a supplementary component of the economy” (Qian and Wu 2000: 10). 
Simultaneously, it regained control over fiscal policy issues in introducing the “tax 
assignment system [to] recentralize the monetary system” (Riedel, Jin and Gao 2007: 12).  
On this stage it has to be concluded that the importance of the private sector including 
collective enterprises played a major role in China’s economic performance during the last 
three decades. According to Riedel, Jin and Gao (2007), the contribution of private firms to 
GDP was about nothing in the mid-1980s, while it gradually rose to 75 percent in 2004 
including collective enterprises. 
6.2 Beijing’s Fiscal Policy 
6.2.1 Fiscal Decentralization 
Lin and Liu concluded their findings based on data from 1970 to 1993 that the Chinese 
decentralized fiscal system contributed to its growth (see Lin and Liu 2000). Initiated in 
1980, the decentralized fiscal system featured contract-determined intergovernmental 
spending and revenue regulations. Such a regulatory system enabled the central and local 
governments to negotiate the tax rates and expenditures, as well as revenue transfers from 
the local to the central government. In 1994, the very “fiscal contraction system” was 
abolished by the implementation of the “separating tax system” which disarranged the 
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revenue responsibility both governmental levels and simultaneously increased each level’s 
accountability and transparency. The changes in central and provincial fiscal revenue, 
demonstrated in figure XII, reveal that the “separating tax system” suited the central 
authorities with more fiscal space, since the central budgetary revenue increased, while the 
provincial budgetary revenue decreased. Nevertheless, provincial overall fiscal revenues, like 
during the pre-fiscal-reform period, continued to exceed those of the central government. 
Figure XII: Changes in central and provincial fiscal revenue in percent,  
     1980-2002 
 
Source: Ding 2007: 247 
Although fiscal revenues increased from a central government perspective, their share in 
government spending dropped constantly after 1994, while provincial government spending 
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increased reciprocally to central spending from almost 55 percent in 1985 over 63 percent in 
1993 to almost 74 percent in 2002 (see Ding 2007: 246). Government spending and revenue 
are strongly dependent on the economic power of the respective province, and, therefore, 
differ between regions. These fiscal disparities are evidenced for the year of 1998 in detail 
by table A-V in this paper’s annex. Beijing, for instance, exceeds the total revenues of 
Guizhou by a factor of nearly seventeen. 
Figure XIII: Composition of Revenue Collection, 1978-99 
 
Source: World Bank 2002: 5 
In the late 1970s to the early 1980s, relatively to China’s GDP growth, the share of the 
central government’s revenue grew in comparison to its provincial counterparts, as 
represented in figure XIII. This has been reversed in following decade, when the central 
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revenue-to-GDP ratio fell faster than those of the regions. From 1996 onwards, both GDP-
related revenues reached equilibrium in the following three years. Ding analyzed 
decentralization’s impact on growth statistically and found variations in the correlation of 
fiscal decentralization to economic growth in the Eastern, Central and Western regions. In 
the Eastern and Central provinces decentralized revenues and spending clearly contributed 
to regional growth, but concerning the Western provinces such correlation is more 
complex, since decentralized spending significantly contributes to growth, while the revenue 
decentralization hampers the region’s prosperity. This can be explained by the fact “that 
expenditure is typically far more decentralized than revenue in most provinces” (Ding 2002: 
254). Hence, investment which lacks behind in the Western part plays a crucial role as it is 
the major source of revenue. When such revenue is more centralized, in fact mainly 
allocated by the central government, in comparison to regional government purchases, the 
local governments in the Western region face huge difficulties to spur growth. Nonetheless, 
the fiscal reforms enabled such governments across all regions to adequately adapt their 
spending behavior to the local economies’ needs.  
6.2.2 Tax System in Transition 
Before Deng’s reforms, revenues and profits became property of the central government, 
although they have been collected by regional authorities. The latter’s revenues were 
negotiated with the central authority. In 1979, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) benefited 
from a tax reform that provided the partial opportunity to gain profit which was foireseen 
to remain within the corporation. The so-called tax substitute for profit was introduced in 
order to push SOEs towards profit-maximization. Instead of directly transferring these 
profits to the government, the reform came up with several kinds of new taxes. Until 1984, 
SOEs were obliged to pay the corporate income tax of 55 percent. As part of the 1984 tax 
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reform, corporate income tax has been supplemented by a more complex tax structure 
containing another ten sorts of taxes, namely product tax, value-added tax, salt tax, natural 
resource tax, adjustment tax (after-corporate-income-tax-profits, housing tax, land tax, 
vehicle tax, city construction tax and maintenance tax. 
The year 1989 earmarked another transitional step in the Chinese tax system. Since the old 
tax system was insufficient in allocating governmental revenues, SOEs first had to pay the 
above mentioned sorts of taxes and additionally transfer parts of their profit to the 
government as SOEs’ owner, while small and medium scale enterprises have been favored 
by a corporate income tax reduction to 35 percent, compared to the same SOEs’ tax 
contribution of remaining 55 percent. As discussed in the section on fiscal decentralization, 
the total revenue share in GDP was on its low of 12.6 percent in 1993, while the central 
government’s share was even lower. Therefore, the introduction of the tax sharing system 
(TSS) in 1994 should reverse the governmental income decline. Taxes have been split into 
national, local and join taxes (see Lin 2009: 29).  
The mid-1990s fiscal reforms uplifted the value added taxes (VATs), while the former 
product tax was abolished in favor of the new business tax. National tax-payers became 
equalized and the structure of the tax system has been simplified by assigning central 
revenues allocated by the national tax system (NTS), whereby provincial government 
collected its income via local tax systems. The dual corporate income tax system 
distinguished between national corporations and foreign-invested enterprises. Dependent 
on their investment-derivation, national corporations delivered a corporate income tax rate 
of 33 percent, while the new law favored foreign direct investment (FDI) by a much lower 
rate of 15 percent in special economic areas. FDI and private enterprises played an 
important role for Chinas economic growth, especially during the 1990s, when the 
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government spurred such development with the new tax regime. FDI attraction as 
development momentum was determined by the exceptional position of foreign invested 
enterprises which experienced tremendous tax reductions. In the first two operational years 
after producing profitably, foreign-invested corporations were exempted from income tax. 
During the third to fifth year, just half of the corporate tax had to be transferred. Such fiscal 
policy incentives cannot be overemphasized, as they pro-actively directed locally needed 
resources to primarily special economic zones (SEZs). Such a policy enabled an annually 
GDP per capita growth rate of almost 9 percent from 1990 to the Asian financial crisis in 
1997.  
6.2.3 Chinese Features of Keynesian Fiscal Policy 
As an aftermath of the crisis, the PRC adopted a clear Keynesian demand-focusing 
approach, while promoting a more aggressive fiscal policy including increased spending (see 
Lin 2009: 32). In May 1998, China’s growth was negative and the threat of deflation 
emerged. Government spending on infrastructure construction was detected to be the most 
appropriate solution to countervail rising unemployment and bankruptcy. The state-owned 
commercial banks, namely Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of 
China, Bank of China as well as China Construction Bank, issued treasury bonds with an 
overall value of RMB100 billion to infrastructure construction funds with an annual interest 
rate of 5,5 percent. Central and local governments decided to split this financial endeavor. 
Backed by the 54th article of Budgetary Law and approved by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, the Fund should invest in: 
1. Irrigation networks and ecological environment preservation 
2. Telecommunication and transportation, including roads, railways and key airports 
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3. Environmental protection projects and infrastructure facilities, including water and 
gas supply as well as heating 
4. Grain depots 
5. Rural and urban power grids 
6. Construction of affordable houses and accommodations 
Information collected from Jia 2002: 618-19 
In the same year, these huge financial transfers from the state-owned banks to the fund 
galvanized the central government to issue RMB270 billion of long-term treasury bonds, so-
called T-bonds, “into the banks to replenish their capital” (Jia 2002: 619). 
Despite the above delineated measures attenuated the economy’s situation, the PRC’s pro-
active policy revealed its full power during the last months of 1999, in order to support the 
export sector and to strengthen domestic consumption via the following incentives: 
1. RMB 60 billion for infrastructure, technological innovation, investments in high 
technologies, education and research. Additionally incentives should enable SOEs 
to upgrade their technologies. 
2. Direct income increases to the rural and urban consumers to make them spend 
more with special focus on low- and medium-income households; subsistence for 
unemployed workers, rising wages for public employees as well as retirement 
pensions to former SOE-employees. The whole package amounted RMB 54 billion. 
3. Tax reforms in favor of the export sector including: 
(a) Export tax refunds valued by RMB 62.2 billion 
(b) Technological upgrading deduct from corporate income tax by 40 percent 
(c) Reductions in business tax, contract tax and land value-added tax in order to 
     reanimate the real estate sector 
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(d) Tax incentives to spur technological innovation and attract FDI 
(e) As a major force to make the people abandon their spending behavior in favor 
    of consumption, the regulation restored the tax on savings held in interest bound 
    bank deposits   
Based on and partly incurred from Jia 2002: 619-20 
This expansionary policy of 1998 and 1999 was continued in 2000 by issuing another 
RMB100 billion of T-bonds mainly to support the ongoing projects, but also add some new 
features like investments on tourist facilities, schoolhouses, agricultural research and 
development (R&D) as well as upgrading the military industry. The discretionary fiscal 
policy became normality in China from 1998 to 2001, since in that’s period last year, the 
Ministry of Finance issued another package of RMB150 billion. Two-thirds funded the 
former years’ projects and the rest was partially spend on the Quinghai-Tibet railway. 
The astonishing expenditures during the post-crisis years of the late 1990s are summarized 
in table I.   
Table I: Bond Issuing, Fiscal Contribution to GDP Growth, 1998-2001 
 
Source: Jia 2002: 621 
The fiscal contribution to GDP growth reveals, that China invested huge amounts of 
money to keep the GDP growth stable, while it Beijing hazarded the consequences of 
worsening the Ministry of Finance’s fiscal deficits. The latter worsened drastically since 
1998, while it performed at a stable level of RMB237 to RMB293 million from 1991 to 
1993, and experienced the same stability on a higher level of RMB575 and RMB582 million 
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from 1994 to 1997. Table II indicates a sharp increase of China’s fiscal deficit caused by its 
aggressive fiscal policy to the tenfold of its level in 1991. The proportional increase of 
annual debt issuing explains that the maintained economic growth was mainly debt-
financed. 
Table II: Basic Fiscal Statistics of China in RMB100 million, 1990-2000 
 
Source: Jia 2002: 622 
The Chinese feature of Keynesian fiscal policy was extended to 2004 justified by the 
2001/9/11 attacks which heavily distorted the global economic climate. During the years 
after the attacks, the PRC’s government issued another RMB150 billion (2002), RMB140 
billion (2003) and RMB110 billion (2004) disemboguing in a situation when debt was 
pushed to 22 percent of GDP. Hence, IMF and World became alarmed and asked China to 
take advantage of the prospering economy to feed the countries liabilities. The Ministry of 
Finance responded to these concerns in promising a targeted reduction of its fiscal deficit 
by an annual rate of 0.25 to 0.5 percent of GDP (see Asia Monitor: China & North East 
Asia Monitor 2005: 4). 
During the Chinese years of fiscal expansionism, Beijing attempted to somehow equalize 
the huge income gap between the rural and urban population. In 2005, fiscal capacity 
transfers amounted RMB381 billion and included, according to its official Chinese 
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definition “general transfers, minority region transfers, wage increase transfers, rural fee-
reform subsidies, ‘Three Rewards and One Subsidy,’ and ‘other fiscal capacity transfers’” 
(World Bank 2007: 14-15). 
Figure XIV: Composition of Fiscal Capacity Transfers in China, 1998-2005 
 
Source: World Bank 2007: 15 
The composition of these transfers, as reported in figure XIV, is dominated by wage 
transfers that directly affect domestic consumption and, therefore, strengthens aggregate 
demand in the Keynesian understanding as core contributor to sustainable economic 
growth. 
6.2.4 Boosting Domestic Demand during the Global Financial Crisis 2008 
After the years between 2003 and 2007 that earmarked formidable economic prosperity 
indicated by constant double-digit real GDP growth rates (see figure XV), the Chinese 
export sector became strongly hit by the global economic downturn in 2008. Since the same 
year’s November, the PRC experienced negative export growth rates. From Jan. 2008 to 
Jan. 2009, the total exports dropped by 18 percent. An annual comparison for both years’ 
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February revealed an even worse scenario, as exports decreased by 26 percent. Weak global 
assets hampered profit aspirations in the very same sectors, which reversely caused 
aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI) to drop by 37 percent to the total amount of US$ 
5.3 billion, from November 2007 to 2008.  
Figure XV: Real and Potential Economic Growth Rates, 2001-2009, 2010(e) 
 
Source: Pyo 2009: 48 
When GDP growth rates fell to the level of 6.8 in the last quarter of 2008, the government 
responded with impressive Keynesian countercyclical government spending like it did in a 
much softer manner after the Asian crisis. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 stigmatized 
as the heaviest economic breakdown since the Great Depression, forced Beijing to react 
quickly and powerfully. As the world’s first government during the ongoing crisis, the 
PRC’s central government announced a massive stimulus package of about US$ 586 billion 
on Nov, 9th 2008, in order to stabilize the country’s growth rate and to support the export 
sector’s orientation towards the domestic assets as bridging economic measure until the 
crisis is over. In the long-run a strong domestic consumer market was expected as growth 
stabilizing element that contributes to the reduction of Chinas current dependency on 
foreign assets. 
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Pyo estimates that “4 million jobs are lost for every 1% reduction in economic growth”, 
while such “an increase in unemployment rate caused by a sudden economic slowdown can 
be a threat to the socialist structure” (Pyo 2009: 46). Therefore, fighting this crisis was 
obligatory not solely to avoid heavy economic damages but to restore political stability 
which came under pressure with increasingly emerging press reports on layoffs. The 
employment situation has been worsened by the instance that 4 million college graduates 
awaited their employment, while the major cities announced over 8 million officially jobless 
people. The dark-figure of unemployment is expected to be way higher. 
The massive stimulus package included investments in the transport system, post-
earthquake reconstruction, public housing, rural infrastructure improvements, technological 
innovation, power-, water- and sanitation-projects as well environment protection. These 
investments were intended to be carried out until 2010. Supplemented by subsidies to 
enhance education and health services, the stimulus program, without any doubt, can be 
interpreted as domestic demand strengthening fiscal policy measure to safeguard domestic 
enterprises, especially China’s SOCs (see figure XVI). 
Figure XVI: Utilization of the US$ 586 Stimulus Package by Sectors 
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Source: Mulchand 2009: 20 
Strengthening domestic demand seems to provide the perfect objective to politically 
stabilize the shaky situation, to enhance prospects for sustainable economic growth with 
special focus on decreasing export dependence and to support China’s chipped export 
oriented SOCs. Another important characteristic of the Chinese macroeconomic structure 
are high saving rates, illustrated in figure XVII.  
Figure XVII: Household Savings in China, 2006-2008 
 
Source: People’s Bank of China 2009 
Reducing savings in China would mean shifting a predominantly external demand-oriented 
economy to one more oriented toward domestic demand. Household savings in China have 
been increasing sharply in recent years, with the 2008 year-end balance of household savings 
26.3% higher than the previous year. As previously explained in the section on monetary 
policy, rising insecurity about the economy’s future animates people to hoard their money, 
instead of stimulating the suffering economic actors to maintain their production via rising 
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domestic demand, created by lower saving in favor of consumption. In such a trap, fiscal 
policy is able to contribute to employment which increases income and therefore 
consumption. This, in turn, initiates a spill-over across several sectors. Backed by that 
Keynesian demand-oriented approach, the stimulus should boost consumption by raising 
farmers’ incomes via price stabilization for agricultural goods, increase retirement pensions, 
creating jobs directly through stimulus construction projects and improve the social welfare 
system to indirectly reduce household savings. Direct subsidies to stimulate rural 
consumption were put on household appliances, motorbikes and items like refrigerators and 
TV sets. A consumption oriented tax reform supported the stimulus. On November, 10th 
Beijing announced to reduce taxation on national companies by more than RMB120 billion 
starting Jan, 1st 2009. The former explained tax policies that favored foreign-invested 
enterprises have been abolished to put local companies on an equal level. Value-added taxes 
were reduced to just 4 percent for industrial corporations, while energy consumption was 
directed in favor of its reduction by lifting the former VAT rate of 13 percent for mineral 
products up to 17 percent. Concerning boosting domestic demand, the disparities between 
urban and rural areas became targeted. Hence, the Ministry of Finance introduced a pro-
rural consumption subsidy program amounting RMB920 billion which was intended to 
stimulate rural buyers to demand items subsidized with 13 percent of the actual price. For 
cars and motorbikes the subsidies are much more attractive, ranging from 15 to almost 40 
percent. Such measures contained direct effects like living standard improvement, 
mobilizing future consumption (electricity for refrigerators or fuel for motorbikes). The 
long-run effect of attracting investment in rural areas including future government revenues 
as well as decreasing unemployment and urbanization pressures justified that massive 
stimulus package. 
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The short-, medium and long-term spill-over of the latter’s features, especially massive 
government spending on reconstruction, infrastructure and housing projects, cannot be 
overemphasized, since they directly employ or workers who contribute to domestic 
consumption. Suppliers, for instance material delivering corporations, benefit. Additional 
teachers are employed. Better roads, railways and airports contribute to long-lasting 
productivity increases that attract future investment. The list of these benefits and their 
spillovers exceed this paper’s space restrictions. Denying these positive contributions to 
domestic demand as sustainable economic growth guarantor is impossible, albeit their 
negative impact on the government’s fiscal balance is immense. As explained above, after 
the post-Asian crisis excessive fiscal policy, government spending was attempted to 
consolidate from 2005 to 2007. This period’s deficit balancing success is shown in figure 
XVIII, while it simultaneously demonstrates the stimulus package’s tremendous deficit 
increasing effect in 2008. 
Figure XVIII: Government Deficit Related to GDP Growth, 2005-2008 
 
Source: OECD 2009: 183 
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Of course, the fiscal balanced is damaged, but this section also showed some evidence that 
the PRC’s economy performed even better with amazing double-digit growth rates after 
their annual Keynesian-like stimuli, lasting from 1998 to 2004. Keeping this in mind and 
inhaling the fact that improved infrastructure and stronger domestic demand directly 
supports future investment attraction, PR China will recover sooner than other 
“macroeconomic balancing economies” and will later be interpreted as having clearly 
benefited from the crisis. 
6.3 China’s Monetary Policy 
6.3.1 Developmental Finance’s Evolvement in China 
The PBC as the Economy’s Only Financier 1949-1978  
Despite the reforms that will be explained below, the PRC’s financial system remains highly 
regulated and not fully developed, but it has undergone some drastic changes since the 
reforms in 1978. From the 1950s to the very reforms, China experienced a mono-bank 
system represented by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) that committed itself to the CPC’s 
economic planning, as it served “as both a central bank and commercial bank, controlling 
about 93 percent of the total financial assets of the country and handling most financial 
transactions in the economy” (Tong 2002: 19). Since the government transformed its 
suspicion of being imperialistic towards foreign financial firms into political measures that 
manifested their restrictions, international capital flows only occurred in form of 
government loans (see Schlichting 2008). 
According to Tong (2002), there have been two liquidity circles at this time. While the 
demand side conducted transactions on the consumer goods market in cash, the supply side 
used bank transfers. Therefore, both circles had to be coordinated in the administration’s 
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“cash plan”, which divided money into two blocks. The supply side was dependent on the 
CPC’s plans that determined the volume of total credit, whereas “the amount of cash 
injected into the economy was based on the level of wage payments by enterprises, which 
was also dictated by the central authorities” (Tong 2002: 19). The people had no possibility 
to invest. If there was a financial surplus, they could just hoard the money on bank deposits. 
Money was just a transaction tool instead of its today’s function as agent of its own 
accumulation. 
Focusing Real Output Sector and Rural Areas 1978 – 1984 
In 1978, the People’s Bank of China started its transition into a sole Central Bank and 
another three banks popped up, namely the Bank of China (BOC) dealing with FDI, the 
People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC) serving the construction sector with limited 
assets as well as the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC). The above described success in the 
agricultural sector led to the latter’s availment as it provided small-scale banking services to 
peasants and township enterprises. In 1979, the State Council manifested a gradual shift 
from state budget appropriations to medium- and long-term bank loans, made available by 
the three newly founded banks. Of course, the latter have not been able to substitute the 
financing of the physical plan, which practically remained task of the PBC. 
Further Steps towards Financial Competition 1984 - 1988 
As the first socialist country, China introduced “a two-tier banking system similar to that in 
market economies” (Tong 2002: 21) and added the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) to its formerly established banking trinity mentioned above, while the 
People’s Bank of China on top of this two-tier banking system lost its operational range of 
commercial banking activities and served as central bank. 
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Although the Banks have been founded to serve its particular sectors, they started to 
compete between even those and interfered in the operational range of their counterparts. 
Additionally, trust and investment corporations (TICs) appeared and intensified 
competition between state-owned banks and such non-banking financial institutions 
(NBFIs), as well as non-state commercial banks like the newly founded Bank of 
Communications (BOCOM) and CITIC Industrial Bank.  
Stabilization vs. Stock Exchange 1988 - 1991 
The oversupply of credits caused by increased competition between the young banks led to 
inflation, which forced the State Council to react. Therefore, the government re-imposed its 
control over the above described banks as well as the TICs which have been transformed or 
closed. Although stabilization have been put forward, China established financial markets 
with the “Shanghai Stock Exchange [that] officially opened at the end of 1990, and the 
Shengzen Stock Exchange [which] was significantly reorganized in 1991” (see Tong 2002: 
23). 
Strong Directing Development Banks 
According to Tong (2002), the 1993’s financial reforms by vice-premier Zhu Rongji 
separated policy loans from commercial loans, deregulated the financial sector and allowed 
the appearance of new banks, corrected the financial law, and further developed financial 
markets. “Designed to be the main vehicles for policy-based lending in the future […,] the 
State Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank, and the Export-Import 
Bank of China” (Tong 2002: 24) have been initiated to serve as strong policy arm within 
further commercialization that disembogued in the occurrence of the first Chinese private 
bank in 1996, namely the Minsheng Bank.  
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SOEs Supporting Legal and Regulatory Framework Transition 
Although the People’s Bank of China was considered as the PRC’s central bank since 1978, 
it legally gained that status by the “Law on People’s Bank of China” in 1995, which ascribed 
the PBC responsibilities on the financial system’s and monetary stability. Simultaneously, an 
independent banking system was intended by the “Law on Commercial Banks” that aimed 
“to transform state commercial banks into true commercial banks” (Tong 2002: 24). 
Within this transition process informal networks evolved that built rent-seeking coalitions. 
The State Council is the overall level, followed by its administrative arm Ministry of Finance 
and Commerce (MOFCOM) which “prepares the annual budget, sets taxes and coordinates 
tax collection through the State Administration of Taxation” (Schlichting 2008: 34). 
Furthermore, MOFCOM plays a major role in recapitalizing state-owned banks. The PRC’s 
maintains three financial regulatory bodies with the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC). All of those commissions have regional counterparts 
supervising the particular sectors. As the financial system changed over the last decades, the 
regulatory commissions transformed, too. Moreover they are still in transition, since they 
fulfill the task of the state-owned companies’ counterparts on the financial stage. 
Nevertheless, “the reform years witnessed an upsurge of the shadow economy [as well as] 
processes of informal privatization and corruption (Schlichting 2008: 34).  
Towards a Socialist Stock Market 
The PRC’s stock market, feeding Chinese SOE’s privatization, is characterized by initial 
public offerings (IPOs). Therefore, such a semi-privatization is expected to hamper the 
stock market’s full efficiency. The latter is still in its infancy and experiences ongoing 
reforms, whereby Chinese state-owned corporations used the global stock markets to raise 
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capital for financing their economic prosperity (Mok and Hui 1998). According to Hope’s 
and Hu’s analyses, the “two most striking features of the Chinese financial system are the 
extraordinary size of monetary assets relative to GDP and the comparative lack of 
development of securities markets when compared with the size of the banks” (Hope and 
Hu 2006: 36). Both scholars also judges the banking system as under-supported by the 
existing legal system, as inefficient in terms of their huge numbers of staffs and branch 
networks that increase operating costs, as well as the system’s potentially fragile nature, 
since all of the four above mentioned banks experience massive loan losses that are far from 
being acceptable in comparison to market economy banks (Cull, Xu and Zhu 2007: 20). 
6.3.2 The Devaluation Danger 
About 70 percent of the Chinese economy has been privatized since the reforms in the end 
of the 1970s in order to attract foreign invest for technological improvements towards 
domestic industrialization, but the huge amount of FDI inflows caused an uneven trade 
balance. China’s open door to participate in global trade enabled its growth “due to the 
opening policy, both export and import increased much faster than GDP. For example, 
export to GDP ratio increased from less than 5% in 1978 to more than 20% by the early 
1990s. The expansion of foreign market interacted with domestic market development, 
which helped push the convergence of the two tracks” (Qian and Wu 2000: 6)  
However, as U.S. official trade figures for the year 2008 show, alone China’s exports to the 
USA as the world’s largest outlet outweigh US imports to China by a difference of -$268 
billions (see U.S. Census Bureau). Added to FDI-inflows, Beijing faces tremendous risks of 
devaluating its Renminbi, since more money comes into the country than is spend abroad.  
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6.3.3 Currency and foreign exchange control 
Since the 1980s, the ratio of international reserves relative to China’s GDP increased 
constantly, whereby the mind-boggling accumulation’s upward-jump of global reserves 
from $1 trillion to $5 trillion was experienced between 1990 and 2006. One explanation why 
China could not get rid of that currency devaluating trap is the Trilemma Model that 
postulates such countries limited options to “choose not more than two of the following 
three attributes: exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial integration” 
(Aizenman 2007: 1).  Caused by the financial crisis in the 1990s, China among other Asian 
countries chose the option of hoarding international reserves to buffer their exposure to 
global financial instability. The current global financial crisis, instead, demonstrates that 
China’s $1.9 trillion US Dollar reserves worsen the PRC’s situation, since it 
interdependently relies on strong foreign currencies. Nevertheless, China could profit in 
some way, as the weak US Dollar contributes to the relaxation of the Chinese devaluation 
issue. However, in the last decade, China proclaimed its go global strategy to enhance 
Chinese OFDI in order to balance its trade figures and to stabilize the Renminbi. Chinese 
huge investments in African countries, for instance, reflect how China transforms its 
domestic needs into an intercontinental strategy that seems mutual beneficial and 
contributes to the improvement of its currency situation. 
6.3.4 Exchange Rate Regimes 
From 1978 to 1994, the dual-rate exchange policy determined financial transfers with 
trading partners and governments abroad. This contained a dual regulation of official and 
market exchange rates. While the former was placed on non-market transactions, the latter 
was used for money transaction within foreign trade by a fixed rate of US$ 1 to RMB 2.8. 
Hence, “the exchange rate of the yuan was pegged constantly to U.S. dollar until 1994” 
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(Guo 2009: 64). In the mid-1990s, the dual-rate emerged into one within the newly founded 
managed floating system that allowed the Yuan to float by 0.1 percent in relation to the US 
dollar. Therefore managed floating regime can be understood as fixed exchange rate regime 
aiming at the creation of a realistic exchange policy adapted to the needs of the step by step 
opening financial system towards market economy. As financial stabilizer, the managed 
floating regime contributed to export-promotion and facilitated the PBC to buy foreign 
currencies. In the last decade, the world’s financial supervisors criticized China “that the 
yuan is practically fixed with the dollar, and thus China has exported deflation toward 
peripheral nations while simultaneously promoting its own exports. Furthermore [, …] with 
the gradual increase of the trade surplus in China, in order to maintain the stability of the 
yuan7dollar exchange rate, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has to continuously intervene 
by buying into the dollar and selling out the yuan [, and therefore] China holds the largest 
foreign exchange reserve in the world” (Guo 2009: 65). These purchases of foreign 
currencies increased domestic money supply which consequently exceeds money demand.  
Figure XIX: Development of Exchange Rates of the Yuan to Dollar, Euro and  
                      Yen, 2005-2008 
 
Source: Guo 2009: 74 
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Therefore, the danger of inflation evolved that pushed the Chinese government to respond 
with a new exchange rate regime that “officially” heralded the abolishment of the dollar peg 
towards a currency basket regime on July, 21st 2005. Nonetheless, figure XIX proves that 
the tight yuan-dollar link remained relatively unchanged, while the exchange rates to Euro 
and Yan seem to be allowed to fluctuate in a broader range. Although information on which 
currencies contain to this currency basket seem to be kept as state secret, practical reasoning 
suggests that these are assembled by the criteria of the PRC’s trading partner importance. 
6.3.5 The PBC’s Role in Chinese Monetary Policy  
In the early 1990s, inflation rates grew rapidly and reached its peak in 1994 at the 27 percent 
level. As a consequence the PBC tightened monetary policy by reducing the money supply 
(M2) that caused deflation until 2002. This had only little implications for prices of 
consumer goods which, for instance, fell in the first six months by 1 percent. Deflationary 
pressure mainly hit commodity and raw material pricing harder, that decreased by 5 percent 
at the same observed time. Surprisingly, the Asian financial crisis seems to have no impact 
on the development of annual inflation rates and money supply growth rates which are 
illustrated in figure XX. Burdekin and Sklos blame “China’s banking sector problems and 
attempts to rein in the level of nonperforming loans” for exacerbation of deflation 
(Burdekin and Siklos 2008: 848). Additionally, the above delineated Chinese banks cut their 
expenses towards a situation when savings exceeded lending by RMB 3.65 billion in 2002. 
Conversely to the situation in 1994, the bank effectively fought deflation by increasing the 
money supply in 2003. In 2004, the central bank hoarded US$ 207 billion which were 
supplemented by an amount of US$ 209 billion in 2005. Those enabled the PBC to regulate 
the economy’s money supply by releasing such reserves on the open market in a controlled 
manner. 
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Figure XX: Annual Inflation Rate and Annual Money Supply (M2) Growth  
                    Rate, 1990-2005 
 
Source: Burdekin and Siklos 2008: 849 
From 1951 to 1991, there was no interest rate that could be manipulated by discretionary 
monetary policy. Hence, money supply was the only available policy measure and inflation 
was directly related to changes in GDP. Money velocity, namely the efficient spread from 
central bank over other banks to economic actors declined until the beginning 1990s, while 
money supply and income increased. Putting this in Keynes words, such situation 
adumbrates the economic actors’ rising marginal propensity to save. Up to recent years the 
manipulation of interest rates by the central bank remained highly administrative. Money 
supply, instead, is detected as the PBC’s major tool to fight either de- or inflation. 
Concluding the central banks rule in China, the PBC has been used to reach the countries 
targeted growth rate by filling the appearing gaps between real GDP and nominal GDP. 
Anyhow, as Zhang (2009) argues, the ongoing increasing velocity will cause a decreasing 
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relationship between money supply and the rate of inflation, which slowly diminishes its 
power in favor of prospects of a slightly liberalizing interest rates policy accompanying the 
more market oriented behavior of the real economy. 
During the Global Financial Crisis 2008, former PBC deputy governor Wu suggested in 
Nov 2008 that the Renminbi is expected to be an international reserve currency. Such a 
deep integration in the global financial system accompanied by the prerequisite of full 
convertibility would drastically loosen the current currency control and, consequently, the 
PBC’s power to manipulate the money supply for inflation control and GDP correction. 
While supporting the IMF during the financial crisis by providing the Fund additional 
funding, Beijing demands a stronger role in the very international financial body. It is no 
secret that China suffers under the current weak US dollar, as the PBC hoards the world’s 
biggest foreign currency reserves of US$ 2.27 trillion in September 2009. On the PBC’s 
website, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of even this central bank, announced that “[t]he crisis 
called again for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an 
international reserve currency” (Zhou cited in BBC News 2009/03/24). Vice-foreign 
minister He Yafei postultated that “[e]fforts should be made to achieve substantial progress 
in the reform of international financial institutions [, namely IMF and World Bank, to] 
increase the representation and say of emerging markets and developing countries” (He 
cited in BBC News 2009/03/24). Such reforms would provide Beijing more power in 
setting global financial rules as well as the opportunity to change the Washington consensus 
development agenda. 
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6.4 The PRC’s Historically Unprecedented War on Poverty  
6.4.1 China Evidences the Bretton Woods Strategy Failure 
The Chinese success-story of poverty alleviation after Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms is 
unprecedented in world history. From 1978 to 2000, poverty has been reduced by 833 
percent, from 250 million to 30 million people officially assessed as poor (see Fan, Zhang 
and Zhang 2004: 395). According to the World Bank, “half a billion people were lifted out 
of poverty […] by the international standard, the absolute number of poor consuming less 
than $1.08 per day (1993 PPP dollars) fell in China from 652 million in 1981 to 135 million 
in 2004, a decline of over half a billion people” (World Bank 2009: 5). The drop of poverty 
in China can be followed in figure XII that draws the comparison of three different poverty 
indicating headcount rates of poverty (HCR) with per capita GDP growth.    
Figure XXI: Poverty Reduction and Growth in China, 1981-2004 
 
Source: World Bank 2009: iii 
6. PR CHINA - ROLE MODEL FOR PRO-POOR FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY ? 
97 
 
This tremendous achievement is even more impressive, when it is put in the context of the 
overall poverty reduction in the developing world over the same period. The World Bank 
reported that “the absolute number of poor (using the same standard) in the developing 
world as a whole declined from 1.5 to 1.1 billion […]; in other words, but for China there 
would have been no decline in the numbers of poor in the developing world over the last 
two decades of the 20th century” (World Bank 2009: 5). This is a true confession of failure, 
the World Bank is testimonializing itself.  
Despite all the SAPs, fiscal and monetary contraction and market liberalization the Bank 
placed in developing countries, even the most state regulated country sensationally 
accomplished poverty alleviation. Instead of continuously bashing the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the more interesting question is of what was needed to succeed in such a 
matchless way. The next section will therefore analyze the contributions of the PRC’s 
government spending and international investments to tackle poverty. 
6.4.2 Government Spending and Poverty in China 
Due to Chinese urbanization, the urban-rural poverty ratio increased during the last decade 
in comparison with those in the twentieth century. Fan, Zhang and Zhang, therefore, argue 
that “income distribution in the cities has become less egalitarian in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the size and severity of urban poverty remain on a much lesser scale than in 
the rural areas” (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2004: 398).  
Since poverty in China is mostly associated with the rural areas (see figure XXII), and the 
later comparison with prospective African economies‘ development paths requires a rural 
and small-town focus, the composition of government spending on the rural sector might 
reveal the PRC’s key to its success in battling poverty.  
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Figure XXII: Rural-Urban Distribution of Poverty in China, 2003 
 
Source: World Bank 2009: xiii 
Moreover, Zhang et al. argue that “most of the rural poor are concentrated in resource 
deficient areas [,] mostly in upland sections of the interior provinces of northern, 
northwestern and southwestern China” (Zhang et al. 2003: 314). The poor of those regions 
often struggle with adverse conditions like unproductive soils and, therefore, these 
agricultural production constraints cause remarkable dependency on outside sources of 
income. Despite such dependency, “ill health, poor human capital and living in such 
isolation” hamper their participation in markets, although market goods are needed to 
ensure the poor’ survival (Zhang et al. 2003: 315). 
Since 1978, the biggest share of public spending in rural areas, unchallenged by any other 
kind of public investment, has been spent on education (see the following page’s figure 
XXIII). One of the world’s less educated populations could be found in the People’s 
Republic of China in the year 1956, when just half of the prospective pupils visited primary 
and secondary school. Due to the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76) the educational system has been stirred up and lacked of resources. 
Antagonizing these drawbacks in education, the 1978 reform introduced the “9 year 
compulsory schooling system” which has foreseen that every child must attend instruction 
for at least 9 years. Even so, its implementation was not that forceful in the rural areas and, 
therefore, lacked success. 
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Figure XXIII: Composition of Public Investment in Rural China in Bn. Yuan, 
1953-2000  
 
Source: Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2004: 398 
In order to forcefully enhance the increase of attendance in rural schools, an education law 
was issued in 1986 that codified the above mentioned official requirement of 9 years school 
attendance. This legislative move caused a numeral amelioration of primary school 
graduates to 85 percent measured in 2000. The acquired additional skills, reflected in 
diminishing illiteracy rates, reversely induced increasing productivity and slightly offered 
non-farm employment opportunities to the rural population. Education can also be 
expected as latent contributor to urbanization caused by labor-migration, as the qualified 
naturally seek adequate jobs. From a macroeconomic stance, such improved “human 
capital” attracts investment, since increased productivity goes along with lower labor costs. 
Like every statistics on China it does not say much about the real success. Official data is 
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collected from the provincial to the national level. Even in the provincial level disparities are 
tremendous; additionally, a comparison between the Western with other Chinese regions 
reveals that the rate of illiteracy is higher and also slower in its pace of decrease. Moreover, 
in relation to GDP growth, government purchases on education, in 2000, still remained on 
a very low level, namely 2.6 percent of GDP. Hence, Fan, Zhang and Zhang (2004) assume 
that more bounteous governmental education might generate higher rural incomes, as 
empirical data evidences a close relationship correlation between government expenditure 
on education and poverty reduction. These scholars also emphasize its “very high returns to 
growth in agriculture and the nonfarm sector, as well as the rural economy as a whole” 
(Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2004: 412). Improvements in the agricultural sector cannot be 
overemphasized. Most development theorists indicate agriculture as a backbone of a 
developing economy, which, not only literally, “feeds” the economy. 
Another major item in the balance sheet of government spending is irrigation. Figure XIII 
lists purchases of this kind on the second position behind education. Irrigation efforts 
experienced their heydays during the commune system, while the mobilization of rural labor 
for irrigation projects has been easy to manage in the 1960s after the disastrous years of 
1958, 1959 and 1960, when famine hit the country caused by harvest-frustrating bad 
weathers. During this period, these projects succeeded by turning more than 10 million 
acres in agriculturally productive land. The second impulse to increase such spending was 
caused by grain-shortfalls in the mid 1990s which forced the government to increase its 
agricultural production via irrigation from 1997 to 1999. In the very timeframe, the 
government brought research on agriculture on the agenda, in order to support increase the 
efficiency in agricultural production. The picture drawn here seems to admit irrigation to 
have a relatively high level of importance, besides its inefficiency in terms of costs and real 
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output. Of course, government spending is measured in money spent on different assets. 
But the Chinese example discovered irrigation as costly form of emergency investment after 
food crises. In a long-term strategy, it might play minor role just to secure nutrition but is 
also expected to decline during today’s China’s advanced development stage. 
After 1978, access to electricity became an objective of high priority, therefore government 
spending on power infrastructure increased enormously leading to the outstanding 
improvement that is noted by Fan, Zhang and Zhang by stating that “98% of Chinese 
villages had access to electricity in 1998, and more than 97% of the households of these 
villages had connection to electricity” (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2004: 401). 
Public investment on infrastructure like roads has been fairly weak until 1985, when the 
government focused on the transport connection improvement between industrial centers 
on China’s east coast. Telecommunication infrastructure in the rural area improved not until 
the early 1990s, when the number of telephone sets jumped from 3.4 million in 1992 to 51.7 
million in 2000. Although, this was mainly due to partnerships with private companies, the 
graph represented in figure XXIII evidences that the respective improvements have been 
supportively accompanied by increased public investment on telecommunications since 
1992. 
6.4.3 FDI Contributions on Poverty Alleviation 
It is undisputable that economic growth contributes to poverty reduction, since investment 
attracting governments are better able to collect larger amounts of revenues which might be 
distributed among the poor via subsidies, direct financial support or indirectly enhancing 
social welfare. Dollar and Kraay (2002) argue that GDP growth affects poverty reduction 
through proportionally increasing incomes. Figure XXIV underlines FDI’s contribution on 
employment and government revenues via tax contributions from foreign affiliates. The 
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latter, for instance, increased by a factor of 26 from US$ 2.2 billion in 1992 to US$ 51.6 
billion in 2003 caused by a fifteen-fold FDI stock increase in the same period. 
Simultaneously, the number of employees in foreign affiliates increased by a factor of 
almost 4 to 23 million employees in 2003. 
Figure XXIV: FDI and Its Importance in the Chinese Economy, 1992-2003 
 
Source: Zhang 2006: 81 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) spurs growth and, therefore, is expected to lead to the 
same beneficial outcome. Besides that linkage, investors usually care about their 
international reputation. These concerns lift labor standards and distribute wages more 
equally. Community building, improved delivery of substantial goods, like water and power 
supply, and other infrastructure improvements are either required to attract foreign 
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investment, or when those are lacking, they will be implemented by the state or the 
investors itself (see Zhang 2006: 82). 
Despite FDI’s supportive role, it is fiscal policy’s responsibility to guide its settlement in 
foreseen regions, its contribution via taxes or direct investments on the poor or indirectly 
through foreign financed infrastructure projects. The Ministry’s of Finance’s most 
important role when it comes to poverty tackling is the most appropriate reallocation of 
pro-poor government spending. 
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7. REINCARNATION OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE ?  
7.1 Rent as a Fiscal Policy Tool to Catch-up 
This section deals with a number of questions like: What is a rent? What affects rent? What 
is rent seeking? Which actors are influenced by such activities? But the much more 
interesting problem is, whether there is a relation between rent and growth. What 
contributes to growth? What hampers it? Are developing economies able to catch up? Is 
there a strategy among all these failing attempts to fight underdevelopment? Of course, 
these questions will not be answered completely, but this master thesis’ section provides 
well-grounded information about the influence of rents on the structure of catching-up 
economies, its automatisms including the operating range of the involved actors and their 
more or less rational objectives. Based on the knowledge about the rent-shaped structure of 
developing countries, strategies can be evaluated more easily.  
As a cause of this structure, rents are also able to abolish or at least to dampen those 
structures. This proposition is followed by a further hypothesis, that the efficient utilization 
of rents initiates growth and enables developing economies to catch up. The argumentation 
is based on the major premise of the decisive role of rents and the inefficient - but rational - 
use of it by the rentier state predominantly shaped by Hartmut Elsenhans’ state classes. 
Moreover, developing economies feature two decisive syndromes, namely structural 
heterogeneity and marginality. Caused by these imperfections, the phenomenon of state 
classes arises and rent-seeking activities arise. 
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7.2 The Rent-Seeking Theory 
7.2.1 Framing “Rent” 
 … In a broader sense 
As point of departure, a very interesting statement by Hartmut Elsenhans speaking casually 
to his students in Leipzig in proclaiming “they call it profit, I call it rent” is worthwhile to 
mention at this stage. It seems to be more academic posturing than a definition of rent. But 
the power of this phrase lies in its quality to initiate thoughts about the difference between 
profit and rent. 
Formerly, Karl Marx explained the relation between profit and rent. Land is provided to the 
peasant by the landowner, who simultaneously exploits the labor force and is also paid for 
giving the peasant the land for the purpose of gaining profits by producing goods. For this 
access to the land he receives a rent. Therefore, the rent is a payment in advance to make 
profit. In this case, the peasant is paying a rent to the landowner to reproduce himself and 
his nuclear family. While producing goods to survive supplemented by goods production 
for the landowner, the peasant is disadvantaged in comparison to the landowner, who gains 
his profit in the unproductive manner of owning the legal rights of the land, which, in turn, 
entitles him to surcharge rent.  
This simple scenario characterizes rent as a prerequisite of gaining profits, as the formal 
access to profit. Quoting Marx, rent is a “contractually determined sum of money for the 
admission to apply capital in a defined field of production. […] Thus, the economic rent is 
the form of economical property-realization and utilization” (translated from Marx [1894] 
1972: 631 f.). Rent as the premise of the capitalist mode of production and as indicator of 
unequal distribution of rights and property aggravate the very syndromes of a capitalist 
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society structure. In the Marxian view, such a modern capitalist society consists of 
landowners, industrial capitalists and wageworkers (see Marx ([1894] 1972: 632). 
… In a Politico-Economic Understanding 
In post-industrialist societies without peonage, the Marxian perspective has to be modified. 
Another major power needs to be added: the regulating and redistributing state represented 
by its administration. In comparison to Marx’ landowner, the administration is an authority, 
which distributes access-rights. As reward for allocating those rights, rents in form of tolls, 
taxes and dues are appropriated. Whenever a firm or an individual wants to invest in a 
region, for instance is planning a start-up, a lot of regulations have to be taken into 
consideration. The self-interest of the “apparently passive” state has long been 
underestimated. Instead, the contrary is the case. Following David Friedmann, “the size and 
shape of nations will be such as to maximize their joint potential net revenue and will 
approach from below the size which would maximize their potential gross revenue” 
(Friedmann 1977: 60). Since the borders are fixed, nations and states have to grow in power. 
Besides military and political power, contemporary states compete with other states for 
economic power and to a smaller extent for welfare in order to legitimate the power of the 
ruling government towards its population for the purpose of reelection - in the case of 
democracy. If there is no self-regulatory institution within the administration, the latter 
tends to expand.  
Nevertheless, the state is in the dilemma of keeping taxes low enough to ensure the 
continuance of firms and taxpayers in the country but also high enough to gain financial 
strength. For this purpose, the state follows a portfolio diversification, which means that 
states tend to create different sorts of taxes towards a fiscal illusion on the part of taxpayers 
in order to raise their tax revenues. Conybeare points out “that those states that have the 
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administrative infrastructure to exploit a diversified tax base will do so [but in contrast to 
developed countries] tax diversification is no help [since] a fairly high level of per capita 
income must be reached before diversification can be fully exploited” (Conybeare 1982: 42). 
7.2.2 Rent – The Unproductive Profit 
Pritzl defines rent as payments towards a bailee of a resource. Such payments exceed the 
income, which might be achieved in the next-best application of this very resource. The 
origins of rents are state interventions and regulations, which lead to state incomes and 
fiscal transfer payments as well as competition- and price-contortions (see Nohlen 2002: 
688). 
According to Elsenhans, rents are incomes, which ruling classes of the South appropriate in 
opposing the free evolution of the market mechanism. Correspondingly, rents depict a 
permanent income that is not employed in the compensation of the factors of production 
determined by market mechanisms. Terms of competition can be neglected; the only reason 
such rents can be appropriated is the monopoly (see Elsenhans 2004: 81). 
7.3 Rent-Seeking 
7.3.1 Tullock’s Costs of Monopoly 
Gordon Tullock postulates that the cost of securing a monopoly is underestimated, since 
“domestic producers would invest resources in lobbying for the tariff until the marginal 
return on the last dollar so spent was equal to its likely return producing the transfer” [. 
Expenditures aiming at governmental decision-making] “are purely wasteful from the 
standpoint of society as a whole” (Tullock 1967: 228). Of course, there is more than one 
competitor for the monopoly, so the entire societal cost of lobbying is the sum of each 
effort pursuing a monopoly. In this bidding for monopoly the competitors are willing to 
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increase their payments on tariffs. Tullock compares such monopoly-seekers to thieves, 
who, while succeeding, stimulate other thieves to follow their procedure. Therefore, “each 
successful establishment of a monopoly or creation of a tariff will stimulate greater 
diversion of resources to attempts to organize further transfers of income” (Tullock 1967: 
228). Due to the high costs of creating a monopoly, the lobbying monopoly-holder is 
consequently willing to pay permanent tariffs in order to achieve its maintenance. Since this 
continuing bidding-process requires huge amounts of resources “invested” in unproductive 
activities, these wasted resources lead to an entire societal welfare loss. 
7.3.2 Rent-Seeking – a Dissipation? 
“’Rent seeking’ can be defined comprehensively as investment of real resources undertaken 
by individuals or groups (coalition) of individuals with similar interests in the expectation of 
obtaining an increase (avoiding a decrease) in their income wealth as a result of securing 
(blocking) legal rights; or maximizing the benefit (minimizing the cost) of earlier policy 
changes that created non-exclusive rights” (Hartle 1983: 539). During such activities, 
transaction costs are incurred on competition for changes in rights or to maximize benefits 
from existing rights. 
Albeit there is an individual rationality in seeking rents, Steven Cheung refers to it as 
“dissipation”, since rents constitute “a waste in the sense that valuable resources are allocated 
to the waiting, which produces nothing of specifiable valuable” (Cheung 1974: 71). But like 
most rent-seeking theorists, Cheung underestimates the revenues for succeeding rent-
seekers. In the neoclassical view, an individual has got a determined resource endowment but 
his possible actions are limited by constraints – such as institutional rules and processes. The 
rent-seeking individual acts in a Pareto optimum, since “transaction costs preclude some 
potential transactions” (Hartle 1983: 543). 
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Notwithstanding, Baghwati describes various forms of those activities as DUPs, namely 
“directly unproductive profit-seeking activities” (Baghwati quoted in: Blomqvist and 
Mohammad 1986: 162). In a short conclusion about the wasting of resources, it has to be 
mentioned, that in perspective of the access-urging actor (individual level) rent-seeking might 
bring revenues, but for the welfare of a state those activities bring losses on account of 
competitive resource-wasting. According to Elsenhans, “[t]he decision to appropriate rents is 
welfare-enhancing as long as perfect specialization is accompanied by declining total export 
earnings or by limited impact on the transformation of the technical skills of the local labour 
force” (Elsenhans 1996: 46). The tolls, taxes and tariffs collecting administration is the 
winner in this bidding-game, if it is able to set the rules of this contest. Such a statement 
describes the burden and responsibility of fiscal policy that is expected to create such rules, 
by taxes, tariffs and subsidy measures, although the danger of the administration’s 
unproductive rent-seeking increases accompanying the rule setting process. 
7.3.3 The Quantitative Importance of Rents 
According to Anne Krüger’s research results, speaking for India but are in principle 
accepted to be conferrable to most developing countries, rents are quantitatively important 
(see Krüger 1974: 293). Despite Gunnar Myrdal’s appraisal that India has “less corruption 
than any other country in South Asia” (Myrdal 1968: 943), Krüger estimates the losses of 
rent-seeking in post-independence India as large as 7.3 percent of national income, whereby 
Mohammad and Whalley number these losses with 30-45 percent of the Indian GNP in 
1983 (see Blomqvist and Mohammad 1986: 162). Krüger identifies import licenses as the 
major field of rent-appropriation. In the sixth decade of the previous century, the young 
independent developing nations adopted a state-led strategy of import-substitution, 
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supported by theories like the dependency theory which detects the reason for chronic 
underdevelopment as a result of the structural disfavor in the terms of trade. 
7.4 Decisive Syndromes of Developing Economies 
7.4.1 Structural Heterogeneity 
Rent incomes lead to an overall market failure. But the bigger question is why this 
accumulated capital by the state is not able to capitalize the respective non-capitalistic 
sectors. Now, the term of structural heterogeneity comes into play. It circumscribes the gap 
between aggregate factors of productivity in different production branches determined by 
different prices. Productivity in the export sector and the luxury goods producing sector is 
relatively high, whereas mass consumption goods producing branches like the agrarian 
sector employ twice as much labor forces, indicating lower productivity. This divergence of 
factor productivities between different branches constrains development, since price 
increases of produced goods do not induce demand increases through higher wages. Those 
disabilities to adapt on changes of relative prices are caused by low factor productivity. The 
latter averts the achievement of average profit rates. Therefore, those economies tend to a 
static inability of reacting to selling price changes. Additionally, there is no noteworthy own 
production of technology. Hence, technological imports have an impact on the export 
goods, since they devalue the currency, which, in turn, hampers further imports by increases 
in cost. Especially the export sector attracts capital and labor forces due to its above-average 
profit rate. Nevertheless, structural unemployment does not allow unqualified workers to 
apply in other branches, albeit these wageworkers are underpaid. As a consequence mass 
demand is too low to attract investors (see Böhmert 2004: 82 f.). These interrelated factors 
reinforce structural heterogeneity as a syndrome of underdeveloped economies.  
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7.4.2 Structural Marginality 
Wages are determined by the productivity of an average labor factor. Accordingly, in an 
economy dominated by unemployment, wages are determined by the labor cost which has 
to be paid for the substitution of this employee. Hence, productivity is not the decisive 
wage determinant, rather the scarcity of labor forces influences the paid wages (see 
Elsenhans et al. 2001: 28). Therefore, marginality correlates with structural heterogeneity 
due to the gap of high-wage and low-wage sectors. A large amount of labor can be 
characterized as marginal, because its productivity is below its cost of reproduction, namely 
the subsistence cost. Without rising productivity, conditions of a free market economy 
cannot improve. 
Furthermore, investment deflagrates and constitutes a pre-capitalistic system, which is 
indicated by strong resource owners, who struggle to defend their advantages (see Böhmert 
2004: 84). These resources can be valuable land (landowner) and production factors 
(capitalists) as well as rights to distribute licenses (administration). The actors in brackets 
have the power to appropriate rents, since marginality keeps workers in a weak position. 
Because of the low productivity, there is no use to hire new employees, but rent-seekers do 
to maximize their negotiation power. The sufferers are the marginal workers, who have to 
provide their labor to survive, but earn declining wages. The problem of marginality gets 
worse by induced demographic growth. In switching in the perspective of a marginal 
wageworker, his rational ambition to have a lot of children who support the reproduction of 
his nuclear family is obvious, although it seems irrational in a macro-perspective. 
Additionally, the emergence of a strong class of entrepreneurs is prevented by the absence 
of dynamic mass markets as an impact of structural marginality. A possible entrepreneur has 
no motivation to invest in a region, which is determined by the absence of an outlet (see 
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Elsenhans 1991: 78). This outlet for non-subsistence mass consumption goods can only be 
achieved by average incomes over the subsistence costs. Marginality limits these outlet 
possibilities. Although individuals might have enough financial resources and investment in 
start-ups seems futile, there is another more efficient alternative to these prospective 
investors, namely buying bureau. Structural heterogeneity and marginality change the 
entrepreneur’s behavior from profit maximizing to lobbying (see Elsenhans 2001: 33). 
7.5 The Bloating Public Sector 
7.5.1 Lobbying via Rent-Payments 
In the 1970s, growth of wage employment in the public sector in comparison to the private 
sector in 14 developing countries can be averaged by 81 percent. The reasons for this 
phenomenon as evidence for structural heterogeneity is analyzed here (see Gelb et al. 1991: 
1186). 
Many developing countries are characterized by surplus labor in public employment. 
Supported by the rent-seeking approach, this surplus labor can be traced back to “lobbying 
for more high-wage (and high-rent) employment” (Gelb et al. 1991: 1186)). The World 
Bank has unveiled the cause of the overmanned public sector more precisely in stating that 
“hiring decisions frequently result from the exercise of political patronage” (World Bank 
1979: 65). Reckoning the state “as a provider of political favors to pressure groups or an 
organizer of political support for staying in power” (Gelb et al. 1991: 1188) instead of a 
promoter of welfare maximization helps to explain the state sector’s rationality behind 
generating rents. 
According to Hartmut Elsenhans, the growing public sector is likewise the result of the 
inability of the private sector to accumulate capital in an insufficient manner (see Elsenhans 
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1991: 78). Even this private sector’s inability to make (productive) profits instead of paying 
(lobbying) rents is constrained by the syndromes of underdeveloped economies, as 
explained above.    
7.5.2 Elsenhans’ State Class Theory 
As an advancement of the dependency theory which explains underdevelopment by 
structural dependence of the developing countries on the world market in their disfavor, 
Hartmut Elsenhans added a theoretical framework to explain internal structures of 
developing economies, in which the administration and policy regulations play a key role in 
the development process in the post-independence era. The focus is directed on the actors 
who are responsible in the decision-making process. What are their motives? In which 
structures and forces are they embedded? There seem to be huge difference between the 
members of the administration in developing countries compared to those in industrial 
states (see Nohlen 2002: 739 f.). 
Elsenhans argues that the central leading group in developing countries is the state class. 
The term is derived from the Marxian understanding of classes. Coalescing the structures of 
developing countries and the Marxian cognitions, Elsenhans defines the state class and its 
members as entities who “are participated in the process of surplus accumulation as income 
of this apparatus via bureau. They decide over its distribution and investment. They steer 
labor and pursue tasks in state-owned firms and state integrated political and social 
organizations” (Elsenhans 1981: p. 122). 
The state class members have to face the problem of legitimating their power, since they are 
suited with a lot of privileges and by far higher living standards in contrast to the marginal 
population they administer. The state class is characterized by a collective accumulation of 
societal surplus via rents. But they are also forced to reinvest this surplus to legitimate 
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power. This reinvestment is not bound by efficiency, because there is a lag of control. 
Solely, political ambitions and pressures matter. Investment in apparently irrational projects 
like stadiums and halls are in this context far away from futile, even rational. It is important 
to point out the collective nature of this behavior. The state class, in contrast to terms like 
administrative or state bourgeoisie, does not privatize capital via individual corruption, but 
uses this societal surplus to manifest its position and induce a bloating process (see Nohlen 
2002: 740). 
7.5.3 State Class Structure and Cyclical Phases 
Elsenhans subdivides the state class in segments which behave in organizational structures 
of communication and decision-making in order to form coalitions in terms of rivalry. Such 
segments, based on kinship and regional origin (ascribed roles) as well as shared convictions 
(achieved roles), are formed due to the ambition to win power games in the competition 
with other segments (see Elsenhans 2006: 175). In this continuous rivalry, “[t]he only 
members of state classes who have reasonable chances to survive in the power game are 
those who can initiate the enlargement of coalitions from already existing networks” 
(Elsenhans 2006: 175), namely segments. This struggle for power between those groupings 
leads to manipulation of data and information in order to weaken the rival segments. In 
contrast to capitalist conditions such losses and inefficiencies are not sanctioned, since there 
is an absence of oversight. Consequently, the state class as a whole tends to expand without 
appreciable limits, except for the scarcity of rents, which are utilized in this race for power.    
Based on Elsenhans’ cognitions, Rachid Ouaissa advanced the state class stratification by 
introducing clans as sub-entities among the particular segments. In defining clans as smaller 
and trustworthy groupings based on consanguinity, tribalism, regionalism, family, language, 
and religion, they represent the first access to the state class (see Ouaissa 2005: 203 f.).  
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7.5.4 The Particularity of Development Administrations 
Hartmut Elsenhans argues that no politically independent administration will be found in 
developing countries, since they are embedded in internal power struggles aiming at 
legitimacy. Therefore, all parts (segments) of the state class are busy in forming or enlarging 
their alliances. In contrast to other forms of administrations, there is no pressure of the 
state class to seem efficient to external observers, since the patrons (segments) solely have 
to legitimize their power towards their clients (clans). There is no external oversight like in 
administrations of largely capitalized economies. Since business and labor are strong in 
developed economies, economic actors are able to oversight the administration and umpire 
as powers of oversight to guarantee free market conditions. In developing economies the 
state class acts vice versa. While influencing labor and business through their decision-
making, market efficiency suffers under the pressure of the state class’ dominance. 
Capitalists in developing countries are practically forced to support the state class, namely 
the segments that decide in their favor, in order to stay in the market. To put it bluntly, 
capitalists have no hope to gain profits in the market. Consequently, they buy bureau and 
appropriate rents. The behavior of those actors is rational, since the market is too weak. 
The procedures described above manifest more and more, since “these rules are learned and 
shape [future] behavior. […] As long as these rules lead to success rather than frustration, 
they will not be changed” (Elsenhans 2006: 177). 
7.6 The Reincarnation of the Southern Rentier State 
There is no developing country that can refuse the rule of rents, since their administrative 
system is structured by it. According to Elsenhans, state classes arose in a historical unique 
setting characterized by “demonstration effects, the belief in the positive effects of 
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economic growth, income losses of former rentiers, desirability of higher consumption, 
[and] the belief of economic progress by state planning” (translated from Elsenhans 2001: 
154). The latter plays a major role in the post-independency era. But even in the present, the 
rapidly growing and future economic superpower PR China is the best example, that state-
led growth becomes more and more popular or leastwise regains legitimacy among the 
world’s governments. Due to the fact, that “[p]lanning in order to restructure the economy 
by engaging in production lines that are not yet profitable enlarges the scope of possible 
rent-seeking and is dependent on the management of rent”, rent-seeking emerges 
(Elsenhans 1996: 46). 
Hartmut Elsenhans argues that there is “in many cases still an absence of free market 
conditions as well as the politico-economic preconditions for the transformation towards 
capitalism” (translated from Elsenhans 2001: 160). The continuous disappearance of the 
state classes in developing countries is caused neither by the emergence of a strong 
bourgeoisie nor the end of the cold war. The inability to appropriate sufficient income is 
meanwhile caused by a lag of rents leading to the state classes’ declension. 
Obviously, structural adjustment programs, carried out in the mid 1980s, might also have 
influenced their decline aiming transparency. “Internal” rents decrease, but external rents, 
for instance development aid, increase. Consequently, one could argue, that the rentier state 
still exists. It is no secret that development aid is extremely unproductive and also leads to 
marginality and structural heterogeneity, because NGOs are benefited by their donors in 
order to carry out projects in developing countries. In cases of direct financial help, the 
development state appropriates rents more apparently. The immanent syndrome of the 
current development aid system is the continuous supply of rents, which corrodes their 
ambitions. This can be pointed out in the following example: 
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An ambitious NGO fighting famine wants to carry out a project. For this purpose, it has to 
ask for licenses or admissions to do so in the target region. The administration interprets 
such a project as rent (unproductive profit), since its prestige can be increased in attracting 
help. Of course, in a patronage-system the admission will urge the project to their clients to 
legitimize its power. Imagining the project succeeds in allocating food for free and relieves 
famine. Simultaneously, it failed, since peasants cannot sell their agricultural goods in 
competition with this unproductive free help. Marginality gets worse and the rentier state 
including the patronage is invigorated. 
7.7 Multinational Corporations, Rents and Profits 
Hartmut Elsenhans postulates, that „[t]he divergences in productivity lags allow for the 
appropriation of rents in the export sectors, not only in the very visible sector of raw 
material exports, but in any production line where costs of production are comparatively 
low. Non-tariff barriers erected in the industrialized countries in order to cope with the 
employment effects of rapidly increasing manufactured exports from Third World countries 
have created the quota rents, rents accruing to Third World exporters who have been 
allotted First World import quotas, and which rents Third World governments can 
appropriate though taxation or auctioning” (Elsenhans 1996: 46). 
Hence, the two decisive major players in the global economy are development state 
administrations and profit seeking multinational corporations (MNCs). The latter have a 
huge capital stock and do business across borders in order to maximize profit. Global 
operating corporations are, furthermore, forced in this profit seeking to reduce costs. Here, 
rentier states come into play, since states are the only actors, who are able to set rules via 
regulations and tariffs. Consequently, they appropriate rents in attracting business in their 
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territories. Rentier states support or hamper the operating range of multinational 
corporations, since their decision-making influences profitability arrangements. As a result, 
multinational corporations and rentier states entail each other in maximizing their incomes. 
To maximize their incomes Pareto-optimally, both need an intelligent steering (see 
Elsenhans 2001: 196). 
“The appropriation of rents calls for the centralization of the ruling class. This is also true of 
the allocation of rent and investment. If rents were invested in rent-yielding sectors, they would 
gradually disappear with production expansion and diminishing prices. Rents can be utilized 
for development if they are transferred from the sectors in which they appear as profits or levies 
and invested in sectors with a relatively low level of “profitability”, in other words, a rate of 
profit which is low in relation to the rent-yielding sector. They must therefore be utilized in 
contravention of the system of allocation prescribed to capitalist entrepreneurs. In this case, 
entrepreneurs competing with each other must not appropriate rent. The appropriation of rent 
rules out market competition between producers with equal production costs.” 
Hartmut Elsenhans 1996: 47 
Therefore, multinational corporations preferring unproductive investment in lobbying will 
induce rent seeking systems. The operating range and decision-making of multinational 
corporations is clearly described by Rama in stating that: “[f]irms decide about capital 
accumulation, but they also engage in rent seeking. Whereas the former leads to a positive 
spillover, a negative externality arises from the latter, and both affect the growth rate of 
output” (Rama 1993: 49). 
Vice versa, administrations, which are embedded in segmental power games supported by 
appropriated rents, also perpetuate and strengthen the rentier state. In a positive manner, 
the state can invest efficiently, only limited by the productivity potential of its economy, 
whereas, the multinational corporation are forced to invest where profits can be gained.  
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7.8 Diversification and Mass Demand via Rents 
7.8.1 Poverty and Demand 
In order to understand the key findings of this section, it is necessary to explain the 
postulation “poverty reduction via mass demand”. Demand is defined as “the quantity of a 
good buyers wish to purchase at each conceivable price”, while “[s]upply is the quantity of a 
good sellers wish to sell at each conceivable price”. An equilibrium price would clear the 
market, namely “the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded” (Begg et al. 1997: 30-
31). The quantity demanded is not demand itself.  
In terms of poverty, the negotiation for a price that clears the market is difficult when 
incomes are too low to satisfy the poor’s demand. Therefore, even lower prices would not 
help the poor to buy necessary goods, if there is no money left at all. Hence, the supply of 
bread might be high, independent from demand, but the quantities supplied are still zero. 
The supplier and the buyer are not able to arrange a price. While the poor suffer from 
hunger, the supplier might suffer as well, as his or her income is in danger. Poverty 
represented by marginality, therefore, annuls the market and, besides all the human and 
social tragedies, indwells the biggest threat to sustainable economic development. This 
section provides possible fiscal and monetary policy measures, including their impact on 
demand and industrial diversifivcation leading to fairer distribution of wealth, in order to 
overcome structural heterogeneity and marginality as rent-seeking encouraging feature of 
developing economies. 
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7.8.2 Growth Determinants in the Catching-Up Process 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) need an outlet, here described as mass demand. This 
demand can be initiated by the state itself in combining unproductive non-market rents, 
competition and consumption. 
Elsenhans suggests the transformation of rents to productive subsidies supporting 
technological innovations in order to create appropriate consumption structures and 
comparative cost advantages. Such a canalization of rents, paying attention on avoidance of 
efficiency losses and overreaching investment in booming export-sectors, leads to a 
stabilization of the productive branches via technological progress (see Elsenhans 2001: 197 
f.). Therefore, the rentier state plays a decisive role for growth initiation during the catching-
up process. 
7.8.3 Fiscal Intervention for Diversification and Mass Market Creation 
The purpose of economic development is to overcome marginality by creating mass-
demand and an outlet which attracts investment. In order to reach these goals, rents play a 
key role. When workers are employed in a booming export sector, they earn more than the 
peasants who produce their food (structural heterogeneity). Consequently, this “rent is 
produced as a surplus of agriculture. In its physical form it is distributed to the additional 
workers in the export sector” (Elsenhans 2004: 100 f.). This rent appears as consumer rent. 
Employees in the export sector could initiate a mass-market, since they demand local 
products and, thus, provide income for the peasants. Consequently, the latter demand more 
advanced products, which, in turn, creates an outlet for these more advanced products. 
These outlet-opportunities attract investment. This investment employs additional workers. 
Furthermore, these workers create increasing demand.  
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The question is how this process of mass-market creation could be initiated. Taking the 
example of the rising Asian Tigers, export-oriented growth was largely state-led (see Baer et 
al. 1999: 1741). It also implies a “skillful spending of rents” (Elsenhans 2004: 101). 
Elsenhans brings forward the argument, that the “necessity of using rents for diversification 
implied increasingly centralized mechanisms of rent appropriation […], which at least 
ideologically were committed to economic development on the basis of state intervention in 
investment, employment and income distribution” (Elsenhans 2004: 99). The composition 
of rents can be divided in consumer rents, as described above, and differential rents in 
mineral production, not limited to - but most apparently - the oil sector. 
7.8.4 Monetary Policy: Devaluation in Favor of International Competition  
Additionally, devaluation plays a role in order to initiate export-led growth. Devaluation is 
possible in producing local food and providing it to the workers in the export sector 
comparatively cheap. This consumer rent leads to a competitive cost advantage, since the 
reproduction of the labor force is comparatively cheap. In this manner foreign investment 
can be attracted. By devaluating the currency, export is subsidized and comparative cost 
advantages increase, since the selling prices become comparatively low and the production 
factor costs remain stable. 
7.8.5 NGO Rents Hamper Development 
As drawn up above, the overall objective to eliminate marginality and structural 
heterogeneity cannot be reached without rents. Neither consumer rents nor differential 
rents can be expected as highly efficient. Now, the question arises whether development aid 
as a rent is efficient.  
The already discussed NGO’s failure implies the apparent inefficiency of development aid 
programs as rents. The NGO-syndrome is not limited to the critique on its infiltration-like 
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internal structure, but is based on the inability to provide help - as rent – in an equally 
distributing manner. Focused on target groups and projects spots, NGOs aggravate 
structural heterogeneity. 
7.9 Fiscal Policy Should Take Sound Steps to Initiate Mass Demand! 
Hartmut Elsenhans sees through the syndromes of development aid agencies and suggests a 
more advanced strategy to overcome marginality by egalitarian distribution in favor of 
consumption. This is congruent to the Chinese domestic consumption boosting strategies. 
His more efficient approach postulates the reduction of rents by using rents. Rent in form 
of development aid or foreign direct investment should be directly distributed to the 
marginal population. In his simplistic metaphorical model, this could be easily and less 
expensively achieved by throwing identifiable stones from helicopters. Such stones could be 
collected by the marginal population, namely the poor, and be brought to a provincial 
“stones-exchange office” of the respective country. The marginal population receives 
money for these collected stones, because these stones represent a determined value. 
Otherwise there will not be incentives for such stone collection. In order to avoid cheating, 
the imitation of these stones is too costly and exceeds their exchange value. This value 
consists of the subsistence cost of the collector and the transportation cost for stones 
delivery. Such a strategy directly reaches the marginal population, since collecting these 
stones is time-intensive, therefore mainly carried out by unemployed poor. Consequently, 
others, who are not dependent on such an activity due to their existing income to secure 
their reproduction, will not put any effort in collecting stones. Whether these stones are 
sold on the local market, or are directly brought to the central exchange agencies, the 
marginal population can sell these stones. Such an artificial created income initiates a 
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demand for local products in order to secure reproduction. Reproduction securing goods 
are rather agrarian products, namely food. Hence, the local food production will increase by 
further investment, since local farmers expect an outlet for their recently demanded 
products. Additional labor forces will be hired to maximize agrarian output in order to 
satisfy this increasing demand. This further employment induces scarcity of labor which, in 
turn, increases wages, since wage determining marginal labor decreases. Higher wages create 
a rising mass-demand on more advanced products like refrigerator, televisions or radios 
which could be produced locally. The small and medium-sized sector grows, because there 
is expected further demand which attracts investment (see Elsenhans 2004: 105). This 
further investment aims an increasing output, which naturally raises the employment of 
additional labor force. Via such an artificial or fiscally stimulated mass demand creation will 
therefore lead to industrial diversification, mainly by the increasing appearance of small- and 
medium-sized manufactures. 
The advantage of Elsenhans’ mass-market creating egalitarian distribution strategy to 
eliminate marginality is the natural use of market mechanisms without any cost-intensive 
and rent appropriating regulations, since “the marginal population indicates through its 
purchasing decisions, without any administrative costs to producers, what should be 
produced” (Elsenhans 2004: 106). This eliminates public rent seeking caused by lobbying-
activities carried out by NGOs and entrepreneurs. 
Despite of its advantage justified by a maximum degree of efficiency (direct donor-target 
group aid), Elsenhans’ ingenious strategy is hard to apply due to the existing lobbying-
structure, namely rent seeking motives of the global development aid apparatus which fears 
its elimination. Hence, it is up to the national fiscal policy supported by its monetary policy 
to regulate capital flows, to using revenues for public spending in low income areas and to 
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directly steer investment. A much closer measure to Elsenhans’ approach would be 
represented in direct payments to the poor. Alternatively, vouchers could be distributed 
among the poor, in order to ensure their direct consumption of government favored items 
which effectively support the region’s small manufactures. During the global financial crisis 
Beijing adopted such a strategy through tax reduction on specific items like refrigerators or 
motorbikes, as they are expected to provide wide-ranging spillovers. 
Growth can only be initiated through overcoming marginality. Trying to reach this objective 
also development aid is doomed to fail, since it is like every actor embedded in this rent 
seeking latently contributing structures. In order to overcome the structure of such a rentier 
state, using rent in an efficient manner is the only way to succeed in eliminating marginality, 
which hampers free market conditions. 
Within the currently practiced development aid apparatus implemented by World Bank, 
IMF and Western NGOs, such a rent driven domestic demand based strategy aiming at the 
abolishment of rents towards the overall objective of rising mass incomes faces a lot of 
established opponents who will fight for the maintenance of these rentier structures. The 
development aid system is comparable to the system of the state class. Various NGOs and 
aid agencies (segments) fight for their rent incomes provided by their donors. These power 
games follow the same rules which are analyzed above.  
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8. PRO-DEVELOPMENT SINO-AFRICAN COOPERATION ? 
8.1 The PRC’s Trade Relations with African Countries 
East Asia, especially the People’s Republic of China, seems to prove the hypothesis that 
trade spurs growth, and growth facilitates development. The People’s Republic of China 
changed the global standing of African economies from too risky into seemingly promising 
investment destinations. Sino-African trade volumes almost doubled from 2007 to the end 
of 2008 to US$106 billion (see Figure XXV). During the 1990’s second half, trade relations 
improved on a low level, while they experienced an upswing in accordance with the first 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing 2000. 
Figure XXV: China's Trade with Africa in US$ billion, 1995-2008 
 
Source: Data collected from World Trade Atlas and carefully compared with  
        IMF data presented in an IPPR (2006) study by Wild and Mepham. 
Until 2003, the trade volumes remained at nearly US$10 billion, but the Addis Ababa 
FOCAC II pushed Sino-African cooperation to the next level, marked by steady growth of 
one third on a yearly basis which transcended the magic benchmark of 100 billion during 
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2008 (see figure XXV). Ther
prominent trading partner after the United States. 
Africa year”, when Beijing became the stage for FOCAC III 
economic, social and political cooperation intensification as well as a more detailed roadmap 
for the 2006-09 period till the fourth FOCAC, to be held in Cairo
2007 to 2008, African exports to China advanced by 54 percent to US$56 billion, as it is 
above illustrated in figure XXVI.
Figure XXVI: African Exports
Source: Own calculations based on data, provided by the World Trade Atlas based on Chinese official 
data. This grouping of the most prominent exporting countries is assembled by the minimum export 
value trigger of at least US$ 1 billion as criteria.
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Almost the same pattern is recognizable for Chinese imports 
valued with US$51 billion in 2008
China’s world exports measures
when China exported an overall value of US$1.4 trilli
XXVIII).  
Figure XXVIII: Global Comparison 
the World in 1995, 2000 and 
Source: Own calculations based on data, provided by the World Trade A
official data. 
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Image I: Store in Lagos, Nigeria Offering Chinese TIGER Gasoline  
               Generators 
 
Source: Own picture 
In almost every bigger African town, small stores sell Chinese cell phones that look like 
their original counterparts. In Nigeria, such mobiles, shown in image II, are called “Nokia 
China” or “Chinco” indicating that those are PRC imports and often faked. Nigerians also 
name such products of minor quality in the local pidgin dialect “better pass my neighbor”, 
which implies that those products are to a lesser reason bought because of their function 
rather incitements of prestige. 
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Image II: Nigerian Salesman Presenting the Locally-Called “Nokia-China” 
Cell Phone 
 
Source: Own picture 
In 2008, the top African destination countries of Chinese imports, below demonstrated in 
figure XXIX, are South Africa (US$8.6 bn.), Nigeria (US$6.8 bn.), Egypt (US$5.8 bn.), 
Algeria (US$3.7 bn.) and Angola (US$2.9 bn.).  
After comparing the total values of Africa’s exports to China (US$ 55.9 bn.) with the PRC’s 
imports to Africa (US$50.9 bn.) based on data of the year 2008, the numbers seem to 
indicate a trade surplus in favor of African economies. Sandrey opposes this impression in 
arguing that “imports into China from Africa include the freight and insurance costs of 
shipping these goods to China [accounted in the above presented data] while the similar 
cost of transporting Chinese goo
statistics, since this section’s numbers are solely collected from Chinese official data 
(Sandrey 2009: 3). To the African nations, such an accounting makes Sino
look better, as it seems to benefit African economies’ trade balances. One can interpret this 
act as statistical manipulation in order to underline the politically promoted economic ties 
between China and Africa.  
Figure XXIX: Chinese Imports to African
Source: Own calculations based on data, provided by the World Trade Atlas based on Chinese official data. 
This grouping of the most prominent exporting countries is assembled by the minimum export value trigger 
of at least US$ 1 billion as criteria.
In 2008, Angola with a share of 24 percent in overall Sino
African trading partner followed by South Africa (17%), 
Egypt (6%). Interestingly three of them are “oil c
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
8. PRO-DEVELOPMENT SINO-AFRICAN 
131 
 
ds to Africa” is not considered in the 
 
 Countries in US$ billion
 
-African trade is China’s top 
Sudan (8%), Nigeria (7%) and 
ountries” (classified by Broadman 2007: 
COOPERATION ? 
above demonstrated 
-African trade 
, 1995-2008 
 
Other African Countries
Liberia
Togo
Kenya
Ethiopia
Libya
Ghana
Sudan 
Benin
Morocco
Angola
Algeria
Egypt
Nigeria
South Africa
DAVID ENGELHARDT   -   MASTER 
 
59). Their trade volumes signify
their trade development with the PRC 
South Africa dominated African 
replaced by Angola in 2006, when the top five’s volumes reached US$ 21 billion
while Angola constituted US$ 11.8 billion, approximately one
China-African trade volumes of US$ 5
Figure XXX: China's "Big Five"
This remarkable boost in Sino
to the enhanced Angolan real GDP performance in the period from the same year until 
2008 (see figure XXXI). The figure also includes estimations on
by the global financial crisis for the years 2008 and 2009, whe
Egypt is estimated as being softer than those on Angola
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
THESIS AT UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA, NOVEMBER 
132 
 62 percent of China-African trade.  Figure XXX underlines 
from 1995 to 2008: During the 1990s 
economic cooperation with China. Its dominance
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 African Trading Partners in US$ Billions, 1995
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latter depend heavily on resource exports that decline in concert with slowing global 
demand caused by production declines. 
Figure XXXI: China’s Most Important African Trading Partners’ Performance 
Measured by Real GDP Growth Rates, 2000-2010 
 
Source: Data re-assembled from AfDB/OECD (2009): African Economic Outlook 2009, including 
estimates (e) and forecasts (p) combined with data from the IMF (Oct. 2008) World Economic 
Outlook. 
Angola is hit hardest because of the countries undiversified export sector which mainly 
consists of the oil export that signifies 97 percent of Angola’s overall exports. The same 
feature applies for Sudan by 92 percent (see OECD 2009: 164-65). Similar to the mining 
sector, China invests in oil equity, instead of just purchasing it. Asche and Schüller 
discovered “a systematic interrelationship between oil imports and investment in the oil 
sector: 15% of all Chinese oil imports are equity oil, in other words oil from sources with 
Chinese equity participation” (Asche and Schüller 2008: 22). Taylor (2006) therefore speaks 
of “oil diplomacy” when he describes China’s Africa engagement. In 2005, Angola delivered 
almost half of the overall crude oil imports into China and contributed like other African 
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oil-exporting countries as Sudan (~25%), DR Congo (13%), Equatorial Guinea (9%) and 
Nigeria (3%) to the diversification of the PRC’s oil suppliers. China not solely intends to 
secure its oil purchases, rather it aims at increasing its own role as global oil supplier, 
advanced by further oil equities (see Tjønneland et al. 2006). 
Figure XXXII: Activities of Chinese oil companies in Africa, 2002-2006 
 
Source: Asche and Schüller 2008: 23 
The PRC’S three main state-owned oil corporations, namely China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) including its affiliate PetroChina, Sinopec and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), function besides ongoing SOC privatization as the 
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Chinese Communist Party’s elongated economic arm. Sinopec and CNPC are under direct 
control of the State Energy Administration and consequently put Beijing’s long-term energy 
strategy into practice (see Taylor 2006). Sudan best exemplifies such strategies. From the 
Western investors’ stance, political instability endangers investments und their 
implementation. From a Chinese perspective as a late bloomer, political instability in 
prospective investment destination countries like Angola and Sudan provides a chance to 
enter the oil market, since Western investment is crowded out by conflicts and legal 
insecurity. The compacts concerning oil deals between 2002 and 2006 are summarized in 
figure XXXII, borrowed from Asche and Schüller 2008, and demonstrate the Chinese oil 
corporations’ focus on Angola and Nigeria. The sensational oil deal with Angola was 
cannibalized by Western media and contributed to the common “China bashing” during the 
last years caused by the fact that IMF and World Bank denied loans for Angola. In 2005, 
China jumped in and secured its oil rights. Procedures of this kind described as “Angola 
Mode” became core feature of Sino-African cooperation. The above demonstrated oil 
contracts mostly follow one pattern, described by Asche and Schüller: 
“Chinese oil corporations grant such countries low-interest loans to develop oil fields, often tied to deliveries of 
Chinese goods and services. They thus offer an alternative outlet to countries which have difficulties accessing 
the international financial market. In addition, state-owned oil corporations pursue alliances with local 
companies.” 
Asche and Schüller (2008: 23) 
Such a rent-seeking behavior by the Angolan state class led to annulations of potential 
future oil revenues valued by US$ 4.5 billion ruled out by patronage and corruption (see 
Taylor 2006 as well as Asche and Schüller 2008). 
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8.2 Pragmatic Aid 
8.2.1 The Political Tool of Aid 
In historical perspective, the allocation of Chinese aid has been a tool to achieve political 
goals. The most prominent example is Chou En-lai’s safari (from Dec. 1963 to Feb. 1964) 
in the golden years of Sino-African diplomacy, whereby the PRC’s aspiration towards its 
recognition as the only Chinese representative state was transformed into its development 
aid policy. PR China’s UN-accession in 1971, facilitated by the support of recently 
independency-reached African countries, proved foreign aid as useful diplomatic tool (Stark 
1990). 
Characterizing Chinese aid to Africa today, an OECD study highlights the economic and 
commercial rationale, as “aid packages have been effectively targeted to complement other, 
more dynamic economic relationships between China and Africa” (OECD 2008b: 114). 
Figure XXXIII borrowed from Holder and Jackson (2008) illustrates the exponential 
development of Chinese Aid to Africa. Between 2002 and 2006, Beijing’s contributions in 
form of aid tripled to the amount $5.7 billion which is estimated to increase by a factor of 3 
½ to 2010.  
Figure XXXIII: Growth in Chinese Aid to Africa 
 
Source: Holder and Jackson (2008: 67) 
According to Reisen and Ndoye (2008: 34), Chinese development aid in its broadest sense 
contains grant aid, zero-interest loans and concessional loans. While the former two are 
subjects to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), concessional loans belong to the 
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operational range of the China Export and Import Bank (EXIM). Nonetheless, Asche and 
Schüller (2008: 32) point out that “MOFCOM is also responsible for the granting of 
concessionary credits, although these are processed via EXIM”, while MOFCOM 
subsidizes such loans with “the difference between China’s central bank base rate and the 
preferential loan rate” (Reisen and Ndoye: 2008: 35). 
Since only those subsidies instead of the whole concessional loans are accounted as aid, 
Chinese aid practically comprises just a small amount of less than $1.5 billion compared to 
the PRC’s perceived engagement revealed by newspaper articles. Though, Chinese 
accounted aid exponentially escalates. Hence, China’s engagement in Africa as a whole has 
to be considered as rather pragmatic cooperation than apparent altruistic aid in terms of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
8.2.2 Preferential Loans Instead of Aid 
The OECD published a factsheet on official development assistance (ODA) accounting 
rules as a supplement of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Statistical 
Reporting Directives. The document, entitled “Is It ODA?” determines the conducting 
bodies as “ofﬁcial agencies, including state and local governments, or […] executive 
agencies”. The aims and requirements are regulated as “transaction of which is administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as 
its main objective and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 
per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)”, see OECD 2008a. 
Concerning concessional lending, it further arranges: “Where concessional and non-
concessional financing are combined in so-called ‘associated financing packages’, the official 
and concessional elements may be reported as ODA, provided they have a grant element of 
at least 25 per cent” (OECD 2008a). In terms of concessionality, Chinese loans differ. Their 
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interest rates are below the market rates, but do not necessarily fulfill the ODA qualifying 
25 percent level required by the DAC. Therefore, the World Bank omitted figures on 
Chinese ODA since 2003. 
8.2.3 Chinese Aid Composition 
Asche and Schüller (2008: 38) discuss the explanatory power of numbers concerning 
Chinese aid, since Chinese records miss international standards, which leads to the 
involvement of necessary but error inducing estimates. Figure XXXIV demonstrates how 
Chinese development cooperation (DC) is composed. Asche and Schüller obviate the term 
“concessional” in their classification of “interest-free credits”, “interest-bearing credits” and 
“grants”.  
Figure XXXIV: Composition of Chinese DC with Africa 2000 - 2006 
 
Source: Asche and Schüller (2008: 39) 
Although the figure misses the $4 billion deal with Angola in 2005, it demonstrates that the 
largest proportion of Chinese DC is conducted via interest bearing credits. Asche and 
Schüller (2008: 40) have collected some interest rates on such loans for Angola (1.5%), 
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Mozambique (2%) as well as Zimbabwe (3%), and conclude that such interests, in general, 
range between 1.5 and 4 percent. The illustration also reveals that there are enough grants 
within the Chinese DC with Africa to meet the ODA requirement. It is merely a matter of 
how China can compose packages in a way to meet the DAC’s concessional rule of at least 
25 percent. This attempt could explain the often confusing collaboration of state agencies, 
banks and corporations.  
8.3 Debt Relief and Free-Riding 
In order to enable Africa’s attraction on FDI, in 2003 on the second FOCAC in Addis 
Ababa, 31 African countries received a cancellation of debt owed to China amounting 
US$1.27 billion (see Le Pere 2008: 15). This was due to the same intention of more far 
reaching Western debt relief programs that aimed at Africa’s restoration of credit-
worthiness. Especially after the Angola-deal, China was polemically bashed as free-rider of 
Western debt relief. Reisen counters this concern in arguing that “[t]he ‘free-riding’ concern 
is misplaced, for a simple reason: The majority of the projects that receive Chinese 
financing for Africa-based infrastructure projects are undertaken in non-HIPC resource-rich 
countries. During the present decade, Angola, Nigeria and Sudan received the bulk of the 
confirmed Chinese financing commitments in infrastructure” (Reisen 2007: 2). Additionally, 
Reisen (2007) adds that Chinese rapid investment is the intended result of Western 
encouragement practiced by debt-forgiveness, since it indeed boosts Africa’s economic 
potential. 
DAVID ENGELHARDT   -   MASTER THESIS AT UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA, NOVEMBER 2009 
140 
 
8.4 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment 
8.4.1 Character of FDI in Sino-African Cooperation 
Behind Asia, Africa is the most important region of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows 
from the PRC. Distinctive from Western FDI which predominantly originates private 
sources, Chinese FDI “comes from firms that are either partly or wholly state-owned” 
(Holder and Jackson 2008: 68). Hence, their timeframe of profitability is more long-term 
oriented. Furthermore, state-owned corporations (SOCs) enjoy decisive advantages like 
access to low-cost capital as well as preferential loans. Singh (2007: 39) adds the aspect of 
political, strategic and diplomatic intentions of such SOCs, besides the pure economic 
factor of profit maximization. This is reasoned by Yang et al. (2008) who claim that “SOE 
managers are interested in noneconomic objectives when deciding where and how to go 
abroad [, which] has been driven by the strong political and diplomatic motivation of the 
central government behind many O-FDI projects” (Yang et al. 2008: 73). 
Asche and Schüller (2008) classify FDI motivation in Africa, which are here borrowed in 
their original UNCTAD terminology as market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, resource-seeking 
and created asset seeking. This is evidenced by a World Bank study that points out that 
“Chinese investors in Africa, like other foreign investors, seek natural resources and local 
markets, as well as a platform for exporting to Europe, the United States and throughout 
the region” (Broadman et al. 2007: 94). An OECD study supplements this thought in 
arguing that “investors intend to take advantage of the preferential market access provided 
by developed countries to African countries through such mechanisms as the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offered by the United States, the Everything But 
Arms (EBA) initiative offered by the EU, and the Economic Partnership Agreement 
between the EU and Africa” (OECD 2008b: 111). 
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Furthermore, the macroeconomic motive of reaching equilibrium in the PRC’s international 
financial flows through currency revaluation has to be taken into consideration, since China 
hoards the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves amounting US$2.27 trillion. Therefore, 
advisable capital outflow in terms of aid, trade, mergers, acquisitions and OFDI is 
encouraged by the Chinese “Go Global” campaign. 
For 2007 year, MOFCOM (2008: 59-77) numbers China’s OFDI flow into Africa with 
US$1.57 billion and OFDI stock with US$4.46 billion. The exact distribution by country 
can be followed by observing the tables A-VII and A-VIII in this paper’s annex which 
demonstrate that Chinese OFDI in 2007 mainly flowed into South Africa (US$454 million) 
and Nigeria (US$390 million). To a smaller extent, both countries are followed by Algeria 
(US$146 million), Zambia (US$119 million) and Niger (US$101 million). In terms of OFDI 
stocks, Africa altogether received US$4.46 billion from the PRC, which is almost the 
tenfold of Chinese OFDI stocks in Africa, that was measured for the year 2003. 
Between 1990 and 2004, Asian FDI towards Africa has been invested by a huge share of 70 
percent in oil rich countries (Broadman et al. 2007). Analyzing the former period between 
1979 and 2000, Asche and Schüller (2008) detect that the manufacturing sector with an 
investment value of $315 million, especially textiles ($102 million), dominates resource 
extraction with an FDI flow of $188 million which is closely followed by services ($125 
million). 
8.4.2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
In the period 1990-2005, China’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) increased globally from 
US$60 million to US$5.3 billion, and they quadrupled to phenomenal US$15 billion in 2006. 
While smaller firms prefer outward offices to implement themselves in foreign markets, 
Chinese SOCs use the OFDI-peculiarity of M&As to “acquire advanced technology, sales 
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networks, brand names and other strategic assets” [. As an OECD study further argues,] 
“M&As by Chinese enterprises are especially popular in technology [,] communications and 
in natural resources sectors” (OECD 2008b: 74-75). 
Such an example is the Chinese-Nigerian joint venture HPZ LTD, commonly known as 
Haier THERMOCOOL. The world’s third largest white goods manufacturer Haier with a 
value of RMB 80.3 billion (2008) collaborates with PZ Cussons Nigeria, known as 
THERMOCOOL brand. 
Image III: Store in Lagos, Nigeria Offering Haier THERMOCOOL Items 
 
Source: Own picture 
The HPZ LTD is a Joint Venture between PZ Cussons Nigeria (THERMOCOOL brand) 
and the Chinese Haier Group. The latter founded this venture as perfect match, since 
“Nigerian consumers have trusted the THERMOCOOL brand since the 1970's” (Haier 
THERMOCOOL website 2009), while the Chinese company Haier is experienced in 
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producing over 30,000 products including Televisions, DVD's, Microwaves, and 
Computers. 
Nevertheless, concerning advertence in the media, the sheer M&A incident of Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China’s (ICBC) acquisition of a 20% stake in South Africa’s 
Standard Bank in October 2007 for US$5.6 billion was remarkable. With such a step the 
ICBC, as the world’s largest bank by market capitalization, put a big foot in the door 
towards an own Chinese voice in the African banking sector to secure financial stability for 
further projects, businesses, trade and financial flows of the Chinese diaspora in Africa. 
8.4.3 Alignment of Aid and FDI 
“Chinese Aid can be considered as an investment made by the Chinese government to promote the prosperity 
of the Chinese economy. As a consequence, the Chinese look to finance projects with limited, circumscribed 
risk and high potential profitability, or else they seek African countries that can provide them with solid 
collateral guarantees.” 
Reisen and Ndoye (2008: 35) 
In May 2006, the estimated amount of Chinese assistance to Africa, valued with $5.7 billion, 
includes the above mentioned types of loans and grants as well as programs on technical 
assistance, scholarships, medical missions and labor cooperation. However, the OECD 
argues that “China has strategically aligned its ODA resources with OFDI policy to support 
Chinese enterprises investing in Africa” (2008b: 67). As mentioned above, this alignment of 
Aid and OFDI is strategically composed in a way in order to encourage Sino-African trade 
while it equips Chinese firms and SOCs with comparative advantages. In the meantime, 
Chinese assistance is propagandistically praised as win-win-benefit in the apparently equal 
South-South cooperation between the self-proclaimed leader of the developing world and 
the region with the world’s most LDCs. Currently, the PRC follows its own strategies, 
predominantly of commercial and economic nature. In the last two decades, Chinese state 
corporations have been transformed into 9 MNCs. In this transition process, Africa seemed 
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to be the best appropriated testing ground due to minor competition pressure. The motives, 
occurrence and composition of this pragmatic China-Africa cooperation has been described 
above, but the main executives of Chinese OFDI- and aid encouragement have not been 
discussed so far. Therefore, the next chapter analyzes the well-known China Export-Import 
Bank (EXIM), the less known China Development Bank (CDB) and the China-Africa 
Development Fund as major lending actors in the very liaison. 
9. PRC’S “PRAGMATIC” TRINITY VS. BRETTON WOODS’ “UNHOLY” TRINITY 
145 
 
9. PRC’S “PRAGMATIC” TRINITY VS. BRETTON WOODS’ “UNHOLY” TRINITY 
9.1 China EXIM – The Motor of Sino-African Cooperation 
9.1.1 The EXIM’s Role 
The Chinese Export-Import Bank accounts a total asset of about $52 billion in 2007, which 
makes it the world’s leader among the other countries’ Export-Import-banks (Export-
Import Bank of China 2007: 5). As a government owned bank, the Eximbank is liable to the 
State Council which appoints its management since its establishment in 1994. However, the 
government does not guarantee the EXIM’s deals except for loans to foreign governments. 
It maintains ten domestic offices and three offices abroad, more precisely in Johannesburg, 
Paris and St. Petersburg. The EXIM’s official webpage praises itself as “an important force 
in the backup system of foreign trade and economy and a significant component of the 
financial system” (Export-Import Bank of China 2009). The business activities are overseen 
by the Ministries of Finance and Commerce, the People’s Bank of China and the China 
Bank Regulatory Commission (see Bosshard 2007). Implementing the PRC’s Go Global 
strategy, the EXIM has to be considered as the spearhead for Chinese multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in Todaro and Smith’s (2006: 707) understanding as “corporation or 
enterprise that conducts and controls productive activities in more than one country”. The 
EXIM itself exposes its emphasis on “profitability” and “higher profit-making ability” 
(Export-Import Bank of China 2008a: 10-11).  
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Source: Moss and Rose (2006: 1)
9.1.2 EXIM in Transition 
Until 2006, on paper the EXIM 
was concerned with export 
credits, loans for overseas 
construction, international 
guarantees as well as official 
credit lines. The main operations 
including their values are 
illustrated above in figure XXXV 
which emphasizes the EXIM’s 
focus on export seller and buyers credits that encourage Sino-African trade in order to 
stimulate Chinese OFDI. According to Asche, “Chinese firms have their operations 
subsidized by the extremely liquid state bank system, with so far the Chinese EXIM bank 
playing a unique role” (Asche 2008: 167). The sole focus on credits officially changed in 
2007, while the Export-Import Bank of China Annual Report 2007 draws out the widening 
of the banks operational range as it “has transformed from the previously export-oriented-
only bank into a new type of bank dedicated to international economic cooperation that 
supports both export and import and provides both development aid and outbound 
investment loan facilities. It is now playing a significant part in the implementation of 
national economic strategies and foreign policies” (Export Export-Import Bank of China 
2007: 9). 
Focusing on EXIM’s engagement in Africa, Asche and Schüller (2008: 34) found out that 
the “bank has granted concessionary loans to over 100 countries and has a total outstanding 
balance of receivables from Africa of $8-9 billion, although this includes concessionary 
Figure XXXV: China EXIM Main Operations, 
2000-2004 
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loans and commercial credits”. As figure XXXVI below demonstrates, the EXIM’s lending 
activity on the African continent increased exponentially. 
Figure XXXVI: EXIM Approved Loans for Chinese Investment in Africa (Including 
Concessional Loans), 1995-2007 
 
Source: Oya (2008: 1) 
Moss and Rose (2006: 1) also report on the bank’s tremendous portfolio growth “with 
annual disbursements more than tripling in five years to $15 billion” in 2006. An OECD 
paper points out that the China EXIM “aims to expand its loans by 15-20% per year. A 
growth rate of 15% would increase its lending to approximately $40 billion in 2010 — 
considerably more than the lending of any other export credit agency or the World Bank” 
(Reisen and Ndoye 2008: 32). 
9.1.3 EXIM – Operations in Africa by Sector 
Resource Extracting: Oil and Gas 
Between 2001 and 2005, Sudan received $1.9 billion for infrastructure projects in exchange 
for oil. This oil-related infrastructure enhancement with Chinese contribution of $8.8 billion 
has also been experienced by Nigeria between 2004 and 2006. Nevertheless, the Export-
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Import bank’s most famous example of its activities in Africa has been the contentious 
procedure of around 10 infrastructure projects, worthy about $4.5 billion in Angola 
between 2002 and 2006 with the possibility of another $9-10 billion. Alone in 2005, the 
Chinese Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) acquired stakes in 20 African countries in the framework of China’s 
strategic assets and rights bargaining which aims at the “exploration, development and 
production in Africa’s petroleum industry” (AfricaPractice 2007: 11). 
Resource Extracting: Copper, Cobalt, Gold and Timber  
According to AfricaPractice (2007), the EXIM was involved in the copper mining sector in 
Zambia through an investment over $170 million in the Chambezi copper mine in 1999 to 
feed the PRC’s world’s largest consumption of copper. In countries like the DRC, South 
Africa and Namibia, the EXIM supports investments in copper mining as well as cobalt 
extraction. The purchase of the renewable but likewise threatened resource of timber to 
China has been predominantly secured in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. In September 
2007, the EXIM headed a joint venture share of 68 percent with DR Congo, which 
provided Chinese construction work by the China Railway Engineering Corporation and 
Sinhydro in exchange for concessional access to Congolese cobalt, copper and gold mines 
(see Asche and Schüller 2008: 37). 
Construction, Power and Telecommunication 
Beyond that, the EXIM co-financed the Bui Dam in Ghana, electricity projects of $2.3 
billion in Mozambique for the Mepanda Nkua dam and hydroelectric plant, plus another 
possible $300 million for the Moamba-Major dam. Furthermore, Moss’ and Rose’s (2006: 1) 
observation also contains EXIM-deals with other construction projects in Congo-
Brazzaville, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Reisen and Ndoye (2008) mention the expansion of 
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Ethopia’s telecommunications network with an EXIM contribution of $1.5 billion (Reisen 
and Ndoye 2008: 33). Above that, Nigeria received a preferential buyers credit for its first 
communication satellite (Moss and Rose 2006). The most apparent Chinese 
telecommunication SOE in Africa is the Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment 
Company Limited (ZTE) which operates in Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Angola, Algeria and Tunisia.  
9.1.4 The “Angola Mode” 
Although the EXIM’s involvement in the above shown deals is apparently incomplete, they 
even so demonstrate the diversity of EXIM investments and its pragmatic procedure best 
exemplified by the “Angola Mode” that concerned the above mentioned investment of 
about $4.5 billion in Angola between 2002 and 2006 with the possibility of another $9-10 
billion. Chinese construction corporations, financed by the Eximbank, carried out projects 
in exchange for access rights to Angolan natural resources through acquiring licenses and 
equity stakes in Angola’s national oil company Sonangol. According to Moss and Rose, the 
oil-rich country has been “able to resist IMF demands for increased budget transparency 
partly because China ExIm has been willing to lend” (Moss and Rose 2006: 3). 
9.2 China Development Bank 
9.2.1 Tasks and Enforcement 
As a policy bank that promised to separate policy lending from commercial lending, the 
China Development Bank (CDA) was founded by the IMF and the World Bank 
simultaneously with the EXIM in 1994. As it raises its fund through international 
commercial loans, IFO-loans and foreign government loans, the CDB is able to re-lend 
such loans and to issue bonds in foreign markets. The bank is also engaged in credit 
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business, inter-bank borrowing, foreign exchange loans, policy loans to policy projects and 
construction project loans (see China Development Bank 2008a). Though the CDB is 
owned by the Ministry of Finance, it is liable to the State Council. According to Asche and 
Schüller, the CDB, as well as the EXIM, are “able to pursue a (relatively) independent 
policy with respect to the granting of credits from its own funds” (Asche and Schüller 2008: 
34). 
9.2.2 Norms of Cooperation 
Within the concept of disciplined development, the bank refers to Social Responsibility as 
its role in optimizing “the allocation of wealth [and] resources to critically needed areas” 
(China Development Bank 2009b). This evidently altruistic notion is relativized as it 
mentions economy first in continuing that “the Bank simultaneously drives both economic 
and social development” (China Development Bank 2009b). Keeping in mind that the CDB 
has been established by World Bank and IMF to promote the PRC’s domestic economic 
prosperity and development, it is clear that the statement adverts to development within 
China supported by investments abroad. 
In terms of Public Private Partnership (PPP), China Development Bank (CDB) governor 
and international operations adviser Dr. Gu Yang pleasantly rejects this mode of 
cooperation in arguing that the “Chinese partners were open to PPP as a mode of 
engagement” but he also announced that “there was often a lack of clarity as to the entry 
point in terms of developing partnerships, as well as the project priorities” (Centre for 
Chinese Studies 2008: 14). His statement can be interpreted as politely packed rejection due 
to the fear that African governments can interfere in Chinese corporations. 
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9.2.3 The Banks Portfolio 
In line with the state’s Go Global strategy, „China has the will and responsibility to share 
the story of its success with other developing countries” (China Development Bank 2009c). 
Therefore, the CDA supported 180 projects and provided loans totally valued by $18.2 
billion. In mentioning cooperation with Africa, the bank emphasizes relations with South 
Africa, Kenya, Uganda and some of Africa’s regional multilateral development-oriented 
financial institutions like the West African Development Bank and the African 
Development Bank (China Development Bank 2008c). The CDB’s website accounts its 
total assets with about $391 billion which contains outstanding bonds of about $311 billion 
in 2007, as presented in figure V. 
Figure XXXVII: The CDB's Total Assets and Bonds Outstanding, 2003-2007 
 
Source: China Development Bank (2009d) 
9.2.4 Targeted Sectors 
The CDB’s focus its operations on the key sectors of electric power, road, railway, 
petroleum and petrochemicals, coal, post & telecommunications, agriculture, forestry and 
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water conservation, and public infrastructure (China Development Bank 2009c). Nota bene, 
these key projects are foreseen to be conducted domestically. Nonetheless, priorities in the 
bank’s Africa businesses are derivable. Until now, a $1 billion credit package is the CDB’s 
major financial contribution to Africa, as well as its participation in the foundation process 
of the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF). 
9.3 China-Africa Development Fund 
9.3.1 Establishment and Rationality 
“The Chinese Government, placing importance on facilitating investment expansion in Africa, decided to 
support related Chinese banks in setting up a China-Africa Development Fund whose total amount will 
gradually reach US$5 billion to give encouragement and support to well established and reputable Chinese 
companies in making investment in projects in Africa which will contribute to local technological progress, 
employment opportunities and sustainable socio-economic development.” 
Source: FOCAC (2006) 
Based on the above quoted article 3.2.5 in the China-Africa-Cooperation-Action Plan 
(2006-2009), formulated on the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 
Beijing 2006, the establishment process of the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) 
was legally heralded. The fund was intended to “support Chinese companies to develop the 
cooperation with Africa and enter the African market” (China-Africa Development Fund 
2009a). 
9.3.2 Investment Frame and Industry Priority 
According to the CADF’s webpage, applying companies’ project proposals are proven by 
the investment team. The investment amount depends on the investment opportunity of 
the respective project. Reasoned with the CADF’s “familiarity with areas of industries, and 
abilities to control risks, and constitutes diversified investment portfolios”, the fund prefers 
“industrial parks set up by Chinese enterprises in Africa [,] natural resources, such as oil, gas 
and solid mineral resources [,] infrastructure and underlying industries, such as electric 
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power and other energy facilities, transportation, telecommunication and urban water 
supply and drainage” (China-Africa Development Fund 2009b). 
9.3.3 The CADF’s 5 Basic Modes 
As the first option, the fund allows joint ventures that originate the CADF to choose 
between registration in China or in Africa. But, “the CADFund [as the second mode] 
directly invests in Chinese-funded enterprises or Chinese-participating enterprises registered 
in Africa. In third form “CADFund directly invests in Chinese-funded enterprises registered 
in China which make investments in Africa [as well as] CADFund directly invests in African 
projects involving international financial institutions” (China-Africa Development Fund 
2009c). The last mode concerns the establishment of further funds that invest in African 
projects that are characterized by the participation of domestic and foreign institutions. 
9.3.4 Recent Events that frame the CADF’s operational intentions 
In June 2008, the fund’s president and public face Chi JianXin and Mr. Arnold Onyekwere, 
president of (Ecobank Transnational Inc.) ETI agreed on a MoU in Beijing. The 
commercial and investment banking conducting ETI was established in Togo in 1985. In 
the same month Chi JianXin met the China Noferrous Metal Mining Co., Ltd’s (CNMC) 
general manager Luo Tao, the general manager. Both discussed a Zambian project and 
other fields possible cooperation. 
9.3.5 How the Dragon becomes a Hydra 
Due to the legal manifestation of the five basic modes, the 3rd FOCAC created a 
cooperation body that is more flexible than the earlier analyzed financial institutions, since it 
is able to transform involved corporations and can even design new funds. In this way, the 
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China-Africa collaboration forearms legally for a possible commercial law battle within the 
framework of WTO adjudication. 
9.4 The Trinities’ Battle for the “Right Way” 
9.4.1 Pragmatic Trinity and the West 
Besides the upheaval of critics named “China bashing” against the PRC’s imprudent 
lending, Goldstein et al. (2006) make clear that intensified trade links with China enabled 
Africa to enjoy higher growth rates, better terms of trades, increased export volumes, and 
higher public revenues. 
Reisen foresees the sliding balance of power between the “Unholy Trinity” and the 
“Pragmatic Trinity“, in saying that “competition now faced by Western financial institutions 
may strengthen competition across economic-policy paradigms, with recipient countries 
freer to choose. Ultimately, reform ownership and accountability may thus be strengthened, 
as power slips away from the old donor cartel” (Reisen 2007: 4) 
9.4.2 Debt Relief 
Although Reisen rejects argumentations that blame China as a debt-aggravating free-rider of 
debt relief in pointing out that Chinese projects have been carried out in non-HIPC-
countries, it is still an issue. Especially, when critiques highlight the EXIM borrowers 
Ghana, Mozambique and Congo-Brazzaville, “creditors (and legislatures and taxpayers) who 
are still appropriating funds to pay for debt relief may (rightly view such efforts as indirectly 
subsidizing new Chinese lending” (Moss and Rose 2006: 3) Hence, the HIPC initiative is in 
danger, since African HIPCs might not be willing to reject Chinese support anymore and 
might therefore contravene IMF and World Bank requirements for the HIPC initiative; or 
the “traditional” donor community can rope the PRC under the Paris Declaration’s 
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buzzword of donor-harmonization. This process of collaboration has been officially 
initiated by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the World Bank and the 
EXIM in May 2007. Both financial institutions, personalized by China EXIM Chairman Li 
Ruogu and World Bank Managing Director Juan Daboub, agreed on the exchange of 
information. 
9.4.3 Transparency and Governance 
Concerning transparency and governance, “China ExIm does not report its own activities in 
the same way as [it] does not place reporting demands on its clients. This not only 
undermines export credit rules aimed at keeping a level playing field, but could also hurt 
global efforts to reduce the secrecy around the financing and contracting of large 
infrastructure or oil projects, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)” (Moss and Rose 2006: 3). Especially, the PRC’s top African exporters Angola, 
Sudan and Congo, as well as major trading partners like Nigeria and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo that are significantly affected by Sino-African cooperation, in contrast to 
South Africa which diversified its export purchasers, performed extremely bad during the 
2002-2008 period, when it comes to corruption perception (see annex table A-XX). Except 
for Nigeria that is placed on the 121st country rank for 2008, all of the mentioned countries 
are ranked by the OECD between the 158th and the worst corruption perception 180th 
country rank (see OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 192-93). Hence, there is at 
least a statistical correlation between China’s engagement in Africa to the worsening of 
perceived corruption in its partner countries.  
9.4.4 Environmental and Social Standards  
In 2004, China EXIM started to ask its borrowers to submit to review of internal operations 
and requires to compliance with the host countries’ local law. Since China is not liable to 
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OECD regulations, there is no formal need to assess prospective project’s environmental 
impact. Moreover, Chinese banks “have not signed up to the Equator Principles which set 
voluntary environmental and social standards for banks on all project lending greater than 
$10 million” (Moss and Rose 2006: 3). But due to long-term investor’s needs, stability and a 
healthy “environment” enhances the investment “climate”. And, as the PRC came to stay, 
environmental issues und social standards will be an issue in the medium-run. 
9.5 China’s Fiscal Policy Abroad 
Beijing encourages domestic corporations to invest in Africa, motivated by the imbalance of 
its FDI-balance and its massive currency reserves. In the previously outlined Angola Mode 
China’s “fiscal policy abroad” is obviously intervening in the local African countries’ fiscal 
policy tasks. In this mode approved by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China 
EXIM provides loans to the government of the beneficiary country mostly for 
infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese construction companies. In advance of the 
loan provision, MOFCOM and the local government agree on the conditions of such 
projects (see figure XXXVIII). During these negotiations, both parties determine the loan’s 
interest rate, the overall amount to be lent, the timeframe and other modalities. The latter, 
for instance, could include the MOFCOM’s call for construction projects that 
predominantly employ Chinese construction workers or the condition that required 
materials should be imported from China instead of locally purchased. Even so, these loans, 
as their only option, are lucrative for governments that are for several reasons excluded 
from World Bank and IMF lending, since African governments are able to co-decide 
investment destinations. This stands in contrast to HIPC-I and II conditionalities, wherein 
the donors as well as the Bretton Woods institutions decided about “proper” pro-poor 
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spending destinations. After these negotiations, EXIM and MOFCOM check the feasibility 
and charges Chinese construction corporations with the respective project. In exchange for 
that loan to be spent on infrastructure, the government of the beneficiary country grants 
Chinese oil-SOCs the access to its oil reserves. Asche and Schüller point out that “[i]n the 
case of the $2 billion credit facilities granted to Angola in 2004, the repayments are to be 
made in the form of delivery commitments amounting to 10,000 barrels of crude oil per 
day, sold internationally at the spot market price” (Asche and Schüller 2008: 37). 
Figure XXXVIII: China’s Interference in Local Governments’ Fiscal Policy  
                                Spheres  
 
Source: Asche and Schüller (2008: 36) 
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Since these purchases are mostly favorable to the Chinese side, they exclude tariffs and tolls 
which are normally put on such purchases. Therefore the government waves future 
revenues that would prospectively encourage their own government spending, or at least 
enlarge their fiscal space. 
Most studies on China’s engagement in Africa highlight the objectives of resource security 
and market-seeking. More advanced analyses point out comparative advantages of 
producing in, but more important shipping from, Africa due to AGOA and EBA. Besides 
those needs, the home-made problem of the PRC’s propensity to hoard such huge amounts 
of foreign reserves turns out to be the decisive cause for China’s engagement in Africa. This 
is due to its favorable past and ongoing domestic investment opportunities that have been 
seized since Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy. The father of China’s economic prosperity 
has not had to face the problem of devaluation in the early 1980s. But in the late 1990s, 
when investment from abroad affected the PRC’s trade balance in a way that led to constant 
devaluation, the inexorable need to invest abroad in order to equilibrate the export-balance 
was furnished with the Go Global strategy, initiated in 1999. 
Furthermore, after the PRC’s WTO-accession in 2001, Chinese corporations that have been 
transformed from fully state-controlled to state-owned faced prospective competition with 
world market experienced corporations. Hence, the urgent need to equip Chinese SOCs 
with international experience in order to compete better in its domestic market. With the 
advantage, that Africa has been and will be a diplomatic minion, it is also blessed with 
natural resources that China needs in order to spur economic growth. Therefore, African 
countries are the conceivable testing ground and a great opportunity to match China’s 
current needs. It does not matter, whether the PRC wants to reform the traditional donor 
system; China also does not urge to impress the world with altruism, since this paper’s 
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previous chapters proved that it would be an easy step to compose grants and loans in a 
way to meet the DAC’s ODA-requirements. Seemingly, these are issues the CPC has put 
last on its agenda. The essential need to keep growth rates high in order to increase wealth 
in China is due to the essential desideratum of domestic stability. Therefore, China’s “fiscal 
policy in Africa” carried out in the “Angola mode” is the best suiting foreign policy 
response. 
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10. PRO-POOR FEATURES OF SINO-AFRICAN COOPERATION TOWARDS MASS 
DEMAND AND DIVERSIFICATION? 
10.1 Improved Infrastructure at Expense of Some Multipliers  
Chinese infrastructure finance focused by a share of 70 percent on Nigeria, Angola, Sudan 
and Ethiopia. Although such projects affect a wide range of sectors, they benefit to a large 
extent the power sector, especially hydropower, and transport. A nearly complete overview 
of documented Chinese financed infrastructure commitments is presented in table A-IX 
(power projects), table A-X (transport projects), table A-XI (ICT projects, table A-XII 
(water projects) and table A-XIII (multisector projects) for the period 2001-07.  
To highlight some outstanding features concerning power projects at this stage, Guinea 
received financial commitments for the Souapiti Dam project of US$1 billion in 2006, while 
at the same time, the identical amount was granted to the Nigerian Mambilla Hydro-Electric 
Power Plant. The same destination country was awarded with altogether US$ 3.5 billion for 
the modernization of the Nigeria railway and the Abuja Rail Mass Transit Project in 2006, 
whereas just an overall amount of US$ 4.2 was delivered to railway projects all over Africa. 
The biggest share of Chinese road project commitments to Africa (0.5 bn.) was delivered to 
Angola which was spent on the rehabilitation of the Kifangondo-Caxito-Uige-Nepage road 
in 2005.  
When it comes to information and communication technologies (ICT), Ethiopia sticks out 
by receiving US$ 1.5 billion, to be compared to Chinese total ICT financing of US$ 2.7 bn.). 
These commitments were intended to expand and upgrade Ethiopia’s telecom network as 
well as the GSM and mobile service. In terms of water projects, much less money was 
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contributed by Beijing. Solely Angola snatched the relative big amount of US$ 0.2 billion 
(300 million in total) for its water projects as part of the famous US$ 2 billion Angola Mode 
deal in 2004. Similar to that, the same Southern African country leads the Chinese list of 
multisector financial commitments, as it reaped US$2 billion for public works and further 
infrastructure. 
These numbers’ exposition might not be easily grasped, but they redound the identification 
of China’s most favorite beneficiary countries, namely Angola, Nigeria and to a much lesser 
extent Ethiopia. An important feature of those financial commitments, which is vital to and 
evidences this paper’s argumentation, is the fact, that all the above outlined projects are 
financed by the EXIM. Therefore, the assumption, that the very Chinese bank is the 
mightiest predator to the World Bank, as global development financier, on African ground. 
Concerning pro-poor aspects of Chinese infrastructure, EXIM commitments clearly 
contribute to the enhancement of current African infrastructure which 
“lags behind other developing regions on most standard indicators of infrastructure development [and] leads 
to losses in industrial production valued at 6 percent of turnover [, as r]oad freight costs in Africa are two to 
four times as high per kilometer as those in the United States, and travel times along key export corridors 
are two to three times as high as those in Asia.” 
Foster et al. 2008: ix 
It is undisputed that the EXIM’s engagement improves African infrastructure and, 
therefore, African countries’ ability to attract foreign investment, as well the respective 
economy’s productivity. Besides such beneficial effects, it constrains the usual Keynesian 
multiplier effect of government spending, since the above drawn finance commitments 
have just little implications for increasing domestic demand. Observing the above 
mentioned tables in this paper’s annex reveals that the contractors carrying out these 
projects, mainly state-owned corporations like Sinohydro and ZTE, are nearly completely 
Chinese. Therefore, the Elsenhansian postulation “overcoming rents by using rents” 
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towards mass demand and diversification does not proceed, at least from the Africa 
perspective. These spillovers are transferred to the PRC, because MOFCOM and EXIM 
favor corporations which, in turn, employ Chinese workers who transfer and spend their 
wages at home. Ajakaiye (2006) highlights these African domestic demand slowing effects 
including the missed opportunity to gain technological knowledge: 
“A challenge is the practice of almost exclusive reliance on Chinese workers and supplies in 
the construction activities implicit in the aid.  This also implies that there will be limited 
technological development and there may be difficulty in maintenance of the assets in the 
medium to long term which is quite sub-optimal.  Perhaps a greater challenge is the tendency 
for the infrastructure being developed with these aid packages are really designed to support 
export activities rather than internal production activities and intra-African trade.” 
Ajakaiye 2006: 11 
Additionally, the rent usually paid to the state class in order to acquire rights to implement 
business or do projects are eliminated, which includes no additive government revenues 
which could finance prospective, solely by the local government desired undertakings. 
Anyhow, this paper’s “reincarnation of the state class” assertion is justified by the 
circumstance, that the Chinese as well as the local government gains political benefits which 
legitimize their power. In case of democracy, if the government attracts such deals or 
commonly improves the countries situation, for instance by better roads, the state class 
chances rise to be reelected during the next ballot. Also, newly built stadiums advance the 
state class’ prestige (see He 2007: 33).  
10.2 FDI-Derived Diversification 
According to Asche, “FDI [foreign direct investment] can strengthen competition in 
domestic markets or, alternatively, displace local providers and dominate the market, thus 
reducing competition” (Asche and Schüller 2008: 54). Mainly caused by Chinese and Indian 
engagement on African ground, FDI doubled to US$ 39 billion from 2004 to 2006. This is 
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due to the fact of the “complementary nature of economic development between Asia and 
Africa” (Africa Research Bulletin 2008: 17731B). Its impact on industrial diversification and 
mass demand as this paper’s proclaimed cause of poverty reduction and sustainable 
economic growth has not been researched in depth, but some patterns can be drawn here. 
The situation slowly improves, since there are some indicators, that the African economies 
dominating extractive industries, to some extent, recognize the profitability of switching 
from just delivering to processing, and then delivering. Based on their economic strength 
including higher future incomes, the Asian partners will be able to spend a little more on 
African extractive imports, which enables African exporters to add this intermediate step of 
processing to their export strategy. Processing, in turn, will increase employment and 
incomes in such sectors. Therefore, local consumption will either engage industrial 
diversification that feeds such new demands or imports increase. Caused by people’s 
disposedness to demand local food, at least agriculture and, therefore, rural incomes will 
improve. These incomes will affect small-scale businesses to produce where their assets are 
located. 
Depending on the processing sector’s workers’ affinity of consumption, either this 
investment multiplier comes into effect in the rural area (the previously described spill-over) 
or in the urban-industrial area (direct spill-over from processing exporters). Depending on 
the highest identified spill-over, governments can contribute to investment in special zones, 
whereby the Chinese special economic zones model might serve as possible role model. 
Some observers expect the latter to be the “new developmental model [which] is in the 
process of being rolled out in key African countries” (Davies 2008: 137). In this model, 
independently from local beneficiary governments, China steers its investment and, in doing 
so, creates such zones. Davies put it bluntly in stating that “[r]ather than being initiators of 
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this process, African governments are the recipients” (Davies 2008: 137). In order to avoid 
such passivity, the Africa Research Bulletin suggests “[s]ector-neutral and passive policies 
should be replaced by flexible, well-targeted efforts to spur FDI that leads to broad-based 
growth” (Africa Research Bulletin 2008: 17732A). Hence, it is up to the government’s fiscal 
policy to steer investment, either initiated by government spending or attracted by tax cuts 
and subsidies. Additionally, investments in infrastructure increase the productivity of the 
favored zone that promises sound spill-over effects and, as a consequence, attracts FDI. 
Such incentives spur the creation of the manufacturing sector that will profit from those 
investments. Regulations on mergers and acquisition as well as joint ventures via taxes or 
labor standards contribute to a more demand-oriented, domestic-consumption increasing 
investment framework. Joint ventures play a key role, as it did in China’s development when 
it comes to knowledge transfer. Unfortunately, there is no data available that reports the 
current technological knowledge spill-over within Sino-African joint ventures, but logical 
thinking allows to assume huge potential in this area. 
The above outlined features of Chinese FDI in Africa are not naturally given, they are 
accepted by passive African governments and carried out based on an active Chinese 
foreign industrial policy. To steer and regulate investment flows is, based on the theories 
presented in this paper, fiscal policy’s task which seems to remain in foreign hands. But 
there is also a bright side, since the increase in investment inflows combined with the stable 
growth in GDP during the pre-crisis years improves investors’ confidence in African 
economies’ prosperity. That builds trust and encourages further investments. If the 
governments are able to steer it towards domestic consumption, mass demand and 
industrial diversification, Africa’s FDI attraction will perform even better. The PRC 
promotes its going global strategy based on its domestic FDI imbalance and its foreign 
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currency reserves; it needs to invest that money abroad. African governments should not be 
to grateful and accept any condition without negotiation, since the factor of Chinese 
altruism is replaced by pragmatism. The PRC truly needs Africa and Africa needs Chinese 
investment. World Bank and IMF seem to have African ministries of finance domesticated 
based on the Neoliberal principle of staying passive. China takes advantage of that African 
passivity by implementing its national policy on foreign ground in various ways: 
Whether state-, province-owned or privately held, the EXIM provides massive incentives to 
such firms, that enables them to invest on such still relatively risky ground. Therefore, as 
Asche and Schüller argue, “capital costs of Chinese companies are lower thanks to 
favourable financing opportunities, or in the case of state-owned corporations tend to zero, 
thus enabling them to make higher bids when aiming to take over other companies” (Asche 
and Schüller 2008: 58). Additionally, the Chinese monetary policy institution PBC improved 
the availability of foreign currency and relaxed restrictions on capital movements, in order 
to spur its outward foreign investment strategy. Moreover, Asche and Schüller report that 
“the framework for investment by Chinese companies abroad [increased] from $3.3 to 5 
billion” from 2003 to 2005 (Asche and Schüller 2008: 58). This financial support was 
supplemented by the previously discussed China-Africa Development Fund in 2006 by 
another US$ 5 billion. China’s FDI advantages are due to its tremendously strong banks 
with the EXIM and CDB on the forefront. Another convenience is originated in the 
organizational structure of the PRC’s FDI, wherein MOFCOM is the key coordinator 
influenced by bigger strategies set by the ministry of finance in concert with the People’s 
bank of China. The EXIM finances the projects that are carried out by state-owned and 
province-owned contractors. Therefore most of Chinese FDI stays within these bodies and 
biggest favor of such a strategy is energy security but more important the increased power 
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of the country’s SOCs which acquire enough skills and capital to be long-term compatible. 
The poverty reducing factor is obvious and mainly one-sided: The investment spill-over of 
Chinese FDI in Africa comes into full effect on Chinese ground, because African 
governments, consternated by the IMF’s and World Bank’s fiscal and monetary policy 
constraining structural adjustment programs, hesitate to take effective measures based on 
own national objectives and priorities. Watching China’s enormous economic development 
underlines the true investment steering power of fiscal and monetary policy. 
From an African pro-poor stance, “for most Africans it is these Chinese small-scale 
entrepreneurs, and most especially retail traders, who have had the greatest impact on their 
lives” (Alden 2007: 37). Even these shopkeepers deliver affordable Chinese imports which 
improve everyday life in a practical manner.  
10.3 Cheaper Consumption Goods 
The undervalued RMB enables Chinese bargainers to take full advantage of relatively low 
production cost at home to cheaply sell these goods on the African continent. Ironically, 
most PRC’s traders profit from the structure that Taiwanese merchants shaped, for instance 
in Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho and Nigeria (see Alden 2007). 
 Despite already low production costs in China, its small-scale enterprises and 
manufacturers follow less expensive production opportunities and migrate into African 
countries. Especially, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) gave Chinese 
manufacturers incentives to label their products as African originated goods, which 
facilitated their purchase preferentially on their way into the United States. Since those 
businesses threaten “Africa’s most important value chain, textiles and clothing” [, Asche 
and Schüller identify] “particular difficulties with the central part of the chain, in which SSA 
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could realize a comparative advantage (yarns and fabrics)”, Asche and Schüller 2008: 56). 
Nevertheless both scholars argue, independently from Chinese competition in the textile 
and footwear sector, African manufactories in such sectors faced problems that indeed have 
worsened by the Chinese presence in Africa, but in the long-run, supplemented by the 
possible AGOA termination, their ability to survive was minimal. However, especially 
Lesotho was forced to close factories, which exacerbated unemployment and structural 
marginality. 
The better side of the coin is expressed by the consumer surplus caused by cheap Chinese 
imports. People are able to consume products that make their lives more comfortable and 
increase their felt incomes. This pro-poverty effect, if just perceived or true, can also have 
spillovers. A cell phone, for example, increases productivity, when it comes to the time 
saving aspect, when this person is not forced anymore to walk to the person he or she 
intends to talk to. In concert with the previously improved infrastructure, there are 
implications for mass demand and diversification, when imagining an African trader buying 
some “Nokia China” to be sold in the merchant’s village, as very simplified case. He might 
improve these trading patterns by buying a bicycle that is locally produced or repaired. Or 
his income enables him to buy a bus-ticket that helps the bus driver to survive and to repair 
its bus, of course locally. 
Due to the Chinese import’s global comparative advantage, African governments should 
increase tariffs and tolls on Chinese imports, as they will remain highly demanded, while 
these extra revenues could be reinvested in government favored sectors and zones. The 
production price in China is often subject in a bargaining process between importer and 
producer. Hence, if the producer argues that tariffs and tolls have risen, the producer will 
make him an offer that will of course decrease both prospective profits, but the latter 
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remain high enough to secure their business’ perpetuation. Hence, national fiscal and 
monetary policy can shape import patterns via tariff, tolls and taxation as well as money 
supply and the control of exchange rates. How China’s engagement in Africa affected 
national fiscal balances and monetary policy will be analyzed in the next two sections. 
10.4 China’s Impact on African Fiscal Policy 
10.4.1 Survey Categorization 
Besides the previously explained theoretical and argumentative findings, observing the 
development of African fiscal balances might reveal some trends. Analyzing every African 
country for changing fiscal factors would exceed this paper’s page limit. Therefore, it seems 
more useful to observe China’s top five African trading partners, Angola, South Africa, the 
Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt for fiscal indicators. It is also necessary to exclude Egypt as non-
SSA country. South Africa is very important when it comes to Sino-African relations, but its 
trade with other countries melts China’s impact on South Africa. Therefore, any overall 
interpretation might be misleading.  
However, respecting Paul Collier’s categorization of economies that respectively lead to 
different economic performances, the distillation of only Angola, Sudan and Nigeria makes 
further analyzes truly one-sided, as all three economies are oil exporters and coastal. In 
contrast to the below mentioned scholars, this paper considers the Sudan as coastal country 
justified by its accessibility via Port Sudan. In a common research paper based on historical 
data, Paul Collier and Stephen O’Connell found out, that “coastal, resource rich” economies 
performed quite bad in relation to their potential and governance problems are likely, as 
“[r]esource wealth poses in its starkest form the choice between public goods and transfers” 
(Collier and O’Connell 2008: 118), which brings fiscal policy on top of the agenda.  
10. PRO-POOR FEATURES OF 
In order to analyze China’s implications for e
hand suggests adding Benin as “coastal, resource
resource-rich” and Ethiopia as “landlocked, resource
based on the principle of economic impor
partners below presented in table III. 
Table III: China's
                  1995, 2007 and 2008
The latter, furthermore, uncovers the indisputable significance of the coastal, resource
economies of Angola, Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Mauritania and Liberia by an overall of 70 percent on Sino
dominance is respected in further analyses, when the coastal, resource
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close ties to France might drastically disturb the analysis’ findings. Therefore, its strong 
francophone economic links suggest a relativization of subsequent interpretations. 
10.4.2 Fiscal Balances 
Observing the IMF data on African countries’ balance on current account illustrated in this 
paper’s annex’ table A-XIV reveals that Africa’s overall fiscal balances performed quite well 
from -1.8 percent of GDP in 2002 to 2.5 % in 2008. The PRC’s African three main coastal, 
resource-rich trading partners confirm this impression.  
Angola’s deficit of -16% of GDP jumped to a positive balance of 7.5% in 2008, while it 
performed remarkably good in the years after the US$ 2 billion EXIM loan in 2004 with 
16.8% (2005), 25.2% (2006) and slowed down to 15.9% in 2007. Nigeria chronicles a more 
steady fiscal balance development from -12.6% in 2002 to 20.4% in 2008. The peak of 
26.5% has been reached in 2006, when the Chinese FDI stock tremendously increased from 
US$ 94 million (2005) to US$ 216 million and China’s state-owned oil corporations secured 
their oil extraction with at least US$ 6.3 billion in the same year (compare to figure XXXII). 
The Sudan as the third coastal, resource-rich object of this analysis exhibits a stable but 
negative fiscal performance. Starting from -12.7% in 2001, the country reached its fiscal low 
with -15.2% in 2006 and somehow recovered to -9% in 2008. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo as representative of the landlocked, resource-rich 
category improved its fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP from -4 percent in 2001 to -1.5 
percent in 2007. However, the sudden drop in the years 2005 (-10.4%) and 2008 (-15.3%) 
jut out. There are no indicators in this paper’s China-Africa data collection detectable that 
might describe the DRC’s fiscal amplitudes of 2005 and 2008. In latter year, obviously the 
crisis might have affected the trade balance. For 2005, it is likely that the Kivu conflict 
forced the government to increase its military power by additional government spending. 
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Benin’s ministry of finance, instead, seems to obediently follow the IMF and World Bank 
guidelines by keeping the fiscal deficit remarkably stable at an average level of -7.4% of 
GDP during the 2001-2008 period. Additionally, the Chinese FDI stock remained stable at 
a comparably low level of around US$ 20 million in 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
The landlocked, resource-scarce substitute Ethiopia also performed very stable at an 
average fiscal deficit GDP share of 4.8 percent from 2001 to 2008. The Chinese FDI stock 
increase from US$ 4.8 million (2003) to US$ 108.9 million (2007) seems to have had no 
impact on Ethiopian fiscal balances. 
The conclusion of this fiscal balance survey assumes a more direct relationship between 
China’s engagement and the fiscal development of resource-rich African countries. This 
analysis just observed statistical correlations. Cause and effect interpretations are 
argumentatively estimated but could not have been evidenced. Benin’s trade relations to 
China are stronger than its relatively little investment and loan cooperation with the PRC. 
For practical and logical reasons, therefore, Benin and the coastal, resource-scarce category 
need to be omitted. 
10.4.3 China’s Sub-National Fiscal Policy on African Ground 
Nevertheless, the survey carried out above supports one of this paper’s key postulations 
that China’s engagement on African ground improves outcomes which are usually 
associated with national fiscal policy measures. The survey reveals that national ministries of 
finance remain passive: Either they improve their fiscal balances via government revenues 
via MOFCOM’s rent-seeking activity like in the cases of Angola, Sudan, Nigeria and the 
DRC, or fiscal balances are not affected at all, represented by the Ethiopian balance account 
development. By all means, there is no sign of increased “own” government spending in 
favor of a national pro-active fiscal policy. Hence, this paper’s assumption that MOFCOM 
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as “China’s ministry of finance abroad” develops strategies for African countries while the 
respective African ministries of finance, infiltrated by the Bretton Woods Neoliberal 
contractionary fiscal policy paradigm, are just aiming at stabilizing the deficit instead of 
actively taking measures to spur long-term features of sustainable economic development 
like domestic consumption towards mass demand and diversification. Figure XXXIX 
demonstrates the Sino-African fiscal subsystem.  
Figure XXXIX: China’s Sub-National Fiscal Policy on African Ground 
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increases and infrastructure projects, MOFCOM assures the respective ministry of finance’s 
non-interference or support as well as tariff and toll reductions for Chinese enterprises and 
trading goods. Based on domestic interests of outward FDI increases and the go-global 
strategy, MOFCOM supports Chinese corporations and traders in implementing their 
businesses in Africa. Such undertakings’ and projects’ pro-poor effects are incumbent upon 
Chinese national interest, although political ties upgrading postulations of win-win aspects 
force Chinese projects to truly improve African economies’ features. 
10.4.4 Diversification and Global Competitiveness 
Concerning industrial diversification, actually nothing has changed among the coastal, 
resource-rich countries this survey is dealing with; this finds evidence by observing table A-
XV in this paper’s annex. From 2003 to 2007, Angola’s diversification index remained at the 
extremely low level of exactly 1.1 in every year due to its overreliance on oil exports. In 
every observed year, the Sudan’s diversification index even linearly declined by one decimal 
from 1.6 in 2003 to 1.2 in 2007. Based on the fact that both economies are react more 
directly in China’s increased engagement, there is an indisputable negative correlation 
between the Chinese oil deals and African resource-rich countries’ diversification. 
Nigeria’s exports are more diverse in terms of purchasing countries, but its reliance on oil is 
also depicted in low diversification indexes for 2003 (1.3), 2004 (1.2), 2005 (1.3), 2006 (1.2) 
and 2007 (1.3). In the same period, the Democratic Republic of Congo gently increased its 
index from 3.4 to 7.6, while Ethiopia’s diversification performed stable at nearly 4.4. 
Therefore, China really had no effect on African diversification despite massive trade and 
FDI increases (compare to OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 166-67).  
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At least global competitiveness improved within that timeframe by 45% in case of Angola, 
Sudan (24%), Nigeria (9%), the DRC (6%) and Ethiopia (13%), see OECD and African 
Development Bank 2009: 166-67. 
10.4.5 Access to Services 
When it comes to pro-poor improvements, the access to services is an important fiscal 
policy related development indicator. Whether or not the PRC has statistically contributed 
to service accessibility is outlined in this section. 
As table A-XVI reveals, every of the observed five cases improved their telecommunication 
infrastructure and their access to electricity. The biggest step made Angola and the Sudan 
which also have the closest link to China. Angola mobile lines per 100 inhabitants increased 
from 0.19 in 2000 to 29.1 in 2007. The same pattern is recognizable in the Sudan, where 
21.3 mobile lines covered 100 inhabitants in 2007, in comparison to 0.07 in 2000. 
Unfortunately there is no reliable up-to-date data available that measures income 
distribution, wages and indicators of spill-over effects like consumption behavior in this 
survey’s period. Nevertheless, the improved access to electricity and to the internet may 
indicate prospective consumption behavior in favor of electronic apparels and imported 
goods. The Sudan experienced the most remarkable increase in electricity consumption 
from 2,058 GWhs in 2000 to 3,553 GHhs in 2006, followed by Angola which doubled the 
same consumption to 2,372 GWhs in 2006. The EXIM supported both countries with 
electricity projects whose documented value is numbered with US$ 621 for the Sudan and 
US$ 261 for Angola during that period. Additionally, both countries jut, concerning internet 
access improvement. This is also due to EXIM loans for ICT projects often carried out by 
the Chinese SOC Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited (ZTE). 
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10.4.6 Effects on Employment 
Unfortunately, there is no data available that indicates any changes in income and 
consumption behavior. For countries that are observed in this survey, the OECD and 
African Development Bank’s African Economic Outlook 2009 solely provided numbers on 
overall worker remittances for Sudan, Nigeria and Ethiopia, that are presented in table A-
XIX. In the Ethiopian case, worker remittances almost quadrupled from US$ 47 million in 
2003 to US$ 172 million in 2007, while they remained stable from 2005 on. 
Nigerian worker remittances nearly tripled in the 2003-2007 period to US$ 3.3 billion and 
show the same stable feature like they showed in Ethiopia from 2005 to 2007. The Sudan, 
instead, exhibits a slowdown in such wage payments. From 2003 to 2004, these remittances 
slightly ascended by US$ 180 million to US$ 1.4 billion which marked their peak in the 
observed period. One year later, worker remittances dropped to approximately US$ 1 
billion, while they slowly increased to US$ 1.2 billion for 2006 and 2007.  
In 2006, Angolan unemployment was rated at 25.2 percent. The Sudanese as well as the 
DRC’s is not available; additionally Nigeria’s unemployment rate was lastly measured in 
1986 and is therefore expected as useless. At least, the Ethiopian unemployment was rated 
with 16.7 in 2006. Due to insufficient available data, the Chinese investment’s and 
engagement’s impact, unfortunately, cannot be analyzed at this stage. 
10.4.7 Survey Conclusion 
Sino-African cooperation certainly improved the closest partners’ infrastructure, especially 
telecommunications and power supply, as well as roads, railways and airports. 
Unfortunately, necessary comparable data was not available for the period of Chinas 
greatest Africa engagement, namely 2003-2007. Anyhow, this survey indicates that fiscal 
policy seems to be in Chinese hands, at least in the case of Angola and Sudan. 
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Diversification remained stable at low levels, while competitiveness increased. Angola’s 
fiscal performance improved remarkably. Although fluctuations appeared, Sudan as the 
second important economy in terms of Chinese involvement’s significance performed 
fiscally stable at an approximate average of -10 percent of GDP. Hence, Angola used 
Chinese loans and oil rents to feed the fiscal deficit, while the Sudan seemed to spend that 
surplus. The Sudanese People's Armed Forces are well equipped. It is likely that Khartoum 
supports its forces with increased military spending to fight the rebel groups in Darfur. 
Both examples reveal that fiscal space might have been enlarged by the Chinese presence in 
Africa. Now it is up to the respective government to make use of it in favor of 
diversification initiating domestic consumption (mass demand) and investment towards 
sustainable, but more important pro-poor, economic growth. It is also necessary to mention 
at this stage that further Chinese FDI and ODA inflows into African economies cause real 
appreciation and Dutch disease (see Lartey 2007). Historically proven, the latter describes 
resource-rich countries’ syndrome that even those resource extracting economies experience 
a decline of the manufacturing sector which results in low diversification, as previously 
evidenced for Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. Real appreciation supports that syndrome, since 
higher exchange rates hamper incompatible small-scale exports and spur imports, which, in 
turn, leads to the displacement of local producers. 
10.5 Implications for African Monetary Policy 
10.5.1 No Need For Inflation Tackles 
This section attempts to analyze China’s implications for African monetary policies. The key 
indicator of money supply as monetary policy measure is inflation. Hence, a short look at 
the inflation indicating consumer price performance might be fruitful, see table A-XVII. 
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During the 1990s, the Democratic Republic of Congo suffered under so-called 
hyperinflation with an average annual consumer price change of 978 percent, followed by 
Angola with 549 percent. The summary of this survey’s countries in table IV indicates that 
inflation slowed down to “truly acceptable” rates.  
Table IV: Annual Percentage Change of Consumer Prices of this Survey’s  
                   Countries, 1991-2008 
 Average 
1991-2000 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Africa 24.5 10.8 9.0 8.7 6.7 7.1 6.4 6.0 10.3 
Angola 549.4 152.6 108.9 98.3 43.6 23.0 13.3 12.2 12.5 
Sudan 67.9 4.9 8.3 7.7 8.4 8.5 7.2 8.0 14.3 
Nigeria 28.5 18.0 13.7 14.0 15.0 17.9 8.2 5.4 11.6 
DRC 977.6 357.3 25.3 12.8 4.0 21.4 13.2 16.7 18.0 
Ethiopia 7.2 -5.2 -7.2 15.1 8.6 6.8 12.3 15.8 25.3 
Source: IMF 2009: 179 
The term acceptable refers to this paper’s finding in the section on monetary policy that 
proclaims: if inflation does not exceed the trigger of 40%, it has no real impact on economic 
performance, including GDP growth, FDI attraction and aggregate demand. Therefore no 
monetary policy constraining rules need to be implemented. This stands in stark contrast to 
the IMF framework of inflation stabilization and control. 
Controlling inflation through monetary policy measures requires a financially very strong 
Central bank. Additionally, setting higher interest rates might lead to long-term slowing 
inflation. But the velocity of banking money is relatively low based on the African banking 
system’s structures. Therefore, an increase of the rate of interest by the central bank will 
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take more time to affect the individual bank’s real loan policy. Small scale-enterprises that 
require such loans would suffer most, since those would be the first to be cut down.  
China might be able to do so. In case of Sub-Saharan African central banks, such a financial 
arduousness is inefficient. Money supply and the regulation of interest rates should rather 
be used to spur domestic demand and to facilitate small-scale produced exports in favor of 
diversification. In order to answer FDI and ODA inflows that cause real appreciation and 
therefore spur imports, adequate inflation rates inducing higher prices for domestic goods, 
to some extent, might be able to slow FDI inflows, if those are expected to outstrip the 
economy’s capacity. The most important pro-poor development job of monetary policy, 
namely the provision of development targeted loans via low interest rates to preferential 
sectors, can be executed, when the central bank’s capacity is not overwrought by inflation 
stabilization tasks. 
10.5.2 Money Supply and the Exchange Rates 
Table A-XVIII on monetary indicators evidences that already supplied money, measured by 
broad money’s percentage share on GDP, is in case of the here surveyed Sino-African 
significant partners quite low. In 2008, except for Ethiopia whose broad money exceeds its 
GDP with a share of 118 percent, Angola’s (18.4%), the Sudan’s (19.2%), Nigeria’s (28.9%) 
and the DRC’s (12.6%) already supplied broad money is far below the African average. That 
reveals such countries monetary policy’s prospective scope. One could also argue that the 
PRC has chosen its partners due to favorable monetary features, since inflation via money 
supply endangers FDI and makes long-term businesses more risky. 
Concerning FDI and trade, exchange rates play a very important role, although the 
following section explains why the latter are not that much important for Chinese investors. 
At this stage, it does not make any sense to list the observed exchange rates of the PRC’s 
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surveyed partners, but the minimal fluctuation between Sudan’s and Ethiopia’s currencies to 
the US-dollar is striking. Remembering the relatively dollar-pegged Chinese currency, little 
exchange rate fluctuations contribute to investment and trade security perceived by Chinese 
economic actors in African countries.   
10.5.3 China’s Sub-National Monetary Policy on African Ground 
As China hoards the world’s largest foreign currency reserves, there is no need to exchange 
the RMB into US$ dollars. China EXIM is able to directly supply the foreign currency via 
credits to Chinese import sellers, construction firms or oil extracting SOCs which use that 
money to participate in joint ventures, buy assets and secure exploration rights. 
Figure XL: China’s Sub-National Monetary Policy Abroad 
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The Central bank of the respective African beneficiary country could therewith be 
circumnavigated in favor of the real appreciation pressure’s relaxation at home, caused by 
tremendous FDI inflows.  
The EXIM’s role as “China’s Central bank on Africa ground” is illustrated in figure XL. 
The export promoting bank carries out the loan policy, as “negotiated” between MOFCOM 
and the beneficiary country’s government, by remitting the bargained loan to the country’s 
Central bank. The latter agrees on non-interference in the EXIM’s loan policy, which 
consists mainly of preferential loans to Chinese corporations or Chinese export sellers in 
the framework of the go global strategy. Such credits below regular financial market interest 
rates endow Chinese economic actors on African ground with enormous financial 
comparative advantages. If the respective African central bank does not react with low 
interest rates in order to provide the same preferential loans to national economic actors, it 
seems very likely that the latter are ousted by Chinese competitors, or easily absorbed into 
common joint ventures or M&As. Alternatively the beneficiary country’s central bank might 
place fares on Chinese capital flows in order to constrain such below-market price 
bargaining for intra-Chinese credits. 
Concerning pro-poor finance, African central banks need to be aware that a nationally 
appropriate fiscal policy strategy requires the central bank’s support. If inflation does not 
drastically fluctuate and exceed the 40 percent trigger, the respective bank does not have to 
care about inflation stabilization. Instead, it can facilitate fiscal policy’s resource allocation 
to prioritized economic sectors, agriculture for instance, by improving the poor’s and small-
scale businesses’ credit access via low sector-favoring interest rates.  
In order to strategically respond to China’s presence on the continent, African countries’ 
own national and regional pro-active monetary and fiscal policies are the most striking tools. 
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CONCLUSION 
This master thesis title asks, if China’s engagement on the African continent is “The Great 
Leap towards African Mass Demand, Diversification and Sustainable Economic Growth?”.  
Although the Chinese presence as well as its intensity differs from country to country, while 
coastal, resource-rich African economies significantly attract larger interest, the answer is 
“potentially yes”, since it indwells the great opportunity to make use of its impressive 
features like exponentially growing trade volumes, massive investment inflows and 
infrastructure projects that are famous for their fast completion. The access to electricity 
improves. Telecommunication networks advance. Better roads and train connections 
increase the respective economies’ productivity. Cheap Chinese imports enable poor people 
to buy items which are normally far from being affordable. There are true pro-poor effects 
detectable. 
The far bigger question is of how the PRC contributes to African countries’ sustainable 
economic growth. This study promotes its basic finding that only African governments 
themselves can utilize Sino-African cooperation towards sustainable pro-poor economic 
development. In order to do so, those governments have to be aware of their available 
tools, namely pro-active fiscal and monetary policy. Before they take action, an own 
national strategy is needed, that recognizes the respective country’s comparative advantage 
and identifies its economic features the PRC is targeting at, based on the appraisal that 
China’s state- and provincially led economic undertakings follow straight pragmatic rules.  
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China’s impressive post-reform development would not have been possible without such 
national strategies that aim at long-term sustainable economic growth, but are also adapted 
to current needs. 
In order to carry out such strategies, fiscal policy and monetary policy matter! Both provide 
mighty measures that have been underrated for decades, as the Bretton Woods institutions 
World Bank and IMF practically forced African governments to implement structural 
adjustment programs and financial programming as condition for assistance. Stigmatized by 
Richard Peet as “Unholy Trinity”, both including the WTO shaped the developing world 
based on theoretical assumptions, backed by Neoliberalism, Monetarism and New Classical 
Economics, that are assumed to be universally feasible. Empirical-historical surveys and the 
current state of African economies evidence that structural adjustment and financial 
programming had no positive impact on GDP growth and poverty reduction. 
Instead, they promoted the clearly inappropriate objective of macroeconomic stability as 
overall goal for developing countries. The latter’s governments had no choice and followed 
IMF and World Bank guidelines that placed a structural long-term constraint on the 
operating range of fiscal and monetary policy. Privatization, decentralization and 
debureaucratization became buzzwords of those structural reforms. 
Even now, the increasing Chinese economic and financial presence in the majority of 
African countries require own national African ministries of finance’s and central bank’s 
fiscal and monetary policy measures to take advantage of ascending investments and rising 
trade volumes. 
Therefore, by presenting different theoretical approaches on fiscal and monetary policy, the 
master thesis on hand reveals detects alternative strategies for African leaders and central 
bank board chairmen. 
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The PRC’s development evidences that state-led economic growth is required to be 
accompanied by reforms of the financial system. Additionally, the Chinese central bank 
PBC fed the real economy’s financial needs and provided a framework that spurred foreign 
direct investment into its emerging economy.  
In regard to the current boost of Chinese FDI into Africa, such a strong financial 
coordinator is missing from an African countries’ perspective. Hence, regional central 
banking could serve as alternative, although central banks should support its respective 
ministry of finance’s fiscal policy. The regionalization of central banks, exemplified by the 
Central Bank of West African States, requires participating countries to agree upon 
common fiscal and monetary strategies. That might work for the relatively homogeneous 
grouping of the West African Economic and Monetary Union wherein Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo share the common 
currency, namely the West African CFA franc. National economic strategies, instead, do not 
work without fiscal and monetary independence, as they cannot under the HIPC initiative 
and Washington consensus regime. 
Moreover, the 21st century’s Sino-African cooperation initiates the development aid 
apparatus’ revolution, as the new form of development cooperation is considered to be 
pragmatic, well-funded, long-term oriented, refuses interference in internal political issues, 
and is flexible enough to respond to beneficiary countries needs 
Although these improvements are remarkable, Africa’s potential to profit from the reheated 
partnership is even bigger, as PR China’s development towards an economic and financial 
superpower can be considered as alternative development strategy that subtends the 
traditional Western development paradigm which is eroded in two ways: 
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1. In a practical manner, China effectively erodes the structures the IMF and the World 
Bank shaped by providing loans and investment to countries like Angola and Sudan which 
are eschewed by Western investors and do not qualify for IMF loans and World Bank 
projects. 
2. In a more ideological manner, Beijing’s politically proclaimed principle of non-
interference in internal issues of partner countries opposes the so-called Washington 
consensus’ conditionality and its inherent theoretical assumptions. China’s growth was 
state-regulated, whereas Neoliberalism, Monetarism and NCE expect state-interventionism 
as biggest threat to economic prosperity. Especially, this ideological clash between passive 
fiscal and monetary policy, as postulated by the Bretton Woods institutions, and their pro-
active counterparts, adopted by the PRC and theoretically promoted by Keynesianism, will 
revolutionize, or at least reform, the current mainstream development cooperation 
paradigm. 
Additionally, the PRC increasingly appears as important creditor for African ministries of 
finance in bargaining deals with governments and, therefore, increasingly pursues rent 
seeking activities which indicate the reincarnation of the written of Elsenhansian state class. 
The growing phenomenon of rents can be interpreted as a bad sign that reveals corruption, 
but also allows optimism: Based on the Elsenhansian demand-oriented approach of 
“overcoming rents by using rents”, the reappearance of rents allow fiscal and monetary 
policy that focus on domestic consumption to use these rents, in order to directly or 
indirectly increase the poor’s incomes. Due to their high marginal propensity to consume, 
the poor will primarily demand locally produced goods (food and shelter) which affect the 
incomes of local sellers, manufacturers and peasants. That, in turn, leads to investment and 
diversification, as businesses follow their assets. In this approach, oil rents are transformed 
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into mass demand initiating rents that contribute to domestic consumption which causes 
pro-poor sustainable economic development feature of diversification. 
Therefore, this master thesis calls for pro-active fiscal policy accompanied by active 
supportive monetary policy that fights the syndromes of structural heterogeneity and 
marginality in a Keynesian demand-oriented manner. 
Whatever happens, China will shape the global development cooperation apparatus in the 
future, on the one hand, with their financial and economic power and, on the other hand, 
by providing a self-experienced alternative pro-poor demand-sided and sustainable 
economic growth promoting agenda. 
As it is proclaimed by both regions in several statements, there really is a win-win-situation 
and mutual benefit, since China advanced African countries in a better position to 
renegotiate the IFI’s conditionality.  
Meanwhile, China’s three financial FDI-stipulating agencies, namely EXIM, CDB and 
CADF experience a transition that arms all of them, concerning commercial law due to 
prospective WTO-proceedings. In regard to lending facilities, the EXIM will probably 
overtake the World Bank by 2010, since it enjoys a rapid growth in loans. 
This financially-mighty Chinese export promoting bank in concert with MOFCOM seems 
to create an own fiscal-monetary political subsystem that provides Chinese investors, 
export-sellers and corporations preferential loans and credits below market price, which 
enables them to buy assets and to create joint ventures. This Chinese financial subsystem on 
African ground is the biggest threat to African enterprises, and its capital flows need to be 
regulated by an active central bank policy. Supplementing these efforts, African countries’ 
ministries of finance should protect its local competitive producers via increased tolls and 
tariffs on Chinese imports. To make a long story short, fiscal and monetary policy matter! 
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ANNEX 
Table A-V: Fiscal Disparities across Chinese Local Governments, 1998 
Source: World Bank 2002: 66 
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Table A-VI: Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants (Percent of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF: AFR Regional Economic Outlook (October 2009)  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Angola -22.8 -8.8 -31.2 -6.1 -2.8 -6.2 -6.4 -0.5 7.3 14.8 11.6 8.8 -4.8 0.7
Benin 0.3 2 1.8 -1.7 -1.4 -2.3 -1.9 -1 -2.5 -0.5 1.6 -1.8 -2.6 -2.9
Botswana 5.2 -3.6 3 8.1 -0.2 -3.3 -1 0.9 6.9 10.5 6.3 -2.8 -10 -10.6
Burkina Faso -3 -2.9 -3.7 -3.6 -3.9 -4.8 -2.9 -4.3 -5.1 16.7 -5.7 -4.5 -5.9 -5.2
Burundi -5.2 -5.2 -6.6 -1.8 -5.2 -1.4 -6.2 -4.9 -5.1 -1.4 1 -1.3 60.1 -5
Cameroon -3.1 -3.6 -2.9 1.2 2.6 0.7 1.2 -0.5 3.6 33.1 4.5 1.4 0.2 -0.2
Cape Verde -12.2 -3.9 -12.6 -19.6 -6.7 -8.3 -4.3 -3.8 -6.4 -5 -0.7 -1.2 -9.1 -5.5
Central African Republic 1.7 -7.5 -0.2 -2.3 -2 1.8 1.3 0.9 -0.8 1.1 -0.4 -1.6 -1.9 -1.7
Chad -3.8 -2.5 -6 -6.9 -5.2 -6 -6.3 -3 -0.4 2.4 3.1 4.5 -9.7 3.6
Comoros -2.2 -2.2 11.8 -1.9 -3.6 -3.6 -3.4 -1.7 0.1 -2.6 -2 -2.5 -1.6 -2.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. of -5.9 -6.4 -5 -6 -1.7 -2.7 -4.7 -4.8 -3.5 -1.1 -2.9 -2.9 -2.1 -10.7
Congo, Republic of -9.1 -20 -5.9 1.1 6.4 -0.4 0.4 3.6 14.6 16.5 10.3 25.9 7.3 24
Côte d'Ivoire -2.1 -2.1 -2.8 -1.3 0.9 -1.3 -2.2 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.8 -2.6
Equatorial Guinea 3.2 -7.7 -0.2 -2.5 14.4 16.9 11.8 12.3 20.6 23.5 17.8 15.3 2.6 7
Eritrea -5.7 -33.9 -48.9 -39.6 -33.3 -26.7 -15.1 -16.9 -21.2 -12 -12 -14.1 -11 -10.9
Ethiopia -1.8 -3.7 -8.8 -9.3 -4.5 -7.6 -7 -3 -4.4 -3.9 -3.6 -2.9 -2.3 -3
Gabon 1.5 -14 1.2 11.6 3.2 3.5 7.4 7.6 8.6 9.2 8.5 11.4 3.7 4.9
Gambia, The -6.5 -2.4 -3.3 0.5 -13.9 -4.4 -4.7 -5.7 -8.6 -7.1 0.2 -2.2 -1.6 -2.3
Ghana -14.6 -12.5 -14.3 -7.9 -5.9 -4.9 -3.8 -4.6 -3.7 -7 -8.5 -13.6 -6.7 -8.2
Guinea -3 -0.7 -3 -3.2 -4.1 -4.4 -6.5 -5.4 -1.6 -3.1 0.3 -1.3 -0.5 43.7
Guinea-Bissau -13 -15.3 -9.1 -6.5 -9.1 -9.6 -11.6 -13.8 -11.7 -8.3 -10.8 -7 -3.2 -2.1
Kenya -1.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -2.1 -3.2 -1.7 -0.1 -1.8 -2.5 -3 -4.4 -5.7 -5.5
Lesotho 2.6 -1.9 -14.9 -5.8 0 -3.3 -0.5 5.8 5 12.7 16.5 6.2 2.1 -2.6
Liberia 0.6 -0.5 -1.2 1 0 0 5.9 3.8 -8 -11.7 430.9
Madagascar -2.4 -6.2 -2.8 -2.8 -4.3 -6.2 -4.8 -5.7 -4.3 37.4 -2.9 -3.7 -4 -4.9
Malawi -5.3 -6.5 -4.6 -4.8 -7.4 -8.4 -4.7 -4.8 -1.3 1.3 -3.1 -5.8 -4.4 -4.5
Mali -3 -3.2 -4.4 -2.9 -3.2 -3.6 -1.3 -2.6 -3.1 31.3 -3.2 -2.2 -4.7 -3.3
Mauritius -7.6 -3.9 -3.4 -3.7 -7.1 -6.1 -6.2 -5.5 -5.3 -5.6 -4.2 -4.5 -3.5 -5.2
Mozambique -2.8 -1.9 -0.9 -1.7 -6.1 -7.2 -3.7 -4.4 -2.8 -4.1 -2.9 -2.5 -5.6 -4.3
Namibia -4.1 -3.8 -2.7 -1.5 -3.5 -3.3 -5.9 -3.7 -1 2.1 4.4 -0.6 -3.6 -3.7
Niger -3.1 -3 -5.6 -3.8 -3.5 -3 -2.8 -3.6 -2 40.3 -1 1.5 -4.8 -3.1
Nigeria -1 -9.1 -5.2 5.9 -5.3 2.1 -3.3 8.1 9.3 7 -1.1 3.7 -9 -0.1
Rwanda -2.5 -3 -4.2 0.8 -1.3 -1.8 -2.1 -0.2 0.6 -0.4 -1.5 0.5 -1.2 -3.1
Senegal 0.5 -0.3 -1.3 0.7 -2.4 0 -1.3 -3.1 -3 -5.7 -3.7 -4.6 -4.8 -4
Seychelles -8.9 -10.5 -7.5 -11.5 -8.5 -14.7 -0.8 -0.9 1.7 -6.1 -9.6 2.6 -6.6 -9.1
Sierra Leone -7 -10.4 -9.5 -9.3 -8.8 -8.3 -6.7 -3.4 -2.7 -2.7 25.2 -4.8 -4 -4.2
South Africa -3.9 -2.6 -2 -1.9 -1.5 -1.2 -2 -1.6 -0.6 0.4 0.8 -0.7 -4.9 -5.5
Swaziland 1.5 0.8 -0.9 -1.3 -2.5 -4.2 -3.2 -4.2 -2.3 7.6 7.4 4.1 -2.7 -4.3
São Tomé and Príncipe -12.7 -17.1 -17 -27.3 -12.9 -9.9 -10.5 -15.8 37.1 -13.7 120.3 14.7 12.6 -13.3
Tanzania -0.6 -1.5 -2.7 -1.2 -1 -1.4 -3.1 -3.2 -5.2 -4.4 0 -5.4 -5.7 -5.1
Togo -1.9 -4.2 -2.7 -5 -0.1 -0.4 2.4 1 -3.5 -3.8 -1.9 -1 -2.3 -3.7
Uganda -1.4 -0.5 -1.3 -9 -2.6 -5 -4.1 -1.4 -0.5 0.1 -1.1 -2 -2.6 -2.9
Zambia -0.2 -5.2 -3.7 -5.9 -7.2 -5.1 -6 -2.9 -2.7 19.8 -1.3 -1.5 -2.6 -2.5
Zimbabwe -12.8 -4.7 -5.1 -4 -3.8 -11.5
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa -3.8 -4.1 -4.5 -2.3 -2 -3.1 -2.6 -1.4 0.8 7.7 2.5 1.4 -3.1 -1.4
Including Zimbabwe 1.7 4.8 1.1 1.3 -4.8 -2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa -3.6 -4 -3.5 -0.9 -2.3 -1.5 -2.5 0.1 1.8 4.8 1.2 1.3 -4.8 -2.4
CEMAC -2.3 -7.8 -2.3 2.8 3.4 2.1 2.7 3 8.3 20 8.5 10.2 1.1 6.5
CFA Franc Zone -2 -4.3 -2.5 0.3 0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.2 2.8 13.6 3.3 4.4 -1.2 1.6
COMESA -5.2 -3.7 -6.1 -4.6 -3.6 -5.1 -4.7 -2.2 0.2 6.8 2.7 1.7 -3.4 -2.6
Coastal  -3.9 -2.8 -2.4 -2 -2.1 -2 -2.2 -1.9 -1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -2.1 -5 -5.4
East African Community -1.4 -1.1 -1.4 -2.4 -1.8 -2.8 -2.7 -1.5 -2.5 -2.4 -1.6 -3.9 -3.5 -4.7
Excluding Nigeria -8.1 -8.1 -9.2 0.2 1.6 -0.6 -0.2 1.8 8.1 17.9 10.1 9.6 -2 3.4
Excluding South Africa -1.6 -3.5 -1.9 -0.1 -3.4 -4.8 -3.5 -2 0.9 4 3.6 -1.6 -5.5 -6.4
Excluding South Africa -2.8 -3.2 -3.5 -3 -3 -3.8 -3.3 -2.6 -2.2 2.8 -1.4 -3.3 -3.6 -3.9
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime -1.5 -4.1 -2.3 0.5 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 0 2.8 12.2 3.8 3.6 -2 0.2
Floating Exchange Rate Regime -4 -4 -3.9 -1.3 -2.9 -1.6 -3 0.1 1.6 3.2 0.6 0.8 -5.5 -3
Fragile Countries -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3 -1.3 -2 -3 -2.6 -2.1 -1.8 0.3 -1.3 0.6 -0.5
Including Zimbabwe -3.2 -2 -0.1 -1.5 0.3 -1.3
Landlocked -2.7 -3.3 -5 -6 -3.3 -4.7 -3.9 -2.9 -2.6 6.6 -2 -2.1 -2.1 -4.2
Low-income Countries -2.8 -3.1 -3.8 -3.6 -3.4 -4.1 -3.4 -2.8 -3.1 3.8 -2.9 -4.2 -4.3 -4.3
MDRI Countries -3.2 -3.7 -4.5 -3.5 -2.9 -3.6 -3 -2.8 -2.3 8.8 -1.6 -3.4 -3.6 -3.6
Middle-income Countries -3.7 -2.7 -2 -1.7 -1.8 -1.7 -2.2 -1.7 -0.4 0.8 1.1 -0.8 -5 -5.6
Non-oil -1.1 -3 -2 -0.4 -1.8 -3 -3.5 -1.9 0.3 5.9 2.5 -1.4 -3.2 -1.1
Non-resource-intensive Countires  -3.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.6 -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 -2.1 -1.5 0.9 -0.5 -2.1 -4.4 -5.2
Oil-exporting Countries -4.1 -8.7 -6.9 3.7 -2.5 1.1 -2.1 5.6 8.8 11.3 3.6 6.3 -5.9 1.5
Oil-importing Countries -3.4 -2.9 -2.7 -2.4 -2.2 -2.5 -2.6 -2.1 -1.3 1.5 -0.2 -2 -4.2 -4.7
Resource-intensive Countries  -3.2 -6.8 -5.3 2.6 -2.3 0.1 -2.5 3.9 7.1 10.3 3.4 5.1 -5.5 1.1
SACU -3.6 -2.7 -1.9 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -2 -1.6 -0.3 1 1.3 -0.7 -5 -5.6
SADC -4.3 -3.1 -3.1 -2.1 -2.1 -2.4 -2.7 -1.9 -0.1 3.2 2.2 0.6 -4.8 -4.4
WAEMU -1.8 -1.9 -2.6 -1.8 -1.3 -1.9 -1.9 -2.4 -2.8 6.8 -2.1 -2 -3.2 -3.4
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Table A-VII: China's outward FDI stock by countries and region in millions  
                         of US $, 2003-2007 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2008): 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Africa 491.22 899.55 159.25 2556.82 4461.83
Algeria 5.7 34.49 171.21 247.37 393.89
Angola 0.3 0.47 8.79 37.23 78.46
Benin 7.71 20.51 19 22.12 35.6
Botswana 2.1 3.8 18.12 25.52 43.39
Burundi n.a. 0.02 n.a. 1.65 1.65
Cameroon 5.73 6.98 7.87 16.46 18.51
Cape Verde n.a. 0.01 0.6 1.65 4.65
Central Africa n.a. n.a. 2 3.98 3.98
Chad n.a. n.a. 2.71 12.78 13.53
Comorin n.a. 0.01 0.01 4.05 4.05
Congo DR 0.24 15.69 25.11 37.61 104.4
Congo  n.a. 5.65 13.32 62.9 65.4
Cote D'Ivoir 8.05 14.1 29.11 25.04 28.18
Djibouti n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.6
Egypt 14.29 14.28 39.8 100.43 131.6
Eq. Giunea 8.64 10.21 16.56 30.44 44.63
Eritrea 1.88 0.12 0.12 6.63 7.22
Ethiopia 4.78 7.87 29.82 95.6 108.88
Gabon 24.05 31.27 35.63 51.28 55.59
Gambia 0.04 0.2 1.19 1.19 1.19
Ghana 6.6 6.31 7.33 8.09 41.87
Guinea 14.34 25.77 44.22 54.63 69.97
Kenya 25.53 28.46 58.25 46.23 55.13
Lesotho 0.24 0.03 0.6 7.6 7.6
Liberia 5.8 6.38 15.95 29.51 29.78
Libya 0.86 0.87 33.06 28.57 70.83
Madagascar 28.13 40.63 49.94 54.34 76.01
Malawi 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.96 1.16
Mali 12.09 13.16 13.28 19.83 32.22
Mauritania 1.82 2.13 2.4 20.12 15.14
Mauritius 12.59 12.63 26.81 51.16 115.9
Morocco 4.31 9.06 20.59 27.01 29.65
Mozambique 2.42 5.6 14.68 14.68 34.24
Namibia 0.72 2.21 2.36 6.43 7.24
Niger 12.5 14.03 20.44 32.99 134.53
Nigeria 31.98 75.61 94.11 215.94 630.32
Rwanda 3.3 3.3 4.72 7.71 7.3
Senegal 2.51 2.58 2.35 4.15 4.39
Seychelles 0.42 0.42 4.19 6.46 6.55
Sierra Leone n.a. 5.74 18.45 14.89 32.28
South Africa 44.77 58.87 112.28 167.62 702.37
Sudan 0.55 171.61 351.53 497.13 574.85
Tanzania 7.46 53.8 62.02 111.93 110.92
Togo 4.73 6.24 4.78 11.72 14.42
Tunisia 1.56 1.28 2.15 3.91 3.57
Uganda 1.33 0.23 4.97 14.69 18.68
Zambia 143.7 147.75 160.31 267.86 429.36
Zimbabwe 36.74 38.06 41.63 46.15 59.15
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Table A-VIII: China's outward FDI flow by countries and regions in millions US $, 
       2003-2007 
 
Source: MOFCOM (2008): 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Africa 74.81 317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31
Algeria 2.47 11.21 84.87 98.93 145.92
Angola 0.19 0.18 0.47 22.39 41.19
Benin 2.09 13.77 1.31 0 6.32
Botswana 0.8 0.27 3.69 2.76 1.87
Cameroon 0.28 0.37 0.19 0.73 2.05
Cape Verde n.a. n.a. 0.32 0.23 0.09
Chad n.a. n.a. 2.71 1.61 0.75
Congo DR 0.06 11.91 5.07 36.73 57.27
Congo  n.a. 0.51 8.11 13.24 2.5
Cote D'Ivoir 0.62 6.75 8.74 -2.91 1.74
Djibouti n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1
Egypt 2.1 5.72 13.31 8.85 24.98
Eq. Giunea 0.48 1.69 6.35 10.19 12.82
Eritrea n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.01 0.45
Ethiopia 0.98 0.43 4.93 23.95 13.28
Gabon n.a. 5.6 2.08 5.53 3.31
Gambia 0.04 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ghana 2.89 0.34 2.57 0.5 1.85
Guinea 1.2 14.44 16.34 0.75 13.2
Kenya 0.74 2.68 2.05 0.18 8.9
Lesotho n.a. 0.03 0.6 n.a. n.a.
Liberia 0.4 0.58 8.65 -7.03 n.a.
Libya 0.1 0.06 0.25 -8.51 42.26
Madagascar 0.68 13.64 0.14 1.17 13.24
Malawi n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2
Mali 5.41 n.a. n.a. 2.6 6.72
Mauritania 1.7 0.09 0.36 4.78 -4.98
Mauritius 10.27 0.44 2.04 16.59 15.58
Morocco 0.19 1.8 0.85 1.78 2.64
Mozambique n.a. 0.66 2.88 0 10.03
Namibia 0.62 0 0.18 0.85 0.91
Niger n.a. 1.53 5.76 7.94 100.83
Nigeria 24.4 45.52 53.3 67.79 390.35
Rwanda n.a. n.a. 1.42 2.99 -0.41
Senegal 0.65 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.24
Seychelles n.a. n.a. 0.05 0.06 0.09
Sierra Leone n.a. 5.92 0.49 3.71 2.85
South Africa 8.86 17.81 47.47 40.74 454.41
Sudan n.a. 146.7 91.13 50.79 65.4
Tanzania n.a. 1.62 0.96 12.54 -3.82
Togo 0.03 1.85 0.31 4.58 2.7
Tunisia n.a. 0.22 n.a. 1.73 -0.34
Uganda 1 0.15 0.17 0.23 4.01
Zambia 5.53 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34
Zimbabwe 0.03 0.71 1.47 3.42 12.57
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Table A-IX: Overview of Chinese Financing Commitments in confirmed 
                       Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-07 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 65) 
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Continued 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 66) 
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Table A-X: Overview of Chinese Financing Commitments in confirmed  
                         Transport Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-07 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 67) 
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Continued 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 68) 
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Table A-XI: Overview of Chinese Financing Commitments in confirmed ICT  
                    Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-07 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 69) 
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Continued 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 70) 
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Table A-XII: Overview of Chinese Financing Commitments in Confirmed   
                        Water Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-07 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 71) 
Table A-XIII: Overview of Chinese Financing Commitments in Confirmed  
                      Multisector Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-07 
 
Source: Foster et al. (2008: 72) 
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Table A-XIV: African Countries’ Balance on Current Account (% of GDP),  
                          2001-2008, estimated: 2009-2014 
 
Source: IMF 2009: 188 
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Table A-XV: Diversification and Competitiveness 
 
Source: OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 166 
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Continued 
 
Source: OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 167 
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Table A-XVI: Access to Services 
 
Source: OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 180 
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Source: OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 181 
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Table A-XVII: Consumer Prices in Annual Percent Change 
 
Source: IMF 2009: 179 
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Table A-XVIII: Monetary Indicators 
 
OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 158 
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Continued 
 
OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 159 
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Table A-XIX: Employment and Remittances 
 
OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 190 
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Continued 
 
OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 190 
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Table A-XX: Corruption Perception Index 
 
OECD and African Development Bank 2009: 192 
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